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1 Introduction and Overview: The Gamble on Atlantic City and a History of
Trump Entertainment Resorts
“Legalized gambling was supposed to rescue the city from its obsolescence...”1
New Jersey voters approved casino gambling in 1976, and locals celebrated the promise of
economic revitalization.2 Atlantic City, then only one of two destinations for legal gaming in the
United States, rapidly evolved into the go-to location for east coast tables and slots. Nine Casinos
opened within four years, and Atlantic City enjoyed a surge in tourism, employment, and tax
revenue.3 Fifteen casinos operated on the New Jersey coast beginning in 1980—over half have
since closed their doors.4
The story of Trump Entertainment Resorts spans over three decades and has recently
concluded with the 2017 closure of its last, and greatest, casino.5 The foundation of Trump
Entertainment was laid in the earliest days of what was once a promising opportunity for investors,
but the casinos of Trump Entertainment Resorts would fall victim to poor marketing and
management, failed attempts to diversify, overwhelming third-party litigation, an economic
downturn, and a natural disaster in the years that followed. This article condenses three nearconsecutive bankruptcies filed by Trump Entertainment Resorts and analyzes the failures in
management and reorganization that led to its demise.

1.1 Background
Donald Trump received his first gaming license from the New Jersey Casino Control
Commission on March 15, 1982.6 Soon after, Mr. Trump opened Atlantic City’s tenth gaming
location, Harrah’s Boardwalk Hotel Casino at Trump Plaza (“Trump Plaza”), in a 1984, $210

1

Nick Paumgarten, The Death and Life of Atlantic City, The New Yorker (Sept. 7, 2015), http://perma.cc/B3CA2R9B.
2

Atlantic City Free Public Library, History of Casino Gambling in Atlantic City, http://perma.cc/YC8C-F2MU.

3

Id.

4

Id.

5

Maria Armental, Carl Icahn to Sell Trump Taj Mahal to Group Led by Hard Rock, The Wall Street Journal (Mar.
1, 2014, 9:25 PM), http://perma.cc/T93C-CKTQ.
State of N.J. Dep’t of Law and Pub. Safety Div. of Gaming Enf’t, Report to the Casino Control Commission In Re
The Application of Trump Plaza Corporation for a Casino License, The Qualifications of Donald J. Trump as Sole
Stockholder, Officer and Director Thereof and the Application of Donald J. Trump for a Casino Key Employee
License as Chief Executive Officer/President, (Oct. 16, 1981), http://perma.cc/VA3B-PXWW.
6

5

million joint-venture with Harrah’s.7 Approximately one year later, Mr. Trump purchased an
unfinished casino project from Hilton Hotels at the Atlantic City Marina, which became Trump’s
Castle Hotel and Casino (“Trump’s Castle”).8 Mr. Trump purchased the remaining interest in
Trump Plaza in 1986 following a legal dispute with his original partner, Harrah’s, over the
similarities between the hotels’ names.9 Donald Trump was the first to own more than one casino
property in Atlantic City.10
In 1987 Mr. Trump seized a second opportunity to take over a mid-construction casino
project by purchasing a controlling interest in “Resorts International,” the parent company of
Atlantic City’s first casino.11 Resorts International’s project, threatened by skyrocketing costs and
need for additional capital, was headed for failure. Mr. Trump sought to purchase the remaining
stock in Resorts International,12 intending to personally finance the project. A competing offer
from Merv Griffin led to highly publicized litigation between the two,13 the settlement of which
resulted in Mr. Trump’s sale of his entire interest in Resorts International and his retaining
ownership of what was to become the Trump Taj Mahal casino (“Taj Mahal”).14 The Taj Mahal
opened in April of 1990,15 and Mr. Trump became the sole owner of his third Atlantic City casino,
each of which would file bankruptcy in the next three years.
In 1995 Mr. Trump established a public holding corporation, Trump Hotels and Casino
Resorts (“THCR”), which assumed ownership of the newly reorganized Trump Plaza.16 THCR
7

Donald Janson, 10th and Largest Casino Opens in Atlantic City, The New York Times (May 15, 1984),
http://perma.cc/SYL8-5V3H.
8

Russ Buettner & Charles V. Bagli, How Donald Trump Bankrupted His Atlantic City Casinos, but Still Earned
Millions, The New York Times (June 11, 2016), http://perma.cc/5GN7-AKV9.
9

David Schwartz, Plaza Suite: History of Trump Plaza, Casino Connection AC, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Feb. 2, 2010),
http://perma.cc/KKK5-VW6N.
10

Id.

11

NewsBank, http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/0EB29D0F2B2C52E2?p=AWNB (last visited
Apr. 13, 2017).
Trump Offers to Buy Rest of Resorts’ Common Stock, Los Angeles Times (Dec. 22, 1987), http://perma.cc/AX3MVCYB.
12

13

Richard W. Stevenson, Griffin Wins Resorts in Deal With Trump, The New York Times (Apr. 15, 1988),
http://perma.cc/6FFQ-N9RS.
14

Takeover battle ends for Trump, Griffin, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 15, 1988, at § 3, at 3, http://perma.cc/X77S-P5FZ.

15

NewsBank, http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/0EAEA84E88B487F6?p=AWNB (last visited
Apr. 13, 2017).
16

Floyd Norris, Trump Plaza Casino Stock Trades Today on Big Board, The New York Times (Jun. 7, 1995),
https://perma.cc/7ZGX-Z7B7.
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filed Chapter 11 in 2004, and emerged from bankruptcy with a reduction of Mr. Trump’s stock
ownership from 56% to 27%, stepping down as CEO to become chairman of the board, as well as
a rebranding of THCR to Trump Entertainment Resorts (“TER,” “Debtor(s),” or the
“Company”).17
In response to the 2008 economic recession and the spread of legalized gambling to
neighboring states, selloffs, unsuccessful buyout attempts, and heavy cutbacks failed to save TER
from yet another Chapter 11 filing in 2009.18 Mr. Trump resigned as chairman of TER’s board
four days prior to the second filing in 5 years.19 Andrew Beal, owner of approximately $500 million
of TER’s $1.25 billion debt, partnered with Carl Icahn, a seasoned billionaire investor who bought
Beal’s debt in TER, in an attempt take over control of the casinos. 20 However, the takeover attempt
ultimately failed after the court favored the Trump backed Debtor plan over the plan proposed by
Beal and Icahn.21 Mr. Icahn would later take control of TER22 and become a proponent of Mr.
Trump in the 2016 presidential campaign.23 The 2009 TER reorganization diluted Mr. Trump’s
equity to 5% of new company stock for the “Trump” license in perpetuity along with warrants to
purchase an additional 5%.24 Mr. Trump would later file suit to have his name removed from the
properties.25
Lawsuits from various creditors forced an already struggling Trump Entertainment Resorts
into its third Chapter 11 bankruptcy in September 2014. TER became a subsidiary of Icahn
Enterprises upon emergence from the bankruptcy and went on to close and sell both the Plaza and

17

David Phillips, Reorganized Trump Entertainment Still Has The Donald Factor, Seeking Alpha (Mar. 27, 2006),
https://perma.cc/YC3Z-J8T3.
18

Declaration of John P. Burke, In Support of First Day Motions, Docket no. 19, Case no. 09-13654-JHW, filed
February 17, 2009 [hereinafter Burke Declaration].
Clare O’Conner, Fourth Time’s A Charm: How Donald Trump Made Bankruptcy Work For Him, Forbes (Apr. 29,
2011, 7:31 PM), http://perma.cc/JKK3-BMP7.
19

20

Verified Statement of Beal Bank Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a), Docket no. 901, Case No. 09-13654-JHW,
filed November 13, 2009.
Daniel Gill & Deborah Swann, The Bankruptcies Behind Trump’s ‘King of Debt’ Claim, BNA.com (Nov. 1,
2016), https://perma.cc/BU8D-U4LU.
21

22

Infra, note 530.

Jeff Cox, Carl Icahn: Here’s why I’m Supporting Trump for president, CNBC.com (Sept. 13, 2016, 5:45 PM),
http://perma.cc/6EK4-ZKPJ.
23

24

Gill & Swann, supra note 21.

25

Trump AC Casino Marks v. Trump Entertainment Resorts, No. C50-14, 2014 WL 3843844 (N.J. Super. Ch. Aug.
5, 2014).
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Taj Mahal.26 The properties of Trump Entertainment Resorts are now vacant and ready for the next
group of investors to rebrand and continue Atlantic City’s legacy as the gambling capital of the
United States’ east coast.

2 Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. 2004 Bankruptcy: Uncovering the
Sweetheart Deal
2.1 THCR 2004 Organizational, Operational, and Capital Structures
The corporate and capital structures of Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. (“THCR” or
“Debtor”) were far more complex prior to the 2004 bankruptcy filing. Donald Trump was the
majority stockholder of THCR.27 THCR’s principal assets were comprised of 59.9% in general
and limited partnership interests in THCR Holdings L.P. (“THCR Holdings”), its wholly owned
subsidiary. 28 A second subsidiary, THCR/LP, was a 3.5% limited partner of THCR Holdings.29
Further, Mr. Trump and two of his wholly owned companies, Trump Casinos, Inc. and Trump
Casinos II, Inc. (“TCI” and “TCI II”, respectively), were roughly 36% limited partners of THCR
Holdings.30 These interests afforded Mr. Trump a 56.4% direct and indirect voting power in the
governance of THCR.31 THCR Holdings owned substantially all the Debtor’s assets through its
subsidiaries, which are illustrated in the diagrams below. Thus, as the sole general partner, THCR’s
only operation was the ownership and management of THCR Holdings and its subsidiaries, Trump
Taj Mahal, Trump Plaza, and Trump Marina.32
THCR was funded primarily by equity, consisting of 29,904,764 publicly traded shares of
common stock and 1,000 shares of Class B common stock with a voting equivalency of 13,918,723
shares of common stock, owned exclusively by Mr. Trump, and long term secured mortgage

26

Armental, supra note 5.

27

See Declaration of Francis X. McCarthy, Jr., In Support of First Day Motions, Docket no. 2, Case no. 04-46898JHW, filed November 21, 2004 [hereinafter McCarthy Declaration]; See also Notice of Filing Exhibits to
Disclosure Statement Accompanying Joint Plan of Reorganization Dated as of December 15, 2004, Docket no. 371,
Case no. 04-46898-JHW, filed January 14, 2005.
28

See McCarthy Declaration, supra note 27.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Id.

8

notes.33 These secured mortgage notes totaled around $1.8 billion and were made up of two groups
of notes named after the THCR subsidiaries who issued them, the Trump Atlantic City (“TAC”)
Notes and the Trump Casino Holdings (“TCH”) Notes.34
The TAC Notes amounted to approximately $1.3 billion of the $1.8 billion, the amount of
which was the principal amount of 11.25% First Mortgage Notes Due 2006 issued by THCR
subsidiary, Trump Atlantic City Associates.35 The TAC Notes were guaranteed by Trump Atlantic
City Associates, which owned and operated Trump Taj Mahal and Trump Plaza, on a first priority
secured basis by all of the assets of Trump Atlantic City Associates.36
The TCH Notes constituted approximately $490 million of principal indebtedness issued
by Trump Casino Holdings, LLC.37 The $490 million was made up of $425 million of 11.625% of
First Priority Mortgage Notes and $68.8 million of 17.625% Second Priority Mortgage Notes, both
due in 2010.38 These were guaranteed by the TCH subsidiaries, Trump Marina, Trump Indiana,
and Trump 29, and were secured by the assets of the TCH subsidiaries on a first priority basis.39
Trump Hotels & Casino’s 2004 Corporate Structure

33

McCarthy Declaration, supra note 27.

34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Id.
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THCR Ownership Interests and Obligations Represented by TAC and TCH Notes 40

2.2 Triggering Events of the 2004 Bankruptcy
The Debtors noted a significant increase in competition since taking the company public
in 199541 despite the constant number of casinos operating in Atlantic City at the time.42
Specifically, one competitor cited by the Debtors as having a significant impact on THCR was the
July 2003 opening of the Borgota, a major casino and hotel venture between MGM Mirage, Inc.
and Boyd Gaming Corporation.43

40

Notice of Filing Exhibits to Disclosure Statement Accompanying Joint Plan of Reorganization Dated as of
December 15, 2004, Exhibit E, Docket no. 371-2, Case no. 04-46898-JHW, filed January 14, 2005; McCarthy
Declaration, supra note 27, Exhibit C.
41

McCarthy Declaration, supra note 27.

42

From 1995 to 2004, a constant 12 casinos were open and operating in Atlantic City. In fact, this number remained
constant from 1987 to 2006. See Center for Gaming Research, Atlantic City Casino Statistics, University of Nevada
Las Vegas, https://perma.cc/2NTJ-NHT9.
43

See McCarthy Declaration; See also Disclosure Statement Accompanying Joint Plan of Reorganization Dated as
of December 15, 2004, Docket no. 189, Case no. 04-46898-JHW, filed December 15, 2004 [hereinafter First
Disclosure Statement]; see generally https://www.theborgata.com/.
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THCR’s market share diminished, and its projected cash flows failed to meet stakeholders’
expectations due to the alleged increase in the Atlantic City gaming competition.44 The diminished
cash flows had two principle effects. First, although the Debtors had sufficient cash to fund casino
operations and honor interest payments for several years, THCR’s liquidity began to dry up in
2004.45 The Debtors used a 30-day grace period to make interest payments on both the TAC Notes
and TCH Notes, but ultimately were not able to fund a $73 million interest payment due on
November 1, 2004.46 Instead, the Debtors filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code on November 21, 2004.47 The second effect of the underwhelming cash flows
was the prevention of further investment into THCR’s casinos to expand and update their facilities
to remain attractive and competitive.48 As newer casinos opened in Atlantic City, Mr. Trump’s
casinos operated in an increasingly dated and shopworn condition.

2.3 Failed Investment Negotiations with DLJ Merchant Bank
After exploring new initiatives to improve the casino’s efficiencies and capital structure,
including reducing overhead, selling properties, and raising funds through new equity investments
by third parties, the Debtors began to restructure their debt out of court by hiring restructuring
counsel and forming the “Informal Noteholder Committees” to represent the TAC and TCH
Noteholder interests.49 THCR organized a “Special Committee” of directors of which Mr. Trump
was not a member.50
THCR received only one legitimate investment offer from DLJ Merchant Bank.51 The initial
discussions provided that DLJ Merchant Bank would inject $400 million in equity into the failing
casinos.52 Further, the TAC and TCH noteholders would receive cash and new notes at a
discounted value.53 However, after months of negotiating and a public announcement that an
44

McCarthy Declaration, supra note 27, at 7.

45

Id.

46

Id. at 8.

47

Voluntary Petition, Docket no. 1, Case no. 04-46898-JHW, filed November 21, 2004 [hereinafter 2004 Voluntary
Petition].
48

McCarthy Declaration, supra note 27, at 8.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Andrew Bary, The Debtor, Barron’s (Feb. 16, 2004, 12:01 AM), https://perma.cc/SS26-5GNG.

53

McCarthy Declaration, supra note 27, at 11.

11

agreement-in-principal had been reached to restructure THCR’s debt obligations in a prenegotiated Chapter 11 case,54 the negotiations fell through after the Debtors and DLJ Merchant
Bank could not reach a final agreement.55 According to one source citing a person close to DLJ,
“a particular group of bondholders,” presumably the TAC and TCH Noteholders, did not like the
offer they had been extended under the deal, which resulted in DLJ growing impatient with the
amount of time the deal was taking.56 As a result, having failed to secure necessary operational
funding, THCR initiated Chapter 11 proceedings to insulate itself from the impending interest
payment default.

2.4 First Plan Filing; Uncovering the “Sweetheart Deal;” Confirming a Plan
Trump Hotel & Casino Resorts filed its voluntary petition for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey on November 21, 2004.57
Although Mr. Trump’s casinos were plenty familiar with reorganization, this was the first filed by
THCR itself. Francis McCarthy, Jr. was THCR’s Executive Vice President of Corporate Finance
and Chief Financial Officer, a position he held since 1998, and served as an officer of each debtor
at the petition date.58 Mr. McCarthy associated with Mr. Trump’s casino empire in various
capacities beginning in 1992.59
The first Plan of reorganization and disclosure statement were filed on December 15,
2004. The Plan was pre-negotiated and agreed to by almost all key parties in interest prior to the
filing.61 Per the disclosure statement, the first proposed plan contemplated the following:
60

54

Trump Hotels and Casino Resorts Plans to File for Bankruptcy Protection by the End of September, 2004; Claims
Agreement Reached with Significant Number of Trump Hotels' Bondholders to Reorganize Under New
Management and New Financing, Hotel Online, https://perma.cc/KGB8-9HYP (last visited May 3, 2017).
55

McCarthy Declaration, supra note 27, at 12.

On Wall Street: Donald Trump’s secret to success, Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/e7464388-13ae11d9-aa94-00000e2511c8 (last visited May 3, 2017).
56

57

2004 Voluntary Petition, supra note 47.

58

McCarthy Declaration, supra note 27, at 2.

59

See Francis X. McCarthy, Jr., Executive Profile, Bloomberg.com, https://perma.cc/X8S2-KLBT.

60

Joint Plan of Reorganization Dated as of December 15, 2004, Docket No. 191, Case No. 04-46898-JHW, filed
December 15, 2004; First Disclosure Statement.
61

Trump casinos file for bankruptcy, NBCnews.com (Nov. 22, 2004, 3:10 PM), https://perma.cc/ZSM8-R46X.
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An exchange of the TAC and TCH Notes for New Common Stock, Cash and/or New Notes;62
A distribution of New Class A Warrants to existing beneficial owners of old THCR Common
Stock (excluding DJT), with an aggregate purchase price of $50 million ($14.60 per share),
and a distribution of New Class A Warrants Proceeds to TAC Noteholders on or as soon as
reasonably practicable after the first anniversary of the Effective Date;
A $55 million cash equity investment by DJT (or a controlled affiliate of DJT) and the
contribution of the TCH Second priority Notes beneficially owned by him to the Reorganized
Debtors, and material modifications to existing arrangements between the Debtors and DJT;
A Reverse Stock Split whereby 1000 shares of Old THCR Common Stock will be consolidated
into one share of New Common Stock on the Effective Date;
A reorganized board of directors of Reorganized THCR initially consisting of nine members,
five of whom will initially be Class A Directors acceptable to the TAC Noteholder Committee
and three of whom will initially be appointed by DJT (including DJT himself, as Chairman),
with DJT’s power to appoint future directors dependent on DJT’s percentage of ownership of
New Common Stock, and the continued election of Class A Directors for the Nomination
Period;
Repayment of a DIP Facility of up to $100 million secured by a first priority priming Lien on
Substantially all the assets of the Debtors during the pendency of the Chapter 11 Cases;63 and
An Exit Facility of up to $500 million secured by a first priority security interest in substantially
all the assets of the Reorganized Debtors upon the Effective Date, with a portion of such Exit
Facility to be used to repay the DIP Facility in full.64

Despite the Plan’s pre-negotiation and near-unanimous approval, Mr. Trump, the secured
creditors, and the “Special Committee” were met with resistance from the U.S. Trustee.65 Although
there was no official committee of unsecured creditors—since they were to be paid in full—the
U.S. Trustee formed an Official Committee of Equity Security Holders (“The Equity Committee”),
made of up THCR “non-insider” shareholders66 in order to combat what it viewed as a “sweetheart

See First Disclosure Statement, supra note 43, at 2-3 (The TAC Noteholders would receive “$777.3 million in
aggregate principal face amount of New Notes, 26,325,562 shares of New Common Stock”, and a Cash Distribution
that would equal the simple interest accruing on the New Notes at a 8.5% per annum rate. The TCH First Priority
Noteholders would receive “$425 million aggregate principal face amount of New Notes, $21.25 million in cash,
582,283 shares of New Common Stock,” and a cash distribution that would equal the simple interest accrued on the
New Notes at a 12.65% per annum rate. In exchange for their notes, TCH Second Priority Noteholders other than
Mr. Trump would receive “$47.7 million aggregate principle amount of New Notes, $2.3 million in cash, 145,116
shares of New Common Stock,” and a cash distribution equal to the simple interest accrued on the New Notes at a
8.5% per annum rate as well as $54.6 million at a rate of 18.625% per annum).
62

63

See Interim Stipulation and Order Providing For Use of Cash Collateral and Providing Adequate Protection,
Docket No 44, Case No. 04-46898-JHW, filed November 22, 2004.
64

First Disclosure Statement, supra note 43, at 1-2.

65

Gill & Swann, supra note 21.

66

Shareholder’s other than Trump and the directors that were a part of the Special Committee.
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deal” benefiting Mr. Trump.67 The Equity Committee filed an objection primarily because noninsider shareholders were to receive only $300,000 in estimated value as a result of the 1000-1
Reverse Stock Split, and reduced equity to 0.01% ownership interest in the reorganized company.68
An amended Plan was filed in response to the objection, on March 30, 200569 (and was
ultimately confirmed by the court 6 days later on April 5, 2005).70 Under the amended Plan, the
non-insider shareholders retained new shares and warrants and would share distributions totaling
$40 million–substantially better treatment than under the original plan.71 A portion of the
distributions included a $17.5 million slice of $25.15 million from the sale of Mr. Trump’s World’s
Fair site property offered up by Mr. Trump in the Amended Plan.72
Mr. Trump, on the other hand, traded $55 million in cash along with 25% of his stake in
Miss Universe LP, reduced ownership interest from 56% to approximately 27%, and forfeited the
CEO title and $1.5 million salary.73 However, Mr. Trump entered into an agreement to serve as
chairman of the board for a $2 million yearly fee.74 TER issued $1.25 billion of 8.25% Senior
Secured Notes due 2015.75
The Plan reorganized and simplified the Company’s corporate structure upon emergence
from the 2004 filing. Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts’ moniker changed to Trump Entertainment

Gill & Swann, supra note 21; Appointment of Equity Security Holders’ Committee, Case No. 04-46898, Docket
No. 292, filed December 30, 2004.
67

68

Objection of Official Committee of Equity Security Holders to (A) Emergency Motion of Debtors For Entry of
Interim and Final Orders (I) Authorizing Post-Petition Secured Superpriority Financing Pursuant To Bankruptcy
Code Sections 105(a), 362, 364(c)(1), 364(c)(2), 363(c)(3) and 364(d) and (II) Setting Final Hearing Pursuant to
Bankruptcy Rule 4001(c) and (B) Emergency Motion of Debtors for Entry of Interim and Final Stipulation and
Order Providing For Use of Cash Collateral and Providing Adequate Protection, Case No. 04-46898, Docket No.
297, filed December 31, 2004.
69

Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of THCR/LP Corporation, Et. Al. Dated as of March 30, 2005,
Docket no. 901, Case no. 04-46898, filed March 30, 2004.
70

(1) Order Confirming Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of THCR/LP Corporation Et. Al. Dated as of
March 30, 2005, and (2) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Docket no. 976, Case no. 04-46898-JHW,
entered April 5, 2005.
71

Gill & Swann, supra note 21.

72

Id.

73

Phillips, supra note 17.

74

Id.

75

Burke Declaration, supra note 18.
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Resorts, Inc.76 The diagram below illustrates the new structure of the entities after confirmation of
the amended plan.
Debtors’ Post-Reorganization Corporate Structure

3 Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc. 2009 Bankruptcy: Here We Go
Again.
3.1 Changes in THCR Capital Structure
Following the 2004 Chapter 11 cases, the reorganized TER entered into a $500 million
secured credit facility in 2005.77 The line of credit was obtained in order to repay the $100 million
DIP financing assumed in the prior reorganization.78 Then, to repay the outstanding amounts and
the $6.6 million in transactional fees from the 2005 credit facility, the Debtors consolidated their
long term debt as a senior secured credit facility with Beal Bank and Beal Bank Nevada, with an
outstanding principal balance of $493,250,000.79 This facility began as an initial $393.3 million
loan, which grew by $100 million, representing the amounts borrowed to finish construction of the
Chairman Tower, a new hotel tower at the Trump Taj Mahal.80
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Gill & Swann, supra note 21.
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Burke Declaration, supra note 18, at 6.
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Id. at 10; Infra, note 97.
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Burke Declaration, supra note 18, at 10.
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3.2 Triggering Events of the 2009 Bankruptcy
As TER emerged from the 2004 Chapter 11 Bankruptcy cases, the legalized gambling
economy in the Northeast—and the country’s economy, generally—were changing for the worse.
Since Atlantic City legalized gambling in 1978, the city was the gambling mecca on the eastern
seaboard. As the second largest gaming market in the United States, Atlantic City served the 30
million adults in the New York-Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington D.C. corridor that were
within, at most, 3-hours from the city center.81 In 2007, however, a new wave of competitive forces
presented itself. The largest of these was the opening of multiple new casino properties in southeast
Pennsylvania.82 Importantly, the economic recession hit the United States in late 2008, and
impacted virtually every industry.83 Specific to the Atlantic City gaming economy, New Jersey
commercial casino revenues dropped from $4.921 billion in 2007 to 4.503 billion in 2008.84
In addition to market decline and recession, the City Council of Atlantic City passed an
ordinance banning smoking on casino floors in early 2008.85 Although, due to the economic
downturn, the City Council delayed its effective date and ultimately withdrew the ordinance,
instituting instead a requirement that 75% of the casino floors be non-smoking.86 Although they
could not quantify the monetary effect the smoking ban had on their revenues, the Debtors asserted
significant negative impact on casino revenues and guest traffic.87
As a result of these external circumstances, TER defaulted on the interest payments due on
the $1.25 billion Senior Secured Notes extended in the 2004 reorganization and voluntarily entered
their second companywide reorganization.88
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See Burke Declaration, supra note 18, at 11.
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American Gaming Association, 2009 State of the States: The AGA Survey of Casino Entertainment (2009),
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2008), https://perma.cc/64CY-Y73H.
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3.3 Bankruptcy Petition and Commencement of the Case
On February 13, 2009, four days before TER filed its voluntary petition for Chapter 11,
Mr. Trump and daughter Ivanka Trump stepped down from TER’s board.89 The Debtors were still
overleveraged at the time of the filing and burdened with roughly $1.7 billion of consolidated
debt.90 The prepetition debt was owned primarily by two groups of creditors at odds throughout
the entirety of the 2009 chapter 11 proceedings.
The first group was Beal Bank and Beal Bank Nevada, (“Beal,” “Beal Bank,” “First Lien
Lender Claims”) whose claims amounted to approximately $486 million as a result of the 2007
Credit Facility.91 The debt was secured by a first priority lien on substantially all of TER’s assets.92
The second group were holders of TER’s 8.5% Senior Secured Notes Due 2015, (“Second Lien
Note Claims,” or the “Ad Hoc Committee”), which were issued as a result of the 2004 Chapter 11
cases, and had an outstanding principal amount of $1.25 billion.93 These notes were granted a
second priority lien on TER’s hotels and casinos.94
First Day Motions
Among the Debtor’s numerous first day motions were a motion for joint administration,
use of cash collateral, utility continuation, cash management order, employee continuation, taxes
and fees motion, customer claims motion, critical vendor motion, PACA motion, reclamation
claims motion, Ordinary Course Professionals motion, Keystone professionals motion, and
applications to hire counsel.95 These motions were largely unopposed, and the court generally
granted the relief sought by the debtors.96
O’Connor, supra note 19; Voluntary Petition, Docket no. 1, Case no. 09-13654-JHW, Filed February 17, 2009
[hereinafter 2009 Voluntary Petition].
89
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O’Connor, supra note 19.
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See generally Burke Declaration, supra note 18.

See Order Directing the Joint Administration of Debtors’ Chapter 11 Cases Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 1015(b), Docket No. 38, Case No. 09-13654-JHW, entered February 18, 2009; Order (A)
Authorizing Continued Use of Existing Business Forms and Records and Maintenance of Existing Corporate Bank
Accounts and Cash Management Systems, and (B) Approving Investment Guidelines, Docket No. 43, Case No. 0913654-JHW, entered February 19, 2009; Order (A) Authorizing the Debtors to (1) Pay Prepetition Employee Wages,
Salaries, Bonuses and Related Items, (2) Reimburse Prepetition Employee Business Expenses, (3) Make Payments
96
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3.4 The Plan Carousel
The 2009 TER Chapter 11 Cases involved numerous competing plans and shifting interests
between the players involved: The Joint Debtors, Donald Trump, the Ad Hoc Committee of
Holders of 8.5% Senior Secured Notes, Beal Bank, and Carl Icahn. Over a 9-month span, battle
lines shifted, players switched teams, and new lenders entered the game.
“The Insider Plan”: The Debtor’s First Joint Plan
On August 3, 2009, the Debtor’s filed a Disclosure Statement (“Debtors’ First Disclosure
Statement”),97 as well as a Joint Plan of Reorganization (“Debtors’ First Joint Plan”).98 At the time
of filing, the Debtors, Mr. Trump, and Beal Bank had mutual goals.99 Based on their own estimates,
the value of TER’s casino and hotel operations were less than the amount of the First Lien Lender
Claims held by Beal Bank.100 Thus, the holders of the Ad Hoc Committee’s Second Lien Note
for which Payroll Deductions Were Made, (4) Make Prepetition Contributions and Pay Benefits Under Employee
Benefit Plans, (5) Pay Prepetition Insurance Premiums, and (6) Pay All Costs Incidental to the Foregoing Payments
and Contributions and (B) Authorizing and Directing Applicable Banks and Other Financial Institutions to Receive,
Process, Honor and Pay Any and All Checks Drawn on the Debtors’ Accounts for Such Purposes, Docket No. 50,
Case No. 09-13654-JHW, entered February 19, 2009; Order Approving Motion for Order Authorizing Debtors to
Pay Prepetition Trust Fund Taxes and Gaming Taxes and Fees, Docket No. 51, Case No. 09-13654-JHW, entered
February 19, 2009; Order Authorizing Payment of Certain Prepetition Customer-Related Claims and Obligations,
Docket No. 52, Case No. 09-13654-JHW, entered February 19, 2009; Order Under 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 331
Establishing Procedures for Interim Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses of Professionals, Docket No.
54, Case No. 09-13654-JHW, entered February 19, 2009; Final Order Authorizing the Debtors to Pay Certain
Prepetition Claims of Critical Vendors and Approving Procedures Related Thereto; Docket No. 58, Case No. 0913654-JHW, entered February 20, 2009; Amended Order Pursuant to Sections 327, 328, 363(c)(1) and 1108 of the
Bankruptcy Code Authorizing the Employment of Professionals on Non-Debtor TER Keystone Development Co.,
LLC Utilized in the Ordinary Course of Business, Docket No. 80, Case No. 09-13654-JHW, entered February 27,
2009; Order Pursuant to Sections 327, 328, 363(c)(1) and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code Authorizing the
Employment of Professionals Utilized in the Ordinary Course of Business, Docket No. 81, Case No. 09-13654JHW, entered February 27, 2009; Order (A) Prohibiting Utilities from Altering, Refusing or Discontinuing Services
on Account of Prepetition Claims and (B) Establishing Procedures for Determining Requests for Additional
Adequate Assurance, Docket No. 155, Case No. 09-13654-JHW, entered Mach 20, 2009; Final Order (I)
Authorizing Use of Cash Collateral Pursuant to Section 363 of Bankruptcy Code and (II) Providing Adequate
Protection to Prepetition Secured Parties Pursuant to Sections 361, 362, and 364 of Bankruptcy Code, Docket No.
157, Case No. 09-13654-JHW, entered March 23, 2009.
Disclosure Statement for Debtors’ Joint Plan Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, Docket no. 519, Case no.
09-13654, filed August 3, 2009 [hereinafter Debtors’ First Disclosure Statement].
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Debtors’ Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, Docket no. 518, Case no. 0913654-JHW, filed August 3, 2009.
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Debtors’ First Disclosure Statement, supra note 97.
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Claims had no value underpinning their security interests and would be treated as wholly
unsecured creditors.101 The Debtors First Joint Plan estimated an approximate recovery of 94% for
Beal, but would extend repayment to December of 2020, rather than 2012, with a below market
interest rate and allowed flexibility of cash interest payments.102 Beal and Mr. Trump would also
invest $100 million into the Company in exchange for 100% of the equity interests in a reorganized
TER.103 Mr. Trump would regain control of his casino empire, and the Ad Hoc Committee
Noteholders would receive nothing under the proposed Plan; neither would unsecured claim and
equity interest holders.104
Ad Hoc Committee Objection; Appointment of Examiner
As one would imagine, the Ad Hoc Committee strongly opposed the Plan proposal. In
response, they filed a motion to terminate the exclusive period to file proposed Plans pursuant to
1121(d) of the Bankruptcy Code and to adjourn the hearing considering TER’s proposed plan.105
The Ad Hoc Committee argued that the exclusivity period should end because the “Insider Plan”
breached the Debtors’ fiduciary duty to maximize creditor recovery and violated the priority ladder
rule by only favoring Beal Bank and Mr. Trump, while wiping every other creditor out.106 Further,
the Ad Hoc Committee stated they had a Plan proposal in-wait in the event exclusivity was
lifted.107 The Ad Hoc Committee asserted that its alternative plan was “fully documented and
financed” and was “ready to go” if the motion was granted.108 The Ad Hoc Committee also moved
for a court appointed examiner from the U.S. Trustee’s Office to review the Debtors’ proposed
plan, citing the Debtors’ “charade and stall tactic[s]” in their plan process.”109
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Id. at 4, 5.
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Id. at 3
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Id. at 4.
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Emergency Motion of the Ad Hoc Committee of Holders of 8.5% Senior Secured Notes Due 2015 For an Order
(A) Terminating the Debtors’ Exclusive Periods in Which to File a Plan of Reorganization and Solicit Acceptances
Thereto, and (B) Adjourning the Hearing to Approve the Debtors’ Disclosure Statement for Debtors’ Joint Plan of
Reorganization, Docket no. 530, Case no. 09-13654-JHW, filed August 11, 2009.
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Id. at 3.
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Id.
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Id. at 3.
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Motion of the Ad Hoc Committee of Holders of the 8.5% Senior Secured Notes Due 2015 for Appointment of
Examiner Pursuant to Section 1104(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, Docket no. 531, p. 8, Case no. 09-13654-JHW, filed
August 11,2009.
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Over the Debtors’ objection to lift exclusivity and appointment of an examiner, the Court
granted both motions.110 In a hearing on August 27, 2009, Judge Wizmur stated that an examiner
was necessary to determine if the Debtors’ proposed their plan in good faith, as well as whether
Mr. Trump’s timely resignation was to protect his own interests or with the intent to regain control
of the Company after the Chapter 11 proceedings wiped out the Debtors’ monstrous debt and old
equity holders.111 If Mr. Trump acted under the latter, the Plan would not have been proposed in
good faith, a requirement for confirmation under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3), and would be
unconfirmable.112 It appears the court determined the debtor and its insiders had too much leverage
in the case with exclusivity intact and appointment of an examiner was needed in order to put the
parties on notice that no one was going to give anyone else the “bum’s rush” in these cases. 113
Judge Wizmur leveled the playing field.

3.5 Ad Hoc Committee Proposed Plan
As promised, on the same day Judge Wizmur lifted the exclusivity period and appointed
the examiner, the Ad Hoc Committee filed its Disclosure Statement and Joint Plan for
Reorganization (the “First Ad Hoc Plan”).114 The Ad Hoc Noteholders contended the Plan
provided more recoveries to creditors, which would in turn lead to a more successful
reorganization.115 The First Ad Hoc Plan called for the Debtors’ to receive a contribution of $175
million in new equity capital in the form of a Rights Offering, backstopped by the Ad Hoc
Committee, issued to all the holders of General Unsecured Claims who were Accredited
Investors.116
110

Order Granting Motion of the Ad Hoc Committee of Holders of the 8.5% Senior Secured Notes Due 2015 For an
Order (A) Terminating the Debtors’ Exclusive Periods in Which to File a Plan of Reorganization and Solicit
Acceptances Thereto, and (B) Adjourning the Hearing to Approve the Debtors’ Disclosure Statement for Debtors’
Joint Plan of Reorganization, Docket no. 613, Case no. 09-13654-JHW, Filed August 31, 2009; Order Granting
Motion of the Ad Hoc Committee of Holders of the 8.5% Senior Secured Notes Due 2015 for Appointment of
Examiner Pursuant to Section 1104 of the Bankruptcy Code, Docket no. 679, Case no. 09-13654-JHW, filed
September 15, 2009.
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Brendan Pierson, Trump Entertainment Plan Will Face Examiner: Report, Law360.com (Aug. 28, 2009, 5:53
PM), https://perma.cc/BWB5-UE4P.
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See Id.

Get/be given the bum’s rush: to be forced to leave a place where people do not want you, https://perma.cc/Y7EXVCKV (last visited May 5, 2017).
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Disclosure Statement for Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code Proposed by the
Ad Hoc Committee of Holders of 8.5% Senior Secured Notes Due 2015, Docket no. 617, Case no. 09-13654-JHW,
filed August 31, 2009.
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Id. at 7 (Under a rights offering vehicle, the General Unsecured Claim holders who were accredited investors will
be eligible to buy additional shares of New Common Stock in the reorganized company in proportion to their
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Additionally, the Plan contemplated the sale of Trump Marina Hotel Casino to Costal
Marina, LLP, for $75 million, “resulting in the infusion of immediate value to the estate in
exchange for the elimination of the large cash drain caused by the Trump Marina’s losses and the
costs associated with prosecuting the litigation pending with the Costal Parties[.]”117 Further, the
First Lien Lenders would get new debt at a court determined interest rate, along with the $75
million in proceeds from the potential Trump Marina sale and Rights Offering.118 Finally, the
General Unsecured Claim holders would receive a pro rata share of 5% of the common stock after
reorganization, while the holders of General Unsecured Claims not eligible to participate in the
Rights Offering would “receive a cash distribution on account of their claims of up to $0.01 per
$1.00 of such Claims.”119
Debtors’ Objection
In their objection, the Debtors argued that the Ad Hoc Committee’s Plan was flawed because
it failed to disclose that the Senior Noteholders and Unsecured Creditors recovery was “minimal
and highly speculative,” that the $175 million cash infusion had not been committed, and there
was no explanation as to how Beal Bank’s $488 million of first lien debt was being treated.120 The
Debtors’ also claimed, without any objective support, that the Trump Marina sale for $75 million
was “highly unlikely to take place.”121

3.6 Ad Hoc Committee Motion for Compliance with Bankruptcy Procedure
During a telephone conference on October 21, 2009, counsel for the Ad Hoc Committee
moved the court to require Beal Bank and Mr. Trump to comply with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 2019.122 Under this rule, in a Chapter 11 reorganization case, “every entity or committee
existing stake in the company. See Offering, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Since it is uncertain how
many General Unsecured Claim holders will take advantage of the offer, which in turn leads to uncertainty in how
much capital would be raised, the Ad Hoc Committee pledged to buy the New Common Stock that went
unpurchased, or to “backstop” the rights offering).
117
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Debtors’ Objection to the Amended Disclosure Statement for Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code Proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee of Holders of 8.5% Senior Secured Noted Notes Due
2015, Docket no. 744, Case no. 09-13654-JHW, filed September 29, 2009.
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Letter from Judge Wizmur to Counsel Regarding Directive Requiring Beal Bank and Donald Trump to Comply
with Rule 2019, Docket no. 825, Case no. 09-13-654, filed October 22, 2009.
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representing more than one creditor or equity security holder . . . shall file a verified statement”
setting forth their “name and address . . . [and] the nature and amount of each disclosable interest
held in relation to the debtor as of the date the entity was employed or the group or committee was
formed.”123 Judge Wizmur ordered compliance with the rule, reasoning that because “both Beal
Bank and Donald Trump qualify as ‘entities’ who represent more than one creditor or equity
security holder in the case,” compliance with Rule 2019 was required.124 Beal and Mr. Trump were
given until November 13, 2009 to file their verified statements given the short notice.125 Both Beal
and Mr. Trump filed verified statements on the due date, which set out their interests in relation to
the Debtor.126 Both were consistent with the representations they had made throughout the Chapter
11 cases.

3.7 Approval of Both Proposed Disclosure Statements
After repetitious Plan modification submissions back and forth between the parties, the
Court entered a Joint Order approving the proposed Disclosure Statements by both parties on
November 5, 2009.127 In the Debtors’ modified disclosure statement, Beal and Mr. Trump agreed
to increase their contribution on account of receiving new equity to $113.9 million from the
originally proposed $100 million.128 The extra $13.9 million was in the form of a cash payment to
the Second Lien Noteholder Claim holders, which would represent a 1.11% distribution on their
$1.25 billion claim.129 On the other front, the noteholders Amended Ad Hoc Plan increased
equity’s capital contribution to $225 million and provided that Beal Bank would receive the $75
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Id. at 2; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019(a) - (c)(2)(B).
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Verified Statement of Beal Bank Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a), Docket No. 901, Case No. 09-13654-JHW,
Filed November 13, 2009; Verified Statement of Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman LLP and Brown & Connery
LLP Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a), Docket No. 902, Case No. 09-13654-JHW, filed November 13, 2009.
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Joint Order Approving (i) Disclosure Statements and Related Notice and Solicitation Procedures and (ii) The
Notice and Objection Procedures for Confirmation of Plans of Reorganization, Docket no. 877, Case no. 09-13654JHW, filed November 5, 2009 [hereinafter Statement Order].
Modified Second Amended and Restated Disclosure Statement For Debtors’ Joint Plan Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, Docket no. 864, Case no. 09-13654-JHW, filed November 4, 2009.
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million from the sale of Trump Marina.130 The deadline to vote on the Plans was set for December
28, 2009.131

3.8 Donald Trump Switches Teams
On November 16, 2009, nine days after the competing Plans and Disclosure Statements
were approved by Judge Wizmur, Mr. Trump sent a letter132 to Beal Bank withdrawing his support
from the Debtors’ Plan, citing the “expensive and distracting litigation” surrounding the
competition for getting a plan approved, and urged creditor support of the senior noteholder’s Ad
Hoc Plan.133 Mr. Trump stated in his letter that the Examiner Order, The Scheduling Order, and
“other bases” gave him a right to terminate the purchase agreement related to the Debtors’ Plan.134
Further, the letter claimed that a “Material Adverse Effect [had] occurred and that the Debtors
estates [had] become burdened with heretofore unprojected and unanticipated massive
administrative and other expenses resulting from, among other things, the inability of the parties
to resolve the competing plan litigation.”135 Mr. Trump issued the following statement after
withdrawing support of the Debtors’ Plan:
“Had circumstances not changed, I would have aggressively continued to pursue
the [D]ebtors’ plan with the objective of acquiring control of and revitalizing a
company that I have not run for many years. However, the [D]ebtor’s plan has
become mired in highly expensive and distracting litigation that threatens the entire
enterprise. It is in the company’s best interests for all parties to coalesce around
the noteholders’ plan, and I urge them to do so.”136
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Third Amended Disclosure Statement For Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code Proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee of Holders of 8.5% Senior Secured Notes Due 2015, Docket no. 872,
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In exchange for his support, Mr. Trump was offered 5% equity in the reorganized company,
as well as a warrant package and a release.137 Mr. Trump agreed to enter into amended trademark
and service deals for the casinos’ continued use of the “Trump” license, and released all claims
against the Debtors.138
Beal Bank’s Motion to File a Competing Plan
As a result of Mr. Trump withdrawing support of the Debtors Joint Plan, Beal Bank
contacted the Debtors on November 19, 2009 and proposed an agreement with material
amendments to the Debtors’ Plan.139 TER rejected the agreement, which forced Beal Bank to move
the court to enter an order modifying the Plan confirmation schedule so that they could introduce
their own Plan (“Beal Bank Motion”), and for the court to temporarily suspend solicitation of the
Ad Hoc Plan.140 Beal Bank proposed five amendments to the Debtors’ Plan:




Beal Bank would adopt the mid-point valuation the Ad Hoc Plan presented, which “values the
Debtors at approximately $13.9 million more than the outstanding principal of the First Lien
Lender Claims.141 This was a significant proposal because Beal Bank at the Debtors had
disputed this valuation.142 Thus, by conceding to this valuation, they would “eliminate
potentially complex and protracted disputes over competing valuations,” and therefore cutting
out the costly litigation cited by Mr. Trump. 143
Instead of the $114 million in equity Beal Bank and Mr. Trump originally offered, Beal Bank
would provide a $225 million Rights Offering to the Second Lien Note Claim holders to
purchase common stock in the reorganized Debtor.144 This Rights Offering would be
backstopped by Beal Bank for a fee equal to a 10% equity stake after reorganization, as
opposed to the 20% equity stake fee proposed in the Ad Hoc Plan.145
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Beal Bank would reduce their secured First Lien Lender Claim by $100 million.146 This was
to be paid from the Rights Offering.147
The balance of Beal Bank’s secured First Lien Lender Claim would be converted into common
stock.148
Unsecured creditors, including Second Lien Note Claim holders, would be distributed common
stock with a 5% stake, an identical value and offer in the Ad Hoc Plan.149

Further, Beal Bank asserted that the Examiner’s investigation into Mr. Trump’s
involvement in the plan formulation with the Debtor would become moot because of Mr. Trump’s
withdraw of support for the Debtors’ Plan, thus eliminating more timely and costly litigation.150
The reorganized Debtor would emerge from Chapter 11 with an even balance sheet at worst.151
Although solicitation had not yet commenced, Beal Bank stated this was a minor, but necessary
Order, so that their Plan would be on the same schedule as the Ad Hoc Plan. In their objection to
Beal Bank’s motion, the Ad Hoc Committee claimed, among other things, that Beal Bank was now
taking a completely opposite stance, and essentially adopting the same plan and solicitation
process as themselves, a position which “Beal Bank asserted was illegal just over a month ago.”152
On a December 3, 2009 teleconference hearing between Judge Wizmur and Debtor’s
Counsel, Beal Bank, and the Ad Hoc Committee, the Court allowed Beal Bank to file their
proposed Plan the next day.153 During the hearing, the Debtors announced they would no longer
pursue their own but would resort to the Ad Hoc Plan since theirs was “dead in the water” after
Mr. Trump switched teams.154 Also during the hearing, the court and the parties agreed on the need
for discussions to continue and for the process to move along after the Debtors had been in a
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S.S.B. and Beal Bank Nevada for an Order Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006: (A) Fixing Reduced Time for
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Transcript of December 3, 2009 Hearing Before the Honorable Judith H. Wizmur United States Bankruptcy
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“stalemate.”155 During the hearing, the parties seemed optimistic that a settlement could be reached
if they continued forward.156 Objections had to be filed by December 9, 2009.157 The next day,
December 4, 2009, Beal Bank filed their proposed Plan158 and Disclosure Statement.159 On
December 9, Mr. Trump, Debtors, and Ad Hoc all filed timely objections to the Beal Bank Plan.160

3.9 Enter Carl Icahn, Savior
Beal Bank and the Ad Hoc Committee would never come to an agreement. As a result of
the breakdown in negotiations, on December 11, 2009, Beal Bank filed its Notice with the Court
that Icahn Partners, owned by Carl Icahn, purchased 51% of Beal Bank’s First Lien Lender claims
for $229 million in cash.161 According to Beal Bank, the inability to reach an agreement hinged on
the fact that they “could not get comfortable with the ability of the Ad Hoc Committee . . . to walk
away from their plan obligations without any meaningful protection to the estate and its other
creditors.”162 Thus, Beal Bank sought out Icahn for a joint sponsorship in their proposed deal and
“made a proposal that was simply too attractive to pass up. . . . Icahn Group [was] willing to . . .
put their money where their mouth [was]. . . .”163
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3.10 Trump vs. Icahn: Competing Personalities and Plans
On January 5, 2010 both the Trump/Debtor backed Ad Hoc Committee and the newly
formed Beal/Icahn partnership filed Amended Disclosure Statements.164
Ad Hoc Committee’s Proposals
The Ad Hoc Committee’s Fifth Amended Disclosure Statement largely advocated for the
same terms proposed prior to gaining Mr. Trump and the Debtors’ support. In sum, the key terms
laid out in the Disclosure statement were as follows:











$225 million equity rights offering to Accredited Investors, which is 70% of the New Common
Stock, backstopped by the Ad Hoc Committee, which in return will receive fee in the form of
20% of New Common Stock. Debtors must consent to material change or termination.
Non-Accredited Investor Second Lien noteholders and General Unsecured Claim holders and
Eligible Holders who do not exercise rights in the rights offering will both receive cash equal
to the value of the Accredited Investors rights.
Second Lien Noteholders and General Unsecured Claim holders would receive pro rata share
of 5% of the New Common Stock, or a cash equivalent of such, as well as subscription rights
to acquire up to 70% of the New Common Stock.
Mr. Trump and his affiliated parties will receive 535,714 shares of New Common Stock, 5%
of the new outstanding common stock, in exchange for waiving all claims against the Debtor
and entering into the new Trademark deal.
Possible sale of Trump Marina for $75 million to Costal Marina, the proceeds of which would
go to Beal Bank as First Lien Lenders
$125 million Rights Offering proceeds and new debt to First Lien Lenders.165

Further, if the Plan was confirmed, the Debtors’ would be provided DIP Financing with
the Ad Hoc Committee, totaling $45 million at a 10% interest rate.166
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Modified Sixth Amended Disclosure Statement for Joint plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code Proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee of Holders of 8.5% Senior Secured Notes Due 2015 and the
Debtors; Docket No. 1076, Case No. 09-13654-JHW, filed January 5, 2010 [hereinafter Ad Hoc Sixth Disclosure
Statement]; Fifth Amended Disclosure Statement for Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code Proposed by Beal Bank and Icahn Partners, Docket No. 1072, Case No. 09-13654-JHW, filed January 5, 2010
[hereinafter Beal Icahn Fifth Amended Disclosure Statement].
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Beal and Icahn Key Proposals
Under the Beal/Icahn Plan, Mr. Icahn would provide a $45 million DIP loan on the date of
confirmation167 to ensure “the Debtors maintain[ed] adequate liquidity.”168 The Plan contemplated
a $225 million Rights Offering that would consummate only if two conditions were met.169 First,
50% or more of the stock issued in the Rights Offering had to be subscribed and paid for.170
Second, Beal and Mr. Icahn opposed a confirmation hearing on the Ad Hoc Plan.171 One of the
reasons set forth to justify the condition was that the Ad Hoc plan allegedly failed requirements
set forth in Section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code.172 As noted in the Disclosure Statement,
Ad Hoc Committee members held approximately 61% of the Second Lien Notes.173 Thus, if they
were not to elect to participate in the Rights offering, which was expected, the 50% involvement
condition would not be met and a Rights Offering would not take place.174
Whether or not the Rights Offering took place would determine the course of the Plan. If a
Rights Offering were to take place, partial proceeds would be used to reduce First Lien Lender
Claims by $100 million; the balance would be converted into an equity stake.175 If the Rights
Offering were to fail to take place, however, the full balance of the First Lien Lender Claims would
convert to equity. Further, the $45 million DIP Loan was to be repaid from the proceeds of the
Rights Offering should it take place.176 If not, then then the DIP Loan was to be converted into
equity, and Mr. Icahn would invest an additional $80 million to offset lost Rights Offering funds.177
Importantly, Second Lien Note Claim holders and General Unsecured claim Holders would receive
a pro rata cash distribution of approximately $13.9 million, but only if the Ad Hoc Plan was not
heard in court due to the alleged §1129(a)(10) deficiencies.178
167
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3.11 Ad Hoc Plan wins
On April 12, 2010 the court confirmed the Ad Hoc Plan although both plans were deemed
confirmable.179 One of components of the Plan at issue were the Trademark agreements and
releases between the Debtors and Mr. Trump. In analyzing the fairness of the agreement to other
parties, the court stated that “we see no unfairness in the willingness of the AHC members to carve
out a piece of the reorganized equity in exchange for the anticipated benefits of the modified
agreements with the Trump Parties.”180 The court also recognized the value of the Trump brand,
and how it’s worldwide recognition and Mr. Trump’s reality television celebrity would benefit the
newly reorganized Debtors. “The debtors’ identification with the Trump Organization raises its
profile in the gaming industry.”181 According to one source, the Debtors valued their trademarks
following the Chapter 11 cases at $8.7 million.182 The order confirming the plan was entered on
May 7, 2010.183

4

Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc. 2014 Bankruptcy: Taj and Plaza Left
Behind

4.1 More on Atlantic City’s Market Decline
The Atlantic City gaming industry thrived between 1978 and 1985 with an average annual
growth of approximately 55%.184 Growth rates slowed from 1986 to 2006, and the casinos
collectively maintained a 4% to 5% rise year over year.185 Recently, the Atlantic City gaming
industry suffers near-consistent annual losses of approximately 7.5% since 2007.186 New Jersey
tax revenues correlate with these findings—New Jersey reported casino tax revenue at an all-time
high of over $500,000 in 2006 and a low, not seen since 1986, of approximately $200,000 in
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Opinion on Confirmation, Docket No. 1434, Case No. 09-13654-JHW, entered April 12, 2010.

180
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However, TER apparently did not “specifically allocate the entire sum to the Trump licensing agreement.” Supra,
note 21.
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Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code Proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee of Holders of 8.5%
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2015.187 The industry’s downturn is still generally thought to be the result of neighboring states’
legalization of gambling, an economic recession in the mid-2000s, the rising influence of internet
gaming, sole reliance on the industry to support Atlantic City’s local economy, and a failure to sell
the Atlantic City brand.188
Atlantic City Gaming Market Decline189
$6,000,000,000
$5,000,000,000
$4,000,000,000
$3,000,000,000
$2,000,000,000
$1,000,000,000
$0
FY 2006

FY 2007

FY 2008

FY 2009

FY 2010

FY 2011

FY 2012

FY 2013

LTM
8/31/14

4.2 Triggering Events of the 2014 Bankruptcy
Robert Griffin, TER’s then and final Chief Executive Officer, noted the declining Atlantic
City market as the leading circumstance of TER’s 2014 filing in an introductory motion supporting
the bankruptcy.190 Mr. Griffin explained TER’s market share was diluted by the 2012 opening of
the “Revel” casino in Atlantic City, significant improvements to existing competing casinos,
187

New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement, Atlantic City Gaming Industry Casino Revenue Fund Taxes and
Fees Source Report, http://perma.cc/YKQ9-WHEZ.
Interestingly, the Creditors’ Committee claimed a competing casino, the Tropicana, had “flourished” and increased
2013 revenues by 29.9%. Infra note 575, at 43.
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Debtors’ Motion for Entry of Order (I) Rejecting Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Trump Taj Mahal
Associates, LLC and Unite Here Local 54 Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1113(C) and (II) Implementing Terms of
Debtors’ Proposal Under 11 U.S.C. § 1113(B), Docket no. 134, Case no. 14-12103, filed September 26, 2014
[hereinafter CBA Motion].
189

Declaration of Robert Griffin in Support of Debtors’ Chapter 11 Petitions and First-day Motions and
Applications at 15, Docket no. 2, Case no. 14-12103, filed September 9, 2014 [hereinafter Griffin Declaration].
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competition from neighboring states, and a general economic decline in southern New Jersey.191
Mr. Griffin went on to relate the negative effects of Superstorm Sandy and Hurricane Irene on the
TER casinos, stating that the closure of surrounding businesses, repeated evacuation of Atlantic
City, temporary suspension of Atlantic City gaming licenses, and physical property damage
resulted in a dramatic reduction to TER’s customer base. Many of these factors were again related
in TER’s Disclosure Statement filed in conjunction with its Plan of Reorganization.192
In addition to Mr. Griffin’s reasoning, it appears TER’s failure to maintain its casinos’
appeal substantially encouraged its decline and eventual closure. Guest reviews frequently identify
the casinos as outdated; in fact, “Outdated” is the main heading of Trump Taj Mahal’s
“tripadvisor” webpage as of March 2017.193 TER invested in a number of property improvements
beginning in 2011,194 but the modest upgrades were unable to restore the Taj Mahal’s appeal. The
years of declining reputation likely made it impossible to revive TER short of reckless investment
into large-scale remodeling and rebranding.
Trump Entertainment Resorts acknowledged the need to reduce its footprint, still facing
approximately $346.5 million in First Lien Debt despite its debt reduction under the 2010
Bankruptcy Plan.195 TER sold the Trump Marina to Golden Nugget Atlantic City, LLC for $38
million in 2011, the “Steel Pier” for approximately $4.3 million, an off-site warehouse for $1.9
million, former corporate offices for $3.1 million, and an unused parcel of land near Trump Plaza
for $1.3 million,196 in an effort to decrease costs. TER solicited offers for Trump Plaza subsequent
to the above sell-off but was unable to consummate a deal due to its inability to obtain releases of
the Plaza’s security interests.197 TER reduced its staff, improved its labor and other operational
efficiencies, and negotiated significant concessions with its unions in addition to reducing property
assets.
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Disclosure Statement for Debtors’ Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code at 20,
Docket no. 166, Case no. 14-12103, filed October 01, 2014 [hereinafter First Disclosure Statement].
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Trump Entertainment Resorts Earnings Decline198
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4.3 2014 Organizational, Operational, and Capital Structures of Trump Entertainment
Detailed Prepetition Overview
Trump Entertainment Resorts was incorporated in Delaware following the 2004
reorganization and served as the parent company of the collective debtors below (the
“Debtors”).199 Following its emergence from the 2009 filing, TER held a 99% interest in Trump
Entertainment Resorts Holdings, L.P. (“TER Holdings”) as a general partner.200 The remaining
1% of TER Holdings was held by TERH LP Inc. (“TERH”), a subsidiary of TER.201 TER Holdings
owned 100% of the equity interest in each of the subsidiary Debtors.202 The Key Executives of
Trump Entertainment Resorts included Mr. Robert Griffin: Chairman and Chief Executive Officer,
Mr. Daniel McFadden: Chief Financial Officer, Ms. Kathleen McSweeney: Senior Vice President
of Marketing Operations, Mr. Michael Mellon: Vice President of Hotel Operations, and Mr. Gary
Ng: Executive Director of Far East Marketing.203
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TER Subsidiary Debtors, 2014
Debtor Name
Debtor Case Number
Trump Entertainment Resorts Holdings, L.P.
14-12104
Trump Plaza Associates, LLC
14-12105
Trump Marina Associates, LLC
14-12106
Trump Taj Mahal Associates, LLC
14-12107
Trump Entertainment Resorts Development 14-12108
Company, LLC
TER Development CO., LLC
14-12109
TERH LP Inc.
14-12110

Trump Entertainment Resorts Organizational Structure, 2014

Trump Entertainment Resorts Shareholders; Board Members; Officers
Name
Title
Ownership
David Hughes
David Licht
Eugene Davis
Jeffrey Gilbert
Michael Elkins
Stephen McCall

Board Member/Former CFO
Board Member
Board Member
Board Member
Board Member
Board Member
33

Robert Symington
Dan McFadden
Robert Griffin
Avenue Capital Group
Contrarian Capital Management LLC
Goldentree Asset Management LP
MFC Global Investment LLC
Oaktree Capital Management
Northeast Investors Trust
Polygon Investment Partners
Donald J. Trump
Remaining Shareholders

Board Member
CFO
Shareholder/Board Member/CEO
Shareholder
Shareholder
Shareholder
Shareholder
Shareholder
Shareholder
Shareholder
Shareholder
Shareholder

1.0%
20.58%
12.81%
7.03%
5.16%
9.0%
8.04%
22.29%
5.0%
9.09%

Trump Entertainment Resorts owned and operated Taj Mahal, a 35.9 acre property
consisting of approximately 2,000 hotel rooms, 162,000 square feet of gaming space, 16 dining
facilities, 5 cocktail lounges, “Scores” gentleman’s club, and various additional facilities used for
entertainment, parking, and leisure.204 The Taj Mahal’s net revenues in 2013 were approximately
$257.0 million and approximately $108.5 million in the first six months of 2014. 205 TER also
owned and operated Trump Plaza, a 10.9 acre property that included 906 hotel rooms, 87,000
square feet of gaming space, a large conference center, several restaurants and bars, and a large
parking garage. Trump Plaza’s net revenue was approximately $76.3 million in 2013 and
approximately $28.1 million in the first six months of 2014. 206 However, despite its seemingly
high revenues, TER was in the process of closing Trump Plaza during the 2014 filing due to losses
of approximately $29 million between January 2012 and July 2014.207
In addition to the Taj Mahal and Trump Plaza, TER partnered with two online gaming
companies—Fertitta Acquisitins CO LLC (D/B/A “Ultimate Gaming”) and Betfair Interactive US
LLC (“Betfair”) (collectively, the “Gaming Companies”).208 The Gaming Companies operated the
internet gambling enterprise under TER’s internet gaming permits. In exchange, the Gaming
Companies paid approximately $15.5 million to TER as well as a percentage of their revenue.209
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Revisiting the First Lien Agreement and Terms
In July 2010, pursuant to that year’s Chapter 11 filing, TER, TER Holdings, and certain
subsidiaries of TER (“Guarantors”) entered into a credit agreement with Beal Bank as the initial
collateral and administrative agent (the “First Lien Agent”), and several companies controlled by
Mr. Icahn as initial lenders (collectively, the “Icahn Partners” or “First Lien Lenders”), loaning the
companies approximately $346.5 million in principal secured by a first lien on all of the
companies’ assets.210 Icahn Partners replaced Beal Bank as collateral and administrative agent in
April 2012.211 The agreement between TER and the First Lien Lenders required quarterly principal
amortization payments in the amount of $866,000 with an annual interest rate of 12%.212 The loan
would mature and the final payment would be due in December 2015.213 TER paid approximately
$60.9 million to the First Lien Lenders until the 2014 bankruptcy filing.214 The outstanding amount
due to the First Lien Lenders, including interest, as of the petition date was approximately $292.2
million.215 TER owed approximately $13.5 million in accounts payable in addition to the credit
agreement.216
Critical Prepetition Third-Party and Creditor Litigation
I.
Levine Staller
The Law Firm of Levine, Staller, Sklar, Chan & Brown, P.A. (“Levine Staller”) represented
TER with the Company’s 2008 appeal of its Casinos’ real property tax assessments, the settlement
of which resulted in tax savings to the Debtors’ of approximately $50.5 million.217 Levine Staller
filed a motion with the Tax Court of New Jersey seeking to enforce an Attorney’s Charging Lien
with respect to a $1.25 million Contingency Fee associated with the tax appeal litigation on August
5, 2014.218 Levine Staller’s motion went uncontested and was granted by the Court, which attached
210
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Objection of Levine, Staller, Sklar, Chan, & Brown, P.A. to the Debtors’ Motion for Entry of an Order
Approving the Proposed Disclosure Statement, Docket no. 144, Case no. 14-12103, filed September 29, 2014
[hereinafter Levine Cash Collateral Objection].
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the Charging Lien to the Tax Court judgment and “the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they
may come.”219 This language would become a point of contention between the parties as they
litigated over TER’s liquid asset appropriation. Levine Staller agreed to allow TER to pay the
Contingent Fee in installments as a result of its uncertain financial condition220 and later reduced
or amended the contingent fee on several occasions. The final installment of the reduced
Contingent Fee in the amount of $1.25 million became due on July 30, 2014, pursuant to their final
agreement.221
On July 31, 2014, Mr. Griffin informed Levine Staller that the final installment would not
be paid.222 Levine Staller filed a Motion to enforce its Charging Lien the following month.223 The
Tax Court granted Levine Staller’s Motion and issued an Order of Judgement in the amount of
$1.25 million in favor of the Law Firm. TER sought bankruptcy relief a few days after service of
a Writ of Execution to collect Levine Staller’s fees.224 Trump Entertainment Resorts argued that,
although the Tax Court of New Jersey granted the motion, the Court limited its enforcement to the
proceeds of the tax settlement.225 TER stated its intention to appeal the judgment in its First
Disclosure Statement, and, even if an appeal was not pursued or granted, argued the proceeds of
the tax settlement were fully expended in the Company’s course of business and no longer
available.226
II.
Trump AC Casino Marks
Trump Entertainment Resorts entered into a third Trademark License Agreement with
Donald and Ivanka Trump following the 2009 reorganization.227 The Agreement granted TER a
perpetual royalty-free license to use certain marks associated with the name “Trump.”228 Mr. and
Mrs. Trump were replaced as “Licensors” with Trump AC Casino Marks LLC (“Trump
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Marks”).229 Trump Marks alleged various breaches of the Trademark License Agreement in a
lawsuit against TER and the First Lien Agent on August 5, 2014.230 Trump Marks assertions of
breach included:231






Failing a quality assurance review at the Plaza and failing to cure that default within the
required timeframe.
Failing to utilize the Trump Marks in a “dignified manner” consistent with “the highest
quality” and “at a level consistent with or exceeding the high reputation and importance of”
the Trump Marks at both the Plaza and the Taj.
Engaging in online internet gaming activities with customers who reside outside the State of
New Jersey.
Utilizing the Trump Marks in association with the closed and ono-operational Plaza.

Trump Marks sought imposition of an injunction to compel TER’s cure of the alleged
breaches from Judge Gross.232 Trump Entertainment Resorts disputed the assertions and argued
that termination of the License Agreement or an injunction against the use of the Trump name
would constitute an event of default under the First Lien Credit Agreement and would have a
significant adverse effect on the Debtors’ business.233
Trump Marks also claimed the Debtors refused to honor their obligations as successors to
a ground lease relating to real property that comprised the driveway leading to the Trump Plaza
entrance.234 Mr. Trump, as a former assignee, remained responsible to the landlord and received
no benefit from the property under the ground lease.235
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III.
The Gaming Companies: Betfair and Ultimate Gaming
The New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement issued internet gaming permits to Trump
Taj Mahal Associates and Trump Plaza Associates in October 2013,236 and TER entered into 10
year Gaming Agreements with Betfair237 and Ultimate Gaming238 in June 2013. Betfair paid $7.5
million to Plaza Associates239 and Ultimate Gaming Paid $8 million to Taj Mahal Associates240 as
“Advancement Fees.”
Betfair purported to deliver notices of default under the Online Gaming Agreement in July
2014, began diverting existing funds from TER’s Online Gaming Accounts, and redirected new
deposits into a segregated bank account under Betfair’s exclusive control (“Betfair Suspense
Account”).241 Betfair later sought to terminate the Online Gaming Agreement on September 4,
2014.242 Betfair filed a Motion for Order (the “Betfair Motion”) on November 21, 2014, during
the course of TER’s 2014 bankruptcy, aiming to declare the Automatic Stay inapplicable to the
funds in the Suspense Account and allow Betfair to remit those funds to itself.243 The Betfair
Motion asserted approximately $9.6 million in claims against the Debtors for default under the
Online Gaming Agreement, which Betfair argued was secured by a right to setoff against the funds
in the Suspense Account.244
Ultimate Gaming delivered a written notice of default under the Online Gaming Agreement
on August 22, 2014 and sought to terminate the Agreement in a letter dated September 3, 2014.245
Ultimate Gaming asserted that TER had agreed to segregate the Online Gaming Accounts from its
general accounts and funds therein would not be permitted for TER’s general operational
Debtors’ Motion for Entry of an Order, Pursuant to Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rule
9019, Approving Settlement By and Among the Debtors and Betfair Interactive US LLC, Docket no. 591, Case no.
14-12103, filed December 4, 2014 [hereinafter Betfair Settlement].
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purposes.246 Ultimate Gaming argued the cash held in Online Gaming Accounts, and identified in
the First Day Cash Collateral Order, was not property of the Debtors’ estates.247

4.4 Bankruptcy Petitions and Commencement of the Case
TER Petitions for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
The collective Debtors individually filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware on
September 9, 2014.248 TER’s petition stated the Company had less than 50 creditors, held between
$100 million and $500 million in assets, had liabilities between $100 million and $500 million,
and TER would have funds available for distribution to unsecured creditors.249 The Debtors were
represented by Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP of New York, NY and Young Conaway Stargatt
& Taylor, LLP of Wilmington, DE. Houlihan Lokey, Inc. was retained as Debtors’ restructuring
advisor. Jane M. Leamy, Trial Attorney for the Office of the United States Trustee in Wilmington,
DE250 (hereinafter “Ms. Leamy” or the “U.S. Trustee”) was assigned to cover the case. United
States Bankruptcy Judge Kevin Gross (“Judge Gross”) presided over the reorganization.
First Day Motions
The Debtors filed a series of 11 First Day Motions on September 9, 2014. Judge Gross held
an interim hearing the following day. TER requested joint administration of the collective Debtors’
Chapter 11 cases251 and appointment of its Claims and Noticing Agent.252 Operationally, TER
sought an order barring its utility and insurance companies from cessation of service and
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coverage,253 as well as permission to honor prepetition insurance obligations incurred in the
ordinary course of business254 and continued funding of post-petition obligations to customer
programs.255 Additionally, TER requested authorization to make payments to critical vendors and
service providers,256 payments of prepetition employee wages and salaries, reimbursement of
employee business expenses, and other employment related obligations.257
Schedule of First Day Motions
Motion Heading

Dkt
#
3 Debtors’ Motion for an Order, Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 1015 and Local Rule 1015-1, Authorizing the
4
5

6

7

Joint Administration of the Debtors’ Chapter 11 Cases
Debtors’ Application for an Order, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 156(c), Bankruptcy Rule 2002(f), and Local Rule
2002-1(f), Appointing Prime Clerk LLC as Claims and Noticing Agent, Nunc Pro Tunc to the Petition Date
Debtors’ Motion for Interim and Final Orders, Pursuant to Sections 105(a) and 366 of the Bankruptcy Code,
(I) Prohibiting Utility Companies from Altering, Refusing, or Discontinuing Utility Services, (II) Deeming
Utility Companies Adequately Assured of Future Payment, (III) Establishing Procedures for Determining
Additional Adequate Assurance of Payment, and (IV) Setting a Final Hearing Related Thereto.
Debtors’ Motion for and Order, Pursuant to Sections 105(a), 363(b), 507(a)(8), 541, 1107(a) and 1108 of the
Bankruptcy Code, (I) Authorizing the Debtors to Pay Certain Prepetition Taxes and Fees and Related
Obligations and (II) Authorizing Banks to Honor and Process Check and Electronic Transfer Requests Related
Thereto.
Debtors’ Motion for an Order, Pursuant to Sections 105(a), 363, and 364 of the Bankruptcy Code, (I)
Authorizing (A) Payment of Prepetition Obligations Incurred in the Ordinary Course of Business in
Connection With Liability, Property, and Other Insurance Programs, Including Payment of Policy Premiums,
and (B) Continuation of Insurance Premiums Financing Programs; and (II) Authorizing Banks to Honor and
Process Check and Electronic Transfer Requests Related Thereto.

Debtors’ Motion for Interim and Final Orders, Pursuant to Sections 105(a) and 366 of the Bankruptcy Code, (I)
Prohibiting Utility Companies from Altering, Refusing, or Discontinuing Utility Services, (II) Deeming Utility
Companies Adequately Assured of Future Payment…, Docket no. 5, Case no. 14-12103, filed September 9, 2014.
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Debtors’ Motion for an Order… (I) Authorizing (A) Payment of Prepetition Obligations Incurred in the Ordinary
Course of Business in Connection With Liability, Property, and Other Insurance Programs, Including Payment of
Policy Premiums, and (B) Continuation of Insurance Premiums Financing Programs…, Docket no. 7, Case no. 1412103, filed September 9, 2014.
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Debtors Motion for an Order… Authorizing (I) The Debtors to Honor Prepetition Obligations Related to
Customer Programs and Otherwise Continue Customer Programs In the Ordinary Course of Business…, Docket no.
9, Case no. 14-12103, filed September 9, 2014.
255

Debtors’ Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders… (I) Authorizing the Debtors to Pay Certain Prepetition
Claims (A) Arising Under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, (B) of Lien Vendors, (C) Arising Under
Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code and (D) of Critical Vendors and Service Providers…, Docket no. 8, Case
no. 14-12103, filed September 9, 2014.
256

Debtors’ Motion for an Order… (A) Authorizing (I) Payment of Prepetition Employee Wages, Salaries and Other
Compensation; (II) Reimbursement of Prepetition Employee Business Expenses; (III) Contributions to Prepetition
Employee Benefit Programs and Continuation of Such Programs in the Ordinary Course; (IV) Payment of Workers’
Compensation Obligations…, Docket no. 11, Case no. 14-12103, filed September 9, 2014.
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8

9

10

11

12
13

Debtors’ Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders, Pursuant to Sections 105(a), 363(b), 503(b), 1107(a)
and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code, (I) Authorizing the Debtors to Pay Certain Prepetition Claims (A) Arising
Under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, (B) of Lien Vendors, (C) Arising Under Section
503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code and (D) of Critical Vendors and Service Providers, (II) Authorizing Banks
to Honor and Process Check and Electronic Transfer Requests Related Thereto and (III) Granting Certain
Related Relief
Debtors Motion for an Order, Pursuant to Sections 105(a), 363(c), 503(b)(1), 1107(a), and 1108 of the
Bankruptcy Code, Authorizing (I) The Debtors to Honor Prepetition Obligations Related to Customer
Programs and Otherwise Continue Customer Programs In the Ordinary Course of Business and (II) Banks to
Honor and Process Check and Electronic Transfer Requests Related Thereto.
Debtors’ Motion for an Order, Pursuant to Sections 105(a), 345, 1107(a) and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code,
Bankruptcy Rule 2015, and Local Rule 2015-2, (I) Authorizing and Approving Continued Use of Cash
Management Systems, (II) Authorizing Use of Prepetition Bank Accounts and Business Forms, (III)
Authorizing Payments of Prepetition Costs and Fees Associated With Customer Credit and Debit Card
Transactions, (IV) Waiving the Requirements of Section 345(b) on an Interim Basis, (V) Granting
Administrative Expense Status to Post-Petition Intercompany Claims, and (VI) Granting Certain Related
Relief
Debtors’ Motion for an Order, Pursuant to Sections 105(a), 363(b), 507(a)(4) and 507(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy
Code (A) Authorizing (I) Payment of Prepetition Employee Wages, Salaries and Other Compensation; (II)
Reimbursement of Prepetition Employee Business Expenses; (III) Contributions to Prepetition Employee
Benefit Programs and Continuation of Such Programs in the Ordinary Course; (IV) Payment of Workers’
Compensation Obligations; (V) Payments for Which Prepetition Payroll Deductions Were Made; (VI)
Payment of All Costs and Expenses Incident to the Foregoing Payments and Contributions; and (VII) Payment
to Third Parties of All Amounts Incident to the Foregoing Payments and Contributions and (B) Authorizing
Banks to Honor and Process Check and Electronic Transfer Requests Related Thereto.
Debtors’ Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders, Pursuant to Sections 105(a), 362 and 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code, Establishing Notification Procedures for Transfers of or Claims of Worthless Stock
Deductions with Respect to Common Stock
Debtors’ Motion for Interim and Final Orders (A) Authorizing Post-petition Use of Cash Collateral, (B)
Granting Adequate Protection to the Secured Parties, (C) Scheduling a Final Hearing Pursuant to Bankruptcy
Rule 4001(b), and (D) Granting Related Relief

The Cash Collateral Motion
Additionally, TER requested use of its cash holdings (“Cash Collateral”) that constituted
collateral of its First Lien Lenders (Icahn Partners), to approve a proposal of adequate protection
to the First Lien Lenders and other potentially secured parties, and to schedule the Final Hearing
within approximately 30 days of filing the Cash Collateral Motion.258 TER argued that it would
have to close its doors without a grant of the requested relief, stating:
“[T]he Debtors have been unable to obtain commitments for post-petition
financing, such that the Cash Collateral is the Debtors’ sole source of funding for
Debtors’ Motion for Interim and Final Orders (A) Authorizing Postpetition Use of Cash Collateral, (B) Granting
Adequate Protection to the Secured Parties … at 20, Docket no. 13, Case no. 14-12103, filed September 9, 2014
[hereinafter Cash Collateral Motion].
258
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their operations and the costs of administering the chapter 11 process. Absent
authority to immediately use Cash Collateral, the Debtors, their creditors and the
estates generally would suffer irreparable harm because the debtors would
immediately cease operations…”259
If authorized to use the Cash Collateral, TER proposed to secure the First Lien Lenders
through Adequate Protection Liens, Superpriority Claims,260 and payment of fees and expenses,
incurred before or after the petition date, by the First Lien Lenders and Agent (“Adequate
Protection Fees”).261 TER argued these guarantees would sufficiently safeguard the interests
secured by the Cash Collateral and moved the court to approve them as adequate protection.

Terms
Entities in
Interest
Purpose
for Use of
Cash
Collateral
Proposed
Adequate
Protection

259

Material Terms and Summary of the Cash Collateral Motion
Summary of Material Terms
Icahn Parties (First Lien Lenders)
The Debtors sought authority to use cash collateral for, among other things, (i) working capital
requirements; (ii) general corporate purposes, and (iii) the costs and expenses of administering the
chapter 11 cases (including making adequate protection payments, fees, and payments to case
professionals), and payments under the carve-out.
Adequate Protection Liens. Subject to the carve-out, adequate protection for any postpetition
diminution in value of the Secured Parties’ interests in the Debtors’ interests in the Prepetition
Collateral. The First Lien Agent, for the benefit of itself and the First Lien Lenders, is hereby
granted, to the extent of any diminution in value, valid, binding, enforceable, non-avoidable, and
automatically perfected security interests in and liens, without the necessity of the execution by the
Debtors of security agreements, upon all agreements, property (whether then owned or thereafter
acquired) of each Debtor and each Debtor’s “estate,” as well as all of the issued and outstanding
capital stock or other equity or ownership interests. Any proceeds from causes of action under the
Bankruptcy Code and any other avoidance actions, proceeds thereof or property or cash recovered
pursuant to Avoidance Actions, and all products proceeds and supporting obligations or the
foregoing would be collectively known as the Collateral.
Adequate Protection Superpriority Claims. Subject to the carve-out, as further adequate protection
for the benefit of the First Lien Lenders, an allowed administrative expense claim in the Debtors’
cases ahead of and senior to any and all other administrative expense claims in such cases to the
extent of any postpetition diminution in value.

Id.

See 11 U.S.C. § 507(b) (“If the trustee… provides adequate protection of the interest of a holder of a claim
secured by a lien on property of the debtor and if, notwithstanding such protection, such creditor has a claim …
arising from the stay of action against such property… from the use, sale, or lease of such property…, or from the
granting of a lien… then such creditor’s claim under such subsection shall have priority over every other claim
allowable under such subsection.”).
260

261

Cash Collateral Motion, supra note 258.
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CarveOut

Releases

Other Adequate Protection. As further adequate protection, the Debtors shall pay the reasonable and
documented costs and expenses, whether incurred before or after the Petition Date, of the First Lien
Agent and the First Lien Lenders, including attorneys’ fees and expenses, to the extent provided
under the First Lien Credit Documents. All amounts paid as adequate protection are deemed
permitted uses of cash collateral.
The Carve-Out shall mean the sum of: (i) all fees required to be paid to the Clerk of the Bankruptcy
Court and to the U.S. Trustee, plus interest; (ii) all allowed and unpaid professionals fees, expenses,
and disbursements incurred prior to the Termination Date by professionals of the estates retained by
order of the Court, in the aggregate not to exceed $450,000 for Estate Professionals and $50,000 for
Creditors Committee Professionals.
Any and all claims or causes of action against either the First Lien Agent and/or any First Lien
Lenders shall be released by the Debtors’ estates, all creditors, interest holders, and other parties in
interest in the Cases and any successor cases.

Appointment of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
The U.S. Trustee filed a Notice of Appointment and established the Creditors’ Committee
(the “Committee” or “OCC”) to represent the unsecured claimants on September 23, 2014.262 The
seven-chair Committee included: Thermal Energy Limited Partnership, Bally Gaming, Inc., Unite
Here Local 54, National Retirement Fund, Atlantic City Linen Supply, LLC, Southern New Jersey
Paper Products, and Conner Strong & Buckelew Companies, Inc.263
Campbell & Levine, LLC and Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP represented Thermal
Energy in the bankruptcy proceedings.264 Thermal Energy entered into service agreements with
the Taj Mahal and Trump Plaza (the “Thermal Service Agreement(s)”) on June 30, 1996 and
September 26, 1996, respectively265 and filed post-petition proofs of claim against the Debtors:266




A general unsecured claim against Taj Mahal Associates in the amount of $2,332,436.09
A claim pursuant to section 503(b)(9) against Taj Mahal Associates in the amount of
$476,634.78
A general unsecured claim against Trump Plaza Associates in the amount of $339,053.04

262

Notice of Appointment of Committee of Unsecured Creditors, Docket no. 109, Case no. 14-12103, filed on
September 9, 2014.
263

Id.

264

Notice of Appearance and Request for Service of All Papers, Docket no. 66, Case no. 14-12103, filed September
12, 2014.
Order…Approving the Release and Settlement Agreement By and Among the Debtors and Thermal Energy
Limited Partnership I at 3, Docket no. 1252, Case no. 14-12103, filed April 21, 2015 [hereinafter Thermal Energy
Order].
265

266

Id. at 9.
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An administrative expense claim against Taj Mahal Associates in a contingent and
unliquidated amount based on the Debtors’ proposed rejection of the Taj Mahal Service
Agreement
A administrative expense claim against Trump Plaza Associates in a contingent and
unliquidated amount based on the Debtors’ proposed rejection of the Trump Plaza Service
Agreement

Joseph Rhodes and Stephen Morrow of Wilmington, Delaware represented the Taj Mahal
and Trump Plaza employees’ union UNITE HERE Local 54 (“Local 54” or “Union”).267 The
Union sought to prohibit TER from reconfiguring the terms of its Collective Bargaining
Agreement (“CBA”). Judge Gross and, ultimately, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
District permitted the CBA’s modification. The National Retirement Fund (“NRF”) assumed an
interest in the reorganization as a result. Landis Rath & Cobb LLP represented the NRF during the
bankruptcy.268 Atlantic City Linen Supply Inc., Southern New Jersey Paper Products, and Conner
Strong & Buckelew Companies, Inc asserted general unsecured claims against the Debtors in the
amounts of $128,538, $286,896, and $245,000, respectively. Bally Gaming Inc. asserted an
administrative priority claim of approximately $568,957.
Objections to First Day Motions and Proposed Orders
I.
Levine Staller
Levin Staller filed a formal objection to TER’s Cash Collateral Motion on September 29,
269
2014. Levine Staller argued the Debtors’ use of Cash Collateral would heighten the risk of
nonpayment of their remaining fees and requested the Court to condition the Debtors’ Cash
Collateral use upon providing Levine Staller with first priority replacement liens on cash and
proceeds270 and an Administrative Expense claim to the extent of any diminution in value.271
Levine Staller based its argument on the facts that (i) Levine Staller possessed a first-priority,
prior-perfected Charging Lien, (ii) the Debtors’ commingling of the Tax Refund with other cash
did not eliminate their debt, and (iii) under New Jersey law, the Charging Lien priority “relates
back” to 2008 and must be honored before subsequent creditors’ claims.272

267

Entry of Appearance, Docket no. 71, Case no. 14-12103, filed September 15, 2014.

268

Affidavit of Service, Docket no. 971, Case no. 14-12103, filed February 24, 2015.

269

Levine Cash Collateral Objection, supra note 217.

270

Levine Staller asked the court to prioritize its claim senior to the First Lien Lenders.

271

Levine Cash Collateral Objection, supra note 217, at 19.

272

Id. at 8-9.
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The Debtors and Levine Staller later announced an agreement regarding adequate
protection, which included an expedited claims objection process that allowed prompt adjudication
of the dispute concerning the Charging Lien’s validity and priority so it would be properly
addressed as such in TER’s Plan and Disclosure Statement.273 Levine Staller subsequently filed a
motion on October 15, 2014 for entry of an order fixing the value and priority of, and allowing its
claim as secured in full.274
II.
The Unsecured Creditors’ Committee
The Unsecured Creditors’ Committee objected to the Cash Collateral Motion on October
2, 2014, and commented that a final hearing on the Motion was “not only a matter that can wait,
but a matter that will benefit greatly from a deferral.”275 The OCC stated that an order allowing
the use of Cash Collateral would be highly prejudicial to its constituents as TER’s proposed Plan
at the time offered nothing to the Unsecured Parties. This was true particularly in light of the fact
that the Debtors’ actions, in conjunction with those by the Icahn Parties, seemed to indicate a
transition from preservation of the going concern value of the operating business to a liquidation
of the casino properties.276 The OCC related its concern that the Debtors set forth several difficult
conditions to be met if the Taj Mahal were to remain open—conditions including nine-figure
government cash infusions or tax breaks, dissolution of the Taj Mahal Collective Bargaining
Agreement (which was arguably illegal under the National Labor Relations Act at the time), and
the confirmability of financing from the Icahn Parties.277
The OCC requested the Court adjourn the Cash Collateral Hearing until November 5,
2015 and insisted on including clarifying language and procedural protections to ensure due
process notice to the Committee in a second interim order.279 If the Court were to proceed with the
final hearing, the Committee requested the Court condition final approval on modifications to the
Final Cash Collateral Order based on:
278

273

Id. at 19.

Motion to Allow Levine Staller… for Entry of an Order Fixing the Value and Priority of, and Allowing its
Claims as Secured in full…, Docket no. 295, Case no. 14-12103, filed October 15, 2014.
274

Objection of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to Entry of Final Order…Authorizing Use of Cash
Collateral…at 2, Docket no. 202, Case no. 14-12103, filed October 2, 2014 [hereinafter OCC Cash Collateral
Objection].
275

276

Id.

277

Id. at 6.

278

Id. at 25.

279

Id. at 21.
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An Adequate Protection Lien on Avoidance Actions.280
The OCC argued that the Secured Creditor’s replacement liens must be granted only to the
extent of its showing that the debtors’ use of the lender’s collateral resulted in a diminution thereof,
and, because TER was increasingly facing the possibility of resorting to a liquidation rather than
a successful reorganization, any replacement liens would significantly reduce the availability of
TER’s unencumbered assets to the unsecured creditors.


A Waiver of Surcharge Rights combined with insufficient Carve-Out for the Committee.281
The OCC argued that the Carve-Out in the Proposed Final Cash Collateral Motion did not
reasonably approximate the costs of administering the Secured Parties’ collateral because the
amount allocated to the Committee was “completely disproportionate” to both the responsibilities
that the Committee had under the Bankruptcy Code and the amount allocated to the Debtors’
professionals and the Secured Parties’ professionals. Ultimately, the Carve-Out for the Committee
would be less than 3.3% of the Carve-Out for the Debtors’ professionals, and only 14% of the
Carve-Out for the Secured Parties’ counsel alone.


An unjustified waiver of § 552(b)(1) “Equities of the Case” Exception.282
Section 552(a) provides a general rule that property acquired by the estate or by the debtor
after the commencement of the case is not subject to any lien resulting from any security agreement
entered into by the debtor before commencement of the case. However, § 552(b)(1) creates an
exception to the general rule, which preserves a secured creditors’ lien on post-petition proceeds,
products, or profits of pre-petition collateral as long as the security agreement so provides.
The OCC argued that the purpose of the Equities of the Case Exception is to balance the
need to preserve valid security interests in proceeds with the need to protect the interests of
unsecured creditors—often in cases where a debtor may provide value used in combination with a
secured creditor’s collateral to generate (cash) assets that could be considered proceeds of the
secured creditor’s collateral.283 The OCC stated that, under the circumstances, the Debtors’ casino
operation generates revenues as a result of an “amalgamation” of personal and real property, goods,
and services upheld by a necessary labor staff. Thus, “as much as the Secured Parties might like
to ignore the Thirteenth Amendment, they do not have a lien on the Debtors’ employees [nor the
value generated therefrom]… and value generated by the Debtors’ employees is not proceeds of
the Secured Parties’ collateral.” Therefore, there remained a critical issue as to what portion of the
280

Id. at 7-10.

281

Id. at 10-13.

282

OCC Cash Collateral Objection, supra note 275, at 13-17.

283

In that circumstance, the exception allows the court to allocate value to the estate in order to avoid a windfall to
the secured creditor(s).
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Debtors’ post-petition revenues could be considered proceeds of the Secured Parties’ prepetition
collateral.


Improper Debtor and Third-Party releases.284
The OCC argued the proposed Cash Collateral Order contained overbroad, improper, and
unwarranted releases of the Secured Parties. Specifically, that upon expiration of the Challenge
Period, “any and all claims or causes of action against either the First Lien Agent and/or any First
Lien Lenders shall be released by the Debtors’ estates, all creditors, interest holders, and other
parties in interest to the Cases and any successor Cases.” Thus, the release would not be limited to
derivative claims on behalf of the Debtors’ estates or claims against the Secured Parties. According
to the OCC, the proposal would effectively release the Secured Parties from claims that their
parties might hold in matters completely unrelated to the Debtors’ cases.
III.
Atlantic City Electric Co.
Atlantic City Electric Co. (“ACE”) filed an Objection to the Debtors’ Motion to prohibit
utility companies from refusing, altering, or discontinuing service and requested the Motion and
Interim Order thereupon be denied.285 In addition, ACE requested that the Court order the Debtors
to pay an amount equal to two months of service ($2,372,660) or face the potential loss of service
after 30 days for failure to provide satisfactory assurance of future performance.286 ACE argued
the Debtors’ proposed adequate assurance of a utility escrow account did not satisfy the express
requirements of the Bankruptcy Code287 if not held by the individual affected utility companies,
nor would it satisfy provisions of local regulatory requirements.288
Atlantic City Exempted from the Automatic Stay
Atlantic City (the “City”) filed for relief from the automatic stay in order to collect backtaxes on November 7, 2014.289 The City claimed the collective Debtors owed approximately $22
284

OCC Cash Collateral Objection, supra note 275, at 17-18.

Objection of Atlantic City Electric to Debtors’ Motion for Interim and Final Orders…Prohibiting Utility
Companies from Altering, Refusing, or Discontinuing Utility Services…, Docket no. 143, Case no. 14-12103, filed
September 29, 2014.
285

286

Id. at 1.

See 11 U.S.C. § 366(a) (“[A] utility may not alter, refuse, or discontinue service to, or discriminate against, the
trustee or the debtor solely on the basis of the commencement of a case under this title or that a debt owed by the
debtor to such utility for service rendered before the order for relief was not paid when due.”).
287

288

Id. at 2-3.

289

Motion of the City of Atlantic City for Relief From the Automatic Stay Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), Docket
no. 449, Case no. 14-12103, filed November 7, 2014 [hereinafter AC Relief Motion].
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million290 in unpaid real-property taxes which the City proposed to mitigate through sales of tax
certificates for the outstanding debts in an upcoming auction.291 The City stated tax sale revenues
were vital to the health and safety of the community and, because the amount owed by the Debtors
constituted approximately 10% of the City’s entire 2014 budget,292 the sale of TER’s debt was
particularly vital.293 Atlantic City argued the post-petition perfection or real estate tax liens would
not violate the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(18) as the sale of a tax certificate would
constitute an non-prejudicial step in the process to enforce the lien.294
Trump Entertainment Resorts295 and the Icahn Parties296 each objected to the City’s Motion
on November 20, 2014. TER argued granting the City relief from the automatic stay would be
highly prejudicial for several reasons:297






The Debtors’ tax liability to the City was in dispute, and the Debtors had filed prepetition
appeals challenging the City’s tax assessments on its property for 2104. The transfer of a tax
certificate could result in the purchaser being able to foreclose at the face amount of the
certificate and impair the Debtors’ rights with respect to its tax appeals.
Under New Jersey law, if the taxes remain unpaid, a purchaser would be entitled to foreclose
on its tax certificate after six months if the purchaser were a municipality or two years if the
purchaser was a private buyer, at which point the Debtors would be required to satisfy the
terms of the tax certificate in cash. However, under the Bankruptcy Code, some of the City’s
tax claims may be viewed as priority claims and entitled to deferred payment over five years
as opposed to immediate payment in cash under a foreclosure scenario.
The City’s Motion failed to explain the Debtors would be required to pay a statutory
redemption penalty equal to 6% of the face value of the tax certificate if the Debtors were to
redeem the certificate more than ten days after the sale occurred.

290

Id. at 1 (The Taj Mahal owed the City $17,488,907.14 in unpaid taxes and the Trump Plaza owed $4,446,891.86).

291

Id.

Id. (“The City relies heavily on the gaming industry as a source of revenue. [The casino] industry accounts for
over 60% of the City’s total real estate tax levy”).
292

293

Id.

294

Id. at 4.

Debtors’ Objection to Motion of the City of Atlantic City for Relief from the Automatic Stay Pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 362(D), Docket no. 517, Case no. 14-12103, filed November 20, 2014 [hereinafter TER Stay Objection].
295

296

Objection of First Lien Parties to Motion of the City of Atlantic City for Relief from the Automatic Stay Pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 362(D), Docket no. 516, Case no. 14-12103, filed November 20, 2014 [hereinafter Icahn Stay
Objection].
297

TER Stay Objection, supra note 295, at 2-3.
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The Debtors argued they should not be placed in a position to have their rights impaired
by a claim of such a substantial amount simply because the City was seeking to monetize its claim
and avoid the Chapter 11 process. TER stated the balance of hardships clearly weighed in their
favor and asked the Court to deny the Motion.298 The Icahn Parties’ Objection largely reflected
TER’s but related an additional argument that the City had not adequately met its burden of proof
to show it would be prejudiced by imposition of the automatic stay. 299 The City relied on
“conclusory and unsubstantiated statements” that the City would be hindered in the management
of its budget, according to the First Lien Lenders.300
The City challenged the objecting parties’ arguments in a Reply to the Court on November
21, 2014, stating:
“The objecting parties [sought] to distort the legal and factual realities underlying
the Motion. Neither Debtors nor the Icahn Parties [could] legitimately dispute that
(a) the City [was] owed many millions of dollars in unpaid real estate taxes, (b) the
Debtors [had] not paid their post-petition property taxes, (c) Debtors [had] not
paid 1.5 quarters of pre-petition property taxes, and (d) the much ‘ballyhooed’ tax
appeals [had] sat dormant for at least the past six months, with not even the
slightest hint of movement on the part of the Debtors.”301
Further, the City argued the objecting parties misstated the relationship between the
Bankruptcy Code and the New Jersey statutory tax lien regime—contrary to the objecting parties
“bizarre” assertions, a tax certificate purchaser could not foreclose on the property without first
obtaining relief from the automatic stay, nor could a purchaser foreclose if the Debtors remained
current on their payments pursuant to a confirmed Plan of reorganization.302
Judge Gross granted the City’s Motion for Relief nearly a year later on November 15,
2015. The Court stated the relief granted was to the extent necessary to permit the City to sell
tax certificates for the Debtors’ properties relating to unpaid taxes in 2015 unless the Debtors were
to pay the delinquent taxes in full prior to commencement of the certificate auction, in which case
303

298

Id. at 2-3.

299

Icahn Stay Objection, supra note 296, at 2-3.

300

Id. at 3.

Reply to Objections to Atlantic City’s Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §362(d),
Docket no. 539, Case no. 14-12103, filed November 21, 2014.
301

302

Id. at 1-2.

Order Granting the City of Atlantic City’s Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§362, Docket no. 1741, Case no. 14-12103, filed November 19, 2015.
303
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the relief order would no longer apply.304 The Court ordered purchasers of the tax certificates to
be subject to the terms of the Court’s Order and issued notice of the Order and pending dispute
between the Debtors and City.305 Judge Gross stated the Court’s retention of jurisdiction over the
allowance and treatment of the tax claims and ordered the City to refrain from dismissing the tax
appeals for non-payment.306
First Day Final Orders
Many of TER’s First Day Motions were granted in full on September 10, 2014. The
remaining Motions were granted on an interim basis the same day, and Final Orders followed on
October 6, 2014. The Court restricted TER’s spending and payments to a limited number of
prepetition obligations, and ordered TER to set aside $1.47 million as adequate assurance for its
utility creditors.

Topic
Utility
Companies

Payment of
Taxes and Fees
Insurance and
Policy
Premiums

304

Id. at 2-3.

305

Id. at 3.

306

Id. at 2-3.

Schedule of Final Orders
Final Order Material Inclusions
Debtors shall deposit $1,470,000 into an account as adequate assurance for the utility companies.
Subject to this assurance procedure, no utility company may alter, refuse, terminate, or
discontinue utility services to, or discriminate against, the Debtors on the basis of the
commencement of these Chapter 11 cases, or require additional assurance of payment, other
than the Utility Deposit, as a condition to the Debtors receiving such service. The Utility Deposit
shall not constitute adequate assurance for Thermal Energy Limited Partnership (OCC
Member). The Objection of Atlantic City Electric to the entry of this order is resolved pursuant
to this Order and a separate agreement between to Debtors and ACE for the payment of adequate
assurance.307
Debtors are authorized to pay prepetition taxes and fees to the authorities in the ordinary course
of business, including those subsequently determined upon audit or otherwise, to be owed for
periods prior to the petition date, up to an aggregate amount of $4,995,000. 308
Debtors are authorized to maintain the insurance programs without interruption, and to renew,
supplement, modify, or enter into new insurance policies, in accordance with the same practices
and procedures as were in effect prior to the petition date. The Debtors are authorized to satisfy

Final Order…Prohibiting Utility Companies from Altering, Refusing, or Discontinuing Utility Services, (II)
Deeming Utility Companies Adequately Assured…, Docket no. 229, Case no. 14-12103, filed October 10, 2014
[hereinafter Utilities Order].
307

Order…Authorizing the Debtors to Pay Certain Prepetition Taxes and Fees and Related Obligations…, Docket
no. 45, Case no. 14-12103, filed September 10, 2014.
308
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Vendors

Customer
Programs

Cash Manage
Employee
Wages,
Benefits,
Programs, and
Expenses

premiums, claims, deductibles, and other obligations that were due and payable prior to the
petition date.309
Debtors are authorized to satisfy PACA/PASA Claims in the ordinary course of business up to
the aggregate amount of $100,000 (any vendor which accepts payment will be deemed to have
waived all claims against the Debtors to the extent payment was received). The Debtors are
further authorized to satisfy Lien Claims up to an aggregate amount of $100,000. The Debtors
are authorized to satisfy 503(b)(9) claims up to an aggregate amount of $1,000,000. The Debtors
are authorized to satisfy critical vendor claims up to an aggregate amount of $3,500,000. The
Debtors shall not satisfy 503(b)(9) or Critical Vendor Claims in excess of $2,500,000 in the
aggregate amount and shall confer with the OCC at least 2 days before satisfying either form of
claim. The Debtors are authorized to condition payments of Vendor Claims on the agreement of
the Vendor to continue supplying goods and services to the Debtors and to enter into trade
agreements with the vendors (subject to good-faith terms).310
Debtors are authorized to continue, implement new, or discontinue Customer Programs in the
ordinary course of business and in a manner consistent with past practices. The Debtors are
authorized to satisfy prepetition obligations relating to the Customer Programs up to an
aggregate amount of $550,000.311
Granted in Full312
Debtors are authorized to satisfy amounts on account of employee wages and benefits in the
ordinary course of their business, and to honor pre-petition checks on account of unpaid wages
that were not cashed prior to the petition date (provided that no payment on account of individual
unpaid wages shall exceed $12,475, no aggregate amount of unpaid wages shall exceed
$2,690,000, and prepetition obligations on account of Union Contributions shall not exceed
$2,200,000 in the aggregate).313

309

Order Authorizing Payment of Prepetition Obligations Incurred in the Ordinary Course of Business in
Connection with Liability, Property, and other Insurance Programs…, Docket no. 46, Case no. 14-12103, filed
September 10, 2014.
Final Order…Authorizing Debtors to Pay Certain Prepetition Claims (A) Arising Under the Perishable
Agricultural Commodities Act, (B) of Lien Vendors, (C) Arising Under Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code
and (D) of Critical Vendors and Service Providers, Docket no. 218, Case no. 14-12103, filed October 6, 2014.
310

Order…Authorizing (I) The Debtors to Honor Prepetition Obligations Related to Customer Programs and
Otherwise Continue Customer Programs in the Ordinary Course of Business…, Docket no. 48, Case no. 14-12103,
filed September 10, 2014.
311

312

Order Authorizing and Approving Continued Use of Cash Management System, Authorizing Use of Prepetition
Bank Accounts and Business Forms…, Waiving the Requirements of Section 345(b) on an Interim Basis, Granting
Administrative Expense Status to Post-Petition Intercompany Claims…, Docket no. 49, Case no. 14-12103, filed
September 10, 2014.
Order…Authorizing (I) Payment of Prepetition Employee Wages, Salaries and Other Compensation…, Docket
no. 50, Case no. 14-12103, filed September 10, 2014.
313
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The Cash Collateral Order
Judge Gross permitted TER’s access to the Cash Collateral, stating that preservation and
maintenance of the Debtors’ assets was necessary to maximize value of the chapter 11 estates.314
All of TER’s existing cash balances, future collection of accounts receivable, and any following
proceeds, were or would become the secured parties’ Cash Collateral within the meaning of section
363(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.315 TER was now entitled to spend money that was partially
securing Icahn’s loan, although the court imposed strict budgetary, reporting, and record access
requirements.316 As a result of the Cash Collateral authorization, and the imposition of the
automatic stay, the court found the secured parties entitled to adequate protection for any decrease
in value of their interests resulting from the automatic stay or the Debtors’ use of Prepetition or
Cash Collateral. By approving the Adequate Protection Liens, the court effectively gave the
secured creditors priority to collect any or all of the Debtors’ assets in the event TER failed to right
the ship.
The Debtors were to set aside Bankruptcy Court Clerk and U.S. Trustee fees under the
“Carve-Out”317 provision of the Cash Collateral Order.318 In addition, the Carve-Out included the
sum of all allowed and unpaid Debtors’ and Icahn Parties (“Estate Fees”) and the OCC’s,
professionals’ fees and expenses.319 Judge Gross capped disbursements to $450,000 for the Estate
Fees and $50,000 for the OCC’s professionals320 and stated that the Icahn Parties would not be
responsible for payment or reimbursement of any professional fees incurred in connection with the
cases under any chapter of the Bankruptcy Code.321 The Court designated the Icahn Parties’ claims
as superpriority, or senior to all claims and administrative expenses;322 provided that, with respect

314

Final Order (A) Authorizing Postpetition Use of Cash Collateral, (B) Granting Adequate Protection to the
Secured Parties, and (C) Granting Related Relief at 7, Docket No. 342, Case No. 14-12103, filed October 23, 2014
[hereinafter Cash Collateral Order].
315

Id. at 3, 7.

316

Id. at 9-15.

317

An agreement by a party that is secured by all or some of the assets of the estate to allocate some portion of the
proceeds of its lien to be paid to others, or in other words, an agreement by the secured creditor to “carve-out” funds
from its lien position to be distributed to other parties.
318

Cash Collateral Order, supra note 314, at 18.

319

Id. at 18-19.

320

Id. at 19.

321

Id.

322

Id. at 20-21.
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to tax judgment proceeds, the superpriority claims and the Levine Staller claims would have the
same priority as that of the secured obligations and the prepetition Charging Lien.323
UNITEHERE Local 54 and the Taj Mahal Collective Bargaining Agreement
Trump Entertainment Resorts filed a Motion on September 26, 2014 for entry of an order
authorizing the Debtors to reject a collective bargaining agreement between Trump Taj Mahal
Associates and UNITE HERE Local 54.324 Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, “Rejection of
Collective Bargaining Agreements,” applies were a debtor seeks to reject a collective bargaining
agreement or reach a consensual agreement with the Union to put in place long-term or permanent
modification to the contract.325 Section 1113 provides the following parameters for motions to
reject bargaining agreements:





Prior to filing for rejection, debtor must make a detailed proposal to the Union of all
modifications necessary to restructure while assuring all creditors and affected parties are
treated “fairly and equitably.”
Debtor must provide Union with relevant information necessary to evaluate debtor’s proposal.
Both parties are required to meet and confer in “good faith” in an attempt to reach mutual
agreement on modifications to the contract.

Once the debtor officially files the Section 1113 motion with the court, a hearing is
scheduled to occur within 14 days and the judge may approve the rejection if, absent a consensual
agreement, the Union has refused to accept a proposal without “good cause,” and the court
determines that the concessions of other constituencies in the bankruptcy are commensurate to
those made by the Union.326
TER claimed the Taj Mahal would be forced to close and liquidate if its labor costs
associated with the UNITE HERE Local 54 Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) were not
eliminated.327 TER operated without promise of post-petition funding at the time and, relying
solely on cash collateral, was paying pension benefits of approximately $14 to $15 million

323

Id. at 21.

Debtors’ Motion for Entry of Order (I) Rejecting Collective Barganing Agreement Between Trump Taj Mahal
Associates, LLC and Unite Here Local 54…, Docket no. 134, Case no. 14-12103, filed September 26, 2014
[hereinafter CBA Motion].
324

325

Summary of Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, http://perma.cc/M5LC-HCBU.

326

Id.

327

CBA Motion, supra note 324, at 9.
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annually328 including $3.5 million in contributions to the Local 54’s pension account, the National
Retirement Fund (“NRF”).329 The Debtors claimed they would suffer losses of $35 to $49 million
in fiscal years 2015 through 2019 if the CBA were to remain in place.330
Annual Payments to Local 54 Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement
Payments Under Local 54 CBA (in millions)
2011
2012
2013 2014 (to date)
Pension
$4.48
$4.72
$4.61
$2.63
Health & Welfare
$15.22 $13.67 $12.18 $6.77
Other Benefits
$0.22
$0.35
$0.23
$0.10
$19.92 $18.73 $17.02 $9.50
Total Local 54 CBA Payments
$32.0
$6.4
($6.1) ($25.7)
Consolidated EBITDA
The Debtors and Local 54 entered negotiations on August 28, 2014.331 TER proposed
modifications to the CBA that entailed eliminating the Debtors’ obligation to continue
contributions to the NRF and replace the obligation with an employee contribution matching
401(k) program.332 TER also proposed to substitute contributions to the Local 54 Health and
Welfare Fund with additional compensation for full time employees to supplement costs under the
Affordable Care Act.333 The Local 54 refused to make concessions regarding the health and
welfare provision.334 TER sought, among other relatively superficial requests, to reduce employee
paid vacation, holiday, and meal time and proposed that the term “sweep” be eliminated from the
list of duties hospitality staff would not be asked to perform.335 TER stated it was forced to file the
CBA Motion336 due to Local 54’s habitual avoidance of negotiations and routine failure to timely

328

Id. at 22.

329

Id. at 9.

330

Id. at 10.

331

Id. at 26.

332

CBA Motion, supra note 324, at 26.

333

Id.

334

Id.

335

Id. at 31.

336

Id. at 37.
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respond to proposals.337 Local 54 objected to TER’s Motion on October 7, 2014338 and stated the
Motion should be denied for four key reasons:339







The Debtors’ non-negotiable demand and failure to bring “relevant decision-makers” to the
bargaining table constituted a failure to satisfy the good faith bargaining requirement under 11
U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2).
The proposal failed to treat stakeholders fairly and equitably because it required permanent,
irreversible concessions from the Union Employees while seeking only contingent, reversible
concessions from others.
Local 54 had good cause to reject the proposed modifications and, further, made a counteroffer
that could have provided a simpler path to the relief the Debtors’ sought.
Debtors were legally unable to obtain the relief of which they sought because Section 1113(c)
provides only for rejection of a collective bargaining agreement in its entirety, not court
ordered modification of particular contract terms or implementation of a new CBA.340

Local 54 stated Section 1113(c) did not authorize “rejection” of terms and conditions of
employment that are imposed by statute.341 Local 54 argued that, “because the CBA that
established the employment terms at issue expired before the Debtors made their Section 1113
proposal, there was no contract in effect to be assumed or rejected.” Local 54 stated that federal
labor law “clearly” precluded courts from compelling a union and employer to reach a collective
bargaining agreement.342 This argument would prove unresolved and led the dispute to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit as a matter of first impression.343

337

CBA Motion, supra note 324.

Objection of Unite Here Local 54 to Debtors’ Motion for Entry of Order Rejecting Collective Bargaining
Agreement…, Docket no. 242, Case no. 14-12103, filed October 7, 2014.
338

339

Id. at 9-10.

340

Id. at 10.

341

In this case the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).

342

Id.

The issues on appeal: “Given that there was no collective bargaining agreement in effect between the Debtors and
Local 54 at the time the Debtors made their Section 1113 proposal and filed their S1113(c) motion, because the
CBA had expired by its terms on September 14, 2014 and was not thereafter renewed or extended by the parties, did
the Bankruptcy Court lack authority under 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c) to grant the Debtors’ application to (i) reject Local
54’s expired collective bargaining agreement and (ii) implement changes in the post-expiration terms and conditions
of employment imposed by the National Labor Relations Act?” See Certification to Court of Appeals by All Parties,
Docket no. 403, Case no. 14-12103, filed November 3, 2014.
343
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Debtors’ Schedules and Statements of Financial Affairs344
Trump Entertainment Resorts and the Subsidiary Debtors individually filed Schedules of
Assets and Liabilities345 (“Schedules”) and Statements of Financial Affairs346 (“Statements”) on
October 9, 2014.347
I.
Annual Earnings Disclosure
The bulk of TER’s income originated from hotel and casino revenues, returns on
investment bonds, and recent real estate tax settlements. Trump Taj Mahal Associates, LLC
reported revenues of $365.5 million in 2012, $304.6 million in 2013, and $183.3 million between
January and August of 2014.348 Trump Plaza Associates, LLC reported $139 million in 2012, $90.7
million in 2013, and $47.3 million during the same months in 2014.349 Trump Marina Associates,
LLC added to company revenue through interest earnings of $9.8 million in 2012, $432,916 in
2013, and $79,287 through August of 2014.350 Collectively, TER and its subsidiaries claimed
approximately $1.14 billion in revenues during the period reported.

All values in this section are rounded approximations obtained from the Debtors’ Schedules of Assets and
Liabilities or Statements of Financial Affairs.
344

345

Schedules of Assets and Liabilities for Trump Entertainment Resorts, Docket no. 264, Case no. 14-12103, filed
October 9, 2014 [hereinafter TER Schedule].
346

Statement of Financial Affairs for Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc., Docket no. 256, Case no. 14-12103, filed
October 9, 2014 [hereinafter TER Statement].
Each of the Debtors’ filings included a preface that incorporated relevant limitations, methodologies, and
disclaimers mutual to the collective Debtors (“Global Notes”). TER included language to proactively mitigate
errors in its disclosure and accounting, to reserve its right to contest the status of pending claims, and to avoid
relinquishing rights it may have under the Bankruptcy Code by making the financial statements. The Global Notes
stated the filings were not financial statements prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles, therefore, the values stated in the schedules and statement of financial affairs could be substantially
different than reports prepared under traditional accounting standards. The Global Notes stated that the Debtors
were unable to set forth a fair market value “in many instances,” that the values given reflected their “net book
value,” and that some personal property assets may have been unknown or unavailable for documentation.
Importantly, the Global Notes state that all existing or future setoffs were excluded from the Debtors’ Schedules and
Statements as were any credits or allowances from a Creditor to any Debtor.
347

348

Statements of Financial Affairs for Trump Taj Mahal Associates, LLC, Docket no. 260, Case no. 14-12103, filed
October 9, 2014 [hereinafter Taj Statement].
349

Statements of Financial Affairs for Trump Plaza Associates, LLC at 11-12, Docket no. 258, Case no. 14-12103,
filed October 9, 2014 [hereinafter Plaza Statement].
350

Statements of Financial Affairs for Trump Marina Associates, LLC at 11, Docket no. 259, Case no. 14-12103,
filed October 9, 2014 [hereinafter Marina Statement].
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2012
2013
2014351
Total

Top Subsidiary Earnings, January 2012 – August 2014
Taj Mahal
Trump Plaza
Trump Marina
$365.5 million
$139 million
$9.8 million
$304.6 million
$90.7 million
$432,916
$183.3 million
$47.3 million
$79,287
$853.4 million
$277 million
$10.3 million

II.
Personal and Property Assets
Trump Taj Mahal Associates, LLC reported approximately $296 million in real property
and $70.4 million in personal property assets which included $24.5 million in cash and savings,
$8.2 million in corporate and government bonds, $8.7 million in intellectual property, and $12.5
million in accounts receivable.352 Trump Plaza Associates, LLC reported approximately $16.1
million in real property and $19.3 million in personal property assets which included $6.5 million
in cash and savings, $6 million in government and corporate bonds, $2.4 million in accounts
receivable, and approximately $3.1 million in equipment and inventory.353
TER Holdings claimed approximately $337 million in personal property assets, including
$3.5 million in savings accounts, $13.5 million in receivable security deposits, $1.9 million in
insurance policy interests, and $318 million in accounts receivable (all but $1,574 from Co-debtors
Taj Mahal, Plaza, and Marina).354 Trump Marina Associates, LLC reported approximately $3.3
million in personal property assets, nearly all of which were bonds or interest receivable
thereupon.355 TERH LP Inc., Trump Entertainment Resorts Development Company, LLC, and
TER Development Co., LLC all reported zero assets and income.

Real Property
Personal Property
Total
351

Subsidiary Asset Disclosures
Taj Mahal
Trump Plaza
Trump Marina
$296 million
$16.1 million
No Report
$70.4 million
$19.3 million
$3.3 million
$366.4 million
$35.4 million
$3.3 million

TER Holdings
No Report
$337 million
$337 million

January 1, 2014 to August 31, 2014.

352

Schedules of Assets and Liabilities for Trump Taj Mahal Associates, LLC at 12-17, Docket no. 268, Case no. 1412103, filed October 9, 2014 [hereinafter Taj Schedule].
353

Schedules of Assets and Liabilities for Trump Plaza Associates, LLC, Docket no. 266, Case no. 14-12103, filed
October 9, 2014 [hereinafter Plaza Schedule].
354

Schedules of Assets and Liabilities for Trump Entertainment Resorts Holdings, L.P., Docket no. 265, Case no.
14-12103, filed October 9, 2014 [hereinafter TER Holdings Schedule].
355

Schedules of Assets and Liabilities for Trump Marina Associates, LLC, Docket no. 267, Case no. 14-12103, filed
October 9, 2014 [hereinafter Marina Schedule].
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III.
Trump Entertainment Resorts Creditor Claims
Excluding TER Development Co., LLC, each of the Debtors listed the outstanding $292
million First Lien Lender debt as the companies’ sole secured creditor liability. Unsecured priority
claims were limited to $12.3 million owed to the City of Atlantic City and “Casino Reinvestment
Dev Authority Special Improvement District Fees” by Taj Mahal and Trump Plaza.356357 Taj
Mahal, Trump Plaza, Trump Marina, and TER Holdings reported unsecured nonpriority claims of
$235.4 million,358 $92 million,359 $9.8 million,360 and $112,000,361 respectively. However, there
was significant overlap in the reported claims against the Debtors. A reasonably accurate figure
for TER subsidiaries’ comprehensive unsecured debt, documented in the Debtors’ final Disclosure
Statement, was approximately $212 million to $232 million.362 TER filed a detailed 170 page list
of its known creditors on September 9, 2014,363 but listed each of the values on its unsecured
nonpriority schedule as “unknown.”364
Subsidiaries’ Creditor Disclosures
Taj Mahal
Trump Plaza Trump Marina TER Holdings
Secured
$292 million
$292 million
$292 million
$292 million
Unsecured Priority
$12.3 million
$12.3 million
No Report
No Report
Unsecured Nonpriority $235.4 million
$92 million
$9.8 million
$112,000
Total
$539.7 million $396.3 million $301.8 million $292.1 million
IV.
Payments to Creditors and Insider Creditors
Bankruptcy Law prevents Debtors from making discretionary payments to particular
creditors under 11 U.S.C. § 547. Each of TER’s creditors were entitled to its proportionate share
356

Taj Schedule, supra note 352.

357

Plaza Schedule, supra note 353.

358

Taj Schedule, supra note 352.

359

Plaza Schedule, supra note 353.

360

Marina Schedule, supra note 355.

361

TER Holdings Schedule, supra note 354.

Disclosure Statement for Debtors’ Third Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code at 22, Docket no. 713, Case no. 14-12103, filed January 5, 2015 [hereinafter Third Disclosure
Statement].
362

Certification of Debtors’ Consolidated Creditor Matrix, Docket no. 14, Case no. 14-12103, filed September 9,
2014.
363

364

TER Schedule, supra note 345.
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of the estates, thus, the U.S. Trustee was entitled to undo certain prepetition transactions that may
have had the effect of undercutting the principle of pro rata distribution.365 Specifically, the
language of §547 states the Trustee may avoid a transfer to a creditor for an antecedent debt (one
that existed before the transfer) made while the debtor was insolvent and within 90 days before
bankruptcy (or one year if the recipient is an insider) if it permits the creditor’s attainment of more
value than it would otherwise receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation.366
Sections 548 and 544 provide the statutory basis to challenge fraudulent transfers under
federal and state law, respectively.367 A transfer of the debtors’ property to another party in order
to deter, hinder, or defraud a creditor, or to unfairly place such property out of the reach of a
creditor is a fraudulent transfer—the U.S. Trustee is given power to set aside or avoid such
transfers. In cases of fraudulent transfer, actual fraud requires proof of intent from the party
challenging the transfer.368 Constructive fraud requires the exchange for the transfer is less than
the reasonably equivalent value and the debtor is unable to pay its debts either at the time of transfer
or as a result thereof.369
Trump Entertainment Resorts payments to creditors within 90 days of filing were
documented at $51.1 million by Taj Mahal,370 $16.4 million by Trump Plaza,371 $19.1 million by
TER Holdings,372 and $39,000 by Trump Marina.373 The Debtors reported payments to current or

365

John Ayer, Michael Bernstein & Jonathan Friedland, Overview of Avoidance Actions, American Bankruptcy
Institute Journal (Mar. 2004), http://perma.cc/PY8P-W2DD.
366

11 U.S.C. § 547, Cornell University Law School, http://perma.cc/8QW8-XWB3.

367

Trey Monsour, Understanding Fraudulent Transfers and Ensuing Litigation, Law360.com,
http://perma.cc/QH4V-EYTJ.
368

Id.

369

Id.

370

Notice of Amendment to Statements of Financial Affairs or Trump Taj Mahal Associates at 391, Docket no.
1384, Case no. 14-12103, filed June 18, 2015.
371

Notice of Amendment to Statements of Financial Affairs or Trump Taj Mahal Associates at 92, Docket no. 1382,
Case no. 14-12103, filed June 18, 2015.
372

Statements of Financial Affairs for Trump Entertainment Resorts Holdings, L.P. at 12, Docket no. 257, Case no.
14-12103, filed October 9, 2014.
373

Notice of Amendment to Statements of Financial Affairs or Trump Marina Associates, LLC at 3, Docket no.
1383, Case no. 14-12103, filed June 18, 2015.
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former insider374 creditors within one year of filing in amounts of $31.2 million by Taj Mahal,375
$4.6 million by Trump Plaza,376 $24.1 million by TER Holdings,377 and $70,000 in intercompany
transfers by Trump Marina.378
Subsidiary Payments to Creditors and Insider Creditors
Taj Mahal
Trump Plaza
Trump Marina
Creditors
$51.1 million
$16.4 million
$39,000
Insider Creditors
$31.2 million
$4.6 million
$70,000
Total
$82.3 million
$22 million
$99,000

TER Holdings
$19.1 million
$24.1 million
$43.2 million

Trump Taj Mahal Associates largest insider payments were to current or former TER
officers and intercompany transfers to Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc.379 The Taj Mahal paid
approximately $75,600 to the company’s former CFO Dan McFadden in the year prior to the
filing.380 Donald Karrer, Kathleen McSweeney, and Michael Mellon received approximately
$182,700, $308,500, and $330,600, respectively.381 Taj Mahal’s intercompany payments to TER,
Inc. were approximately $29.8 million.382 Trump Plaza’s schedule of insider payments identified
approximately $4.6 million in payments to Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc.383
V.
Summary of Debtors’ Statements and Schedules; Claims and Creditors
TER and its subsidiaries held approximately $424.1 million in real and personal property
384
assets and owed approximately $641.6 million to the First Lien Lenders, Atlantic City, Levine

The Debtors define “insiders” pursuant to § 101(31) of the Bankruptcy Code as (a) current or former directors,
officers or persons in control of a debtor, (b) relatives of aforementioned persons, (c) general partners, or (d) an
affiliate of a debtor.
374

375

Taj Schedule, supra note 352.

376

Plaza Schedule, supra note 353.

377

TER Holdings Schedule, supra note 354.

378

Marina Schedule, supra note 355.

379

Taj Statement, supra note 348, at 418-27.

380

Id.

381

Id.

382

Id.

383

Plaza Statement, supra note 349, at 114.

384

$742.1 million reported minus $318 million in intercompany receivables.
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Staller, and numerous unsecured creditors.385 The Debtors generated approximately $626.5 million
in revenue over the 20 months leading up to the 2014 filing. These figures represent only what
TER was then able or willing to claim, and, as explicitly related in the Global Notes, were subject
to variation and incompleteness.
In addition to Icahn’s $292 million secured loan, TER and its subsidiaries had
approximately $212-232 million general unsecured debt and another $13.5 million in prepetition
unsecured trade debt.386 In addition to TER’s large class claimants, the Company was managing
disputes with Thermal Energy for approximately $3 million, Levin Staller for $1.5 million,
Atlantic City for $12-22 million, and the Gaming Companies for approximately $1.5 million.

4.5 The First Plan Proposal: Icahn’s Big Opportunity
The Plan and Disclosure Statement
Trump Entertainment Resorts and its subsidiary debtors filed a 56 page Joint Plan of
Reorganization (the “First Proposal” or “First Plan”)387 and an effectively empty Disclosure
Statement388 on October 1, 2014. The stated purpose of TER’s First Plan was to provide for the
restructuring of the Debtors’ liabilities in order to maximize stakeholder recovery, to enhance the
Debtors’ financial viability, and to preserve the existing business.389 The First Proposal
distinguished creditors by voting entitlement, impairment of Claims or Interests, and presumption
of Plan acceptance or rejection.390

385

Schedule of Claims, Primeclerk.com, http://perma.cc/63RA-QY9S.

Disclosure Statement for Debtors’ Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code at 23,
Docket no. 166, Case no. 14-12103, filed October 1, 2014 [hereinafter First Disclosure Statement].
386

Debtors’ Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code at 1, Docket no. 165, Case no.
14-12103, filed October 1, 2014 [hereinafter First Plan].
387

388

First Disclosure Statement, supra note 386, at 1.

389

Id. at 17.

390

First Plan, supra note 387, at 21.
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Class
Class 1
Priority NonTax
Class 2
Other
Secured

Class 3
First Lien
Credit
Agreement
Class 4
General
Unsecured
Class 5
Securities and
Subordinated
Class 6
Existing TER
Interests

Classification of Claims and Interests
Treatment
Rights unimpaired by Plan. Claim holder shall receive cash from the
applicable Reorganized Debtor in an amount equal to the Allowed
Claim on the First Distribution Date.
Rights unimpaired by Plan. Claim holder shall receive, at the
discretion of the Reorganized Debtors: (i) cash equal to such
Allowed Claim; (ii) the return of collateral securing such Allowed or
Secured Claim; or (iii) other treatment that will render the Claimant
unimpaired, pursuant to § 1124.391 Undersecured portions of Allowed
Claims shall be classified as a General Unsecured Claim. 392
Allowed Claims in the amount of $292,257,374.79. Holders of First
Lien Secured Claims shall receive (i) 55% of the shares of New
Common Stock issued by Reorganized TER; and (ii) the New Term
Loan.393
Holders of General Unsecured Claims not entitled to distribution.395

Holders of Existing Securities Law Claims or Equitably
Subordinated Claims not entitled to distribution.396
Holders of existing TER interests not entitled to distribution. All
exiting TER interests deemed cancelled and extinguished.

Impairment and Voting
Entitlement

Not impaired claims. Presumed to accept
plan under § 1126(f). Not entitled to
vote for acceptance or rejection of Plan.
Not impaired claims. Presumed to accept
plan under § 1126(f). Not entitled to
vote for acceptance or rejection of Plan.

Impaired claims. Holders are entitled to
vote to accept or reject the Plan. Class
acceptance requirements for approval.394
Impaired claims. Presumed to reject plan
under § 1126(g). Not entitled to vote for
acceptance or rejection of Plan.
Impaired claims. Presumed to reject plan
under § 1126(g). Not entitled to vote for
acceptance or rejection of Plan.
Impaired claims. Presumed to reject plan
under § 1126(g). Not entitled to vote for
acceptance or rejection of Plan.

Id. at 23 (“…provided, however, that Other Secured Claims incurred by a Debtor in the ordinary course of
business may be paid in the ordinary course of business in accordance with the terms and conditions of any
agreements relating thereto…”).
391

392

Id. See also Deficiency Claims: Law Insider, Deficiency Claim Sample Clauses, lawinsider.com,
http://perma.cc/FWP7-C5EL (“If the monies collected by or received by secured party in respect of any realization
upon or sale of the collateral are not sufficient to satisfy all obligations and liability of any debtor to secured party,
each debtor shall remain responsible to the secured party for any deficiency, and secured party shall be entitled to
claim such amount and all interest and costs associated therewith from any debtor.”).
393

First Plan, supra note 387, at 21.

First Disclosure Statement, supra note 386, at 34 (“An impaired Class of Claims shall have accepted the Plan if
(a) the holders of at least two thirds in amount of the Claims in such class actually voting on the Plan have voted to
accept it and (b) more than one-half in number of the holders in such class actually voting in the Plan have voted to
accept it.”).
394

First Plan, supra note 387, at 27 (Section 7.3: “…all agreements, instruments, and other documents evidencing
any Claim or Interest, other than intercompany interests, and any rights of any holder in respect thereof, shall be
deemed cancelled, discharged and of no force or effect.”).
395

Id. at 29-30 (Section 7.13: “No distributions under the Plan shall be made on account of an Allowed Claim that is
payable pursuant to one of the Debtors’ insurance policies until the holder of such Allowed Claims has exhausted all
remedies with respect to such insurance policy.”).
396
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Under the First Proposal, Trump Entertainment Resorts would issue 55% of new common
stock to the Icahn Partners (“New Common Stock”) while extinguishing between $212 million
and $232 million of its unsecured debt.397 The First Proposal summary of TER’s claims treatment
estimated 100% recovery for Classes 1 & 2, but did not estimate the value of claims in either
class.398 TER did not give an estimated recovery percentage on the Class 3 First Lien Lender’s
$292 million balance, and stated that Classes 4 through 6 would receive no distribution.399

Class
Class 1:
Class 2:
Class 3:
Class 4:
Class 5:
Class 6:

Recovery Amounts and Percentages Summary (First Proposal)
Estimated Amount of Claims or Interests
Estimated Amount of Recovery
$[x]
100%
$[x]
100%
$292,257,374.79
[x]%
n/a
0%
n/a
0%
n/a
0%

The stock exchange agreement between TER and the First Lien Lenders was to “equitize
a portion of their existing senior secured debt and exchange the remainder of that debt for new
debt requiring no cash interest payments.”400 The agreement was effectively a debt-for-equity swap
and would potentially save TER approximately $38 million in interest each year.401 TER proposed
to accept a second investment from the Icahn Partners in addition to cancelling the First Lien Debt
in an aggregate principal amount of $100 million with a five year maturity (the “New Term
Loan”).402 The New Term Loan would be secured by a first and second lien on substantially all of
the assets of the Reorganized Debtors;403 however, the recapitalization was contingent on the
Debtors’ receipt of $175 million in government assistance upon exit from bankruptcy in the form
of cash, tax credits, or other financial consideration.404

397

Id. at 19.

398

Id.

399

Id.

400

First Plan, supra note 387, at 17.

401

Id. at 18.

402

Id. at 17.

403

First Disclosure Statement, supra note 386, at 67.

404

First Plan, supra note 387, at 41.
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The Reorganization would be funded by the collective Debtors’ cash on hand in addition
to proceeds from the New Equity Investment.405 TER planned to emerge from bankruptcy free of
all claims or interests against it while vesting all pre-petition property, or property acquired during
reorganization, back to the respective Reorganized Debtor.406 In addition to trimming its debt, TER
allowed itself the opportunity to dispose of a number of existing executory contracts and unexpired
leases,407 presumably those were connected to the closing Trump Plaza, and if any disputes arose
therefrom, all claims regarding existing contracts or leases not assumed by TER would be
classified as unsecured and ineligible for distribution.408 Existing contracts or leases assumed
under the plan would be entitled to reimbursement for past monetary defaults as administrative
claims.409
Employee compensation and benefit programs of the Debtors—including savings,
retirement, healthcare, disability, and other incentive plans—would be terminated at the effective
date and immediately assumed by the Reorganized Debtors.410 Additionally, all employment
agreements would be terminated;411 however, the Reorganized Debtors would assume the Taj
Trade Collective Bargaining Agreements, the obligations of which were outlined in the CBA
Order.412 TER would fully dispose of the Plaza Collective Bargaining Agreements, as the Plaza
was in the process of closing its doors.413
TER and the Debtors set forth several conditions precedent to confirmation of the Plan and
Effective Date.414 TER’s conditions included: successful execution of the New Equity Investment
Agreement with the First Lien Lenders, all obligations to members of Local 54 – UNITE HERE
must be extinguished with entry of the modified CBA Order by the Bankruptcy Court, continued
enforceability of the Cash Collateral Order, and a commitment from one or more government
entities—including Atlantic City, Atlantic County, and the State of New Jersey—of $175 million
405

First Disclosure Statement, supra note 386, at 44.

406

Id.

407

Id. at 47-50.

408

Id. at 47.

409

Id.

410

First Plan, supra note 387, at 39.

411

Id. at 39-40.

412

Id. at 39.

413

Id. at 40.

414

Id. at 41-43.
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in financial support during the 5 year period immediately following TER’s reorganization.415 TER
allowed itself the opportunity to file a motion to vacate a Confirmation Order and, if vacated,
nullify the Plan in its entirety if the conditions were to go unsatisfied.416
Plan and Disclosure Statement Objections
On October 1, 2014, Trump Entertainment Resorts filed a Motion for the Court’s approval
of the Disclosure Statement and establishment of voting and objecting procedures and deadlines.417
TER’s Disclosure Statement and Approval Motions were immediately met by Objections from
Levine Staller, Trump Marks, Atlantic City, and the Unsecured Creditors’ Committee.




Levine Staller objected to the adequacy of TER’s Disclosure Statement and re-raised its
argument that the Statement misrepresented the priority and status of the debt in question and
that Levine Staller’s Charging Lien was a fully secured claim against the Debtors’ estates under
New Jersey law.418
Trump Marks objected to the Disclosure Statement on three grounds.419 First, it failed to
disclose the risks and consequences to the estates if Trump Marks were to succeed in its State
Court Action.420 Second, it failed to disclose the Debtors’ intentions with respect to the use or
disposition of the Trump name under the Plan.421 Third, it did not disclose how the Debtors
intended to address a $147,638 priority claim by Trump Marks for a ground lease advance to
the Debtors.422

415

First Plan, supra note 387, at 41.

416

Id. at 43.

Debtors’ Motion of Order (I) Approving the Disclosure Statement…, Docket no. 175, Case no. 14-12103, filed
October 1, 2014.
417

Objection of Levine, Staller, Sklar, Chan & Brown P.A. to the Debtors’ Motion for Entry of an Order Approving
the Proposed Disclosure Statement, Docket no. 366, Case no. 14-12103, filed October 28, 2014 [hereinafter Levine
First Statement Objection].
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Objection of Trump AC Casino Marks, LLC and Donald J. Trump to the Disclosure Statement for Debtors’ Joint
Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code at 2, Docket no. 376, Case no. 14-12103, filed
October 29, 2014 [hereinafter Trump First Statement Objection].
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Atlantic City’s objection related the Property Debtors’—Trump Taj Mahal Associates and
Trump Plaza Associates—tax default of approximately $12.3 million.423424 The City argued
the Disclosure Statement failed to recognize the City’s first-priority liens on the Debtors’
respective properties and did not address the liens as secured claims.425
Unsecured Creditors’ Committee Objection

The Unsecured Creditors’ Committee’s constituents were to receive nothing under the
Plan, and the committee’s actions were all aimed at creating some leverage that would result in
amendments of benefit to these otherwise shut out creditors. The Unsecured Creditors’ Committee
Objection focused first on the continued incompleteness of the Disclosure Statement after
numerous attempts by the Committee to verify information through discovery.426 The Committee
noted the Debtors failure to include Liquidation Analysis and Financial Projection attachments to
the Disclosure Statement; further, that material provisions of the Plan were excluded from the
Disclosure Statement; and finally, that key sections were designated as “To Come” or left blank,
including TER’s necessary tax relief and caps on administrative claims.427 Taken together, the
Committee argued the Disclosure Statement failed to provide information necessary to assess the
feasibility of the Plan.428
Beyond the lack of information, the Committee argued the Plan and Disclosure Statement
suffered from “fundamental problems” and deemed its solicitation and tabulation procedures a
“charade” and “complete waste of time.”429 After all, the only voting class was class 3, which
housed Icahn’s secured claims. All others were paid in full and deemed to accept or to receive
nothing and deemed to reject. The Committee stated the Plan was orchestrated by Mr. Icahn, who
“[did] not need a disclosure statement to determine whether to vote to accept or reject the Plan that
he imposed on the Debtors.”430 The Committee humorously included an entire section in its
Limited Objection of the City of Atlantic City to Debtors’ Disclosure Statement at 1-2, Docket no. 390, Case no.
14-12103, filed October 31, 2014 [hereinafter AC First Statement Objection].
423

424

Atlantic City expected the amount to reach $22 million by the Disclosure Statement Hearing.
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AC First Statement Objection, supra note 423, at 1-2.

Preliminary Objection and Reservation of Rights of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to Debtors’
Motion for Order (I) Approving the Disclosure Statement… at 5-7, Docket no. 389, Case no. 14-12103, filed
October 31, 2014 [hereinafter OCC First Statement Objection].
426

427

Id. at 2.
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objection addressing the fact that the Plan appears to solicit votes from several classes of creditors
while actually soliciting votes only from Mr. Icahn,431 and, since Mr. Icahn and TER had
presumably already agreed to the terms of the Plan, the Disclosure Statement was wholly
unnecessary.432
The Committee objection addressed a statement included in the Plan that noted the Debtors
would proceed to confirmation even if the Taj Mahal closed; the Committee argued that action
could be only for the sole purpose of preserving hundreds of millions of dollars in tax attributes
for the exclusive benefit of Mr. Icahn.433434 The Committee ended its preliminary statement by
arguing: “If Mr. Icahn wants to use the jurisdiction of the Court to preserve the Debtors’ valuable
tax attributes, then he must do so in a manner that is compliant with the requirements of the
Bankruptcy Code, including the fair and equitable treatment of general unsecured creditors.”435
The Committee went on to argue the Plan was “patently unconfirmable” for three reasons.436
First, because the Plan lacked a showing of sufficient likelihood that the Debtors would be
able to satisfy the “impaired consenting class” requirement of § 1129(a)(10).437 Section 1129
requires a vote by at least one impaired class, not including the votes of insiders, if such a class
exists; 438 thus, the Committee argued the Plan could not be confirmed if the First Lien Lenders
did not vote to accept. The OCC’s Objection to the Disclosure Statement asked the Court to reject
it on the grounds that “[i]f the Debtors cannot obtain assurance that the Icahn Parties will vote in
favor of the Plan, which is premised on conditions precedent dictated by the Icahn Parties, then
the Debtors cannot show a sufficient likelihood that they will be able to satisfy the Bankruptcy
Code.439

431

OCC First Statement Objection, supra note 426, at 7.

432

Id. at 8.
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Id. at 3.
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The Committee related its belief that the Taj closure was a foregone conclusion and that Mr. Icahn and TER were
working together to ensure Mr. Icahn would reap the benefit of the Debtors’ tax attributes.
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OCC First Statement Objection, supra note 426, at 3 (emphasis added).
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See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (“[i]f a class of claims is impaired under the plan, at least one class of claims that is
impaired under the plan must vote to accept the plan.”).
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OCC First Statement Objection, supra note 426, at 11 (emphasis omitted).
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Second, the Debtors would not be able to satisfy the Conditions Precedent to Conformation
included in the Plan based on the Taj Mahal remaining open.440 The Plan conditions are required
only “to the extent the Trump Taj Mahal . . . shall remain open,”441 and the Committee argued that
statements by Mr. Icahn suggested the Taj Mahal was certain to close.442 Thus, because the Debtors
identified Mr. Icahn as its only potential source of funding, and that source was apparently
committed to the closure of the Taj Mahal, the Plan could not be confirmed. The objection also
acknowledged TER’s inability to meet a second condition by failing to obtain government
financial support at the time of filing.443
Lastly, the Plan would violate 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(1)-(3) and § 1129(d) of the Bankruptcy
Code if the Debtors sought confirmation under alternative Conditions Precedent following closure
of the Taj Mahal.444 Section 1129(d) states that, if on request by a government party in interest, a
reorganization plan will not be confirmed if the principal purpose is the avoidance of taxes. The
aforementioned United States Code sections relate to good-faith and compliance with the
Bankruptcy Code. Based on the suggestion by Mr. Icahn that the Taj Mahal would almost certainly
close, the Committee argued that the only purpose of the Debtors was to preserve significant net
operating losses445 and other tax attributes to enable the First Lien Lenders to avoid paying taxes
on future income.446 In the Committee’s words: “There is no other reason for the debtors to incur
the delay and expense of a plan confirmation process in order to hand over two dark casinos to the
Icahn Parties under a Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization that provides zero value to any other nonpriority creditors.”447
The Committee maintained that strong factual and legal grounds mandated distribution of
significant value to the Debtors’ general unsecured creditors, and therefore a vote by the Class 4
claimants.448 But, even assuming the Plan would be amended to allow its constituents a seat at the
table, the Committee preemptively refused the terms in its reiteration of the Disclosure Statement’s
440

Id. at 10.

441

First Plan, supra note 387, at 36.

442

OCC First Statement Objection, supra note 426, at 12.
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Id. at 11-14.
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Id. at 10.
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Federal carryover figures were approximately $450 million. New Jersey carryover figures were approximately
$840 million.
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447

Id. at 17.

448
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exclusion of information on the treatment of intercompany claims or insider compensation,
material terms of the Plan such as the Conditions Precedent to confirmation, and analysis on the
valuation of the Reorganized Debtors.
Judge Gross’s CBA Order Reaches the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
Judge Gross granted TER’s Motion to reject the Local 54 and Trump Taj Mahal Collective
Bargaining Agreement on October 17, 2014.449 The Court held the Debtors’ Proposal to Local 54
was based on the most complete and reliable information available, provided modifications
necessary to permit the reorganization of the Debtors, and that Local 54 failed to show good cause
for its rejection.450 Judge Gross stated that “The balance of equities clearly favors rejection of the
CBA”451 and authorized TER to implement the terms and conditions of the proposed modifications
to the Taj Mahal Bargaining Agreement.452
Material Modifications to the Taj Mahal Collective Bargaining Agreement453
The Debtor proposes to expand its right to direct and control employees, such as by
Control,
consolidating jobs, by determining and re-determining job content and determining the
Discharge
assignment of work, in order to allow for a more flexible use of staff and generate cost-savings.
and Seniority
The Debtor proposes to eliminate paid meal times. Rather than a paid meal time, the Debtor
Meal and
proposes that all employees working on a shift of six hours or more will be provided with an
Locker
unpaid, uninterrupted thirty minute meal period. Accordingly, the Debtor would also require
Facility
that employees clock out prior to the commencement of their assigned unpaid break and clock

Holidays

Hours of
Work

in upon the conclusion of their break and return to work. This modification would ensure that
amounts paid will match actual work performed.
The Debtor proposes to reduce the amount of pay employees receive for working on a holiday.
Rather than receiving straight pay for hours actually worked plus holiday pay, the employee
would only receive a more market-standard time-and-a-half for hours actually worked on the
holiday, thereby matching the amount paid to work actually performed. Employees would still
receive holiday, at straight time, for the portion of the employee’s usual shift which the
employee does not work due to the holiday.
The Debtor proposes to eliminate the guarantee that employees will be paid for a full shift if
they are sent home at the direction of the employer after the completion of more than half their

Order Granting Debtors’ Motion for Entry of Order (i) Rejecting Collective Bargaining Agreement Between
Trump Taj Mahal Associates, LLC and Unite Here Local 54 Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1113(C) and (ii) Implementing
Terms of Debtors’ Proposal Under 11 U.S.C. § 1113(B), Docket no. 318, Case no. 14-12103, filed October 17, 2014
[hereinafter CBA Order].
449

450

Id. at 2.

451

Id.

452

Id. at 3.

453

Id. at 1-3.
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Health and
Welfare,
Pension and
Severance

Term of
Contract

shift. Instead, the Debtor proposes that employees who are sent home shall be guaranteed pay
for half of their scheduled shift of the hours actually worked, whichever is greater.
The Debtor proposes to withdraw from the Health and Welfare Fund and, instead, substitute
with health care coverage under the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Fulltime employees, however, would receive additional compensation of $2,000 per year which
will enable them to offset and, in some cases, completely defray the cost of obtaining health
insurance. Non-union employees would receive identical treatment.
The Debtor further proposes to cease making contributions to, and permanently withdraw from,
the Pension Fund (National Retirement Fund) and, instead institute an employer sponsored
401(k) plan with the employer matching employee contributions up to 1% of each employee’s
compensation per year.
The Debtor proposes to enter into a four year agreement such that the benefits of the proposed
modifications are realized over a necessary period of time.

The Debtors and Local 54 petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit for a direct appeal to review Judge Gross’s Order. The appeal was granted on December
15, 2014.454 The Court of Appeals “resolved the effect of two potentially conflicting provisions of
federal law” between Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, which allowed a Chapter 11 debtor
to reject its CBA, and the National Labor Relations Act, which prohibited an employer from
unilaterally changing the terms and conditions of a CBA even after its expiration.455
The Court of Appeals held the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction over TER’s motion to
reject the CBA, and, although the Bankruptcy Court did not have authority to interpret or
administer the NLRA, the governing statute was non-jurisdictional and only allowed a debtor to
terminate or modify its ongoing obligations to its employees.456 The Court of Appeals affirmed
the Bankruptcy Court’s holding and stated that a debtor may reject an expired CBA or its
continuing obligations as defined by the expired CBA, and that the rejection of the Debtors’
continuing labor obligations, as defined by the expired CBA, was necessary to permit the Debtors’
reorganization.457 The United States Supreme Court denied Local 54’s cert petition in May
2016.458
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4.6 The Second Plan Proposal: Crumbs for Unsecured Creditors
The Amended Plan and Disclosure Statement
In response to the objections to its first plan proposal, Trump Entertainment Resorts filed
amendments to the initial Plan and Disclosure Statement on November 3, 2014. The first
amendments were effectively copies of the originals, continuing to refuse payment to the
Unsecured Creditors, but included approximately $370,000 in disbursements to Class 2. TER
submitted a second round of amendments less than 5 hours before a continued hearing459 on
November 14, 2014,460461 in response to a settlement offer made by the Committee three days
prior.462
The second amendment to the Plan (the “Second Proposal” or “Second Plan”) offered the
Unsecured Creditors a seat at the voting table and entitled them to their pro rata share of “General
Unsecured Claims Distribution” plus “Litigation Trust Interests.” However, the Distribution was
set at $1 million—less than half of a percentage point of the collective unsecured claims’
amount,463 and the Litigation Trust was unfunded at that time.464

Class
Class 1:
Class 2:
Class 3:
Class 4:
Class 5:
Class 6:

Recovery Amounts and Percentages Summary (Second Proposal)
Estimated Amount of Claims or Interests
Estimated Amount of Recovery
$0.00
$369,000.00
$292,257,374.79
$212,000,000.00
n/a
n/a

100%
100%
45.3% - 56.5%
0.47%465
0%
0%

Motion…to Terminate Exclusivity…and (II) Supplemental Objection of the Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors to Debtors’ Motion for Order (A) Approving the Disclosure Statement… at 3, Docket no. 482, Case no.
14-12103, filed November 14, 2014 [hereinafter OCC Motion to Terminate and Second Objection].
459

Debtors’ Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, Docket no.
476, Case no. 14-12103, filed November 14, 2014 [hereinafter Second Plan].
460

Disclosure Statement for Debtors’ Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, Docket no. 477, Case no. 14-12103, filed November 14, 2014 [hereinafter Second Statement].
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OCC Motion to Terminate and Second Objection, supra note 459, at 10.
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Second Statement, supra note 461, at 22.
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OCC Motion to Terminate and Second Objection, supra note 459, at 10.
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“Potential value” of the Litigation Trust Interests not included.
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The Reorganized Debtors’ Financial Forecast
I.
TER Valuation Analysis
TER’s valuation analysis was conducted under the assumption the Company’s financial
projections and relief conditions would be met, the Taj Mahal operating on a going concern basis,
and the Plaza on a closed basis.466 TER’s financial advisor, Houlihan Lokey, estimated the range
of the Reorganized Debtors’ value to be between $240 million and $290 million467 as of October
24, 2014.468 Houlihan Lokey estimated TER’s value would be between $125 million and $170
million if the Taj Mahal were closed.469 The valuations below incorporate the $100 million New
Term Loan which, if excluded, would leave a maximum total enterprise value available to prepetition creditors at $165 million if the Taj Mahal remained open and $132.5 million if the Taj
Mahal closed its doors.470
Valuation of Reorganized Debtors’ Casino Assets
Valuation
Factors and Methodology
Trump Plaza
Taj Mahal (Open)

Taj Mahal (Closed)

$20 - $30 million471 (1)
(2)
$265 million
(1)
(2)
(3)
$80 - $100 million (1)
(2)

Previous offers received
Metrics on recently closed casinos
Comparable public company analysis
Precedent transactions analysis
Discounted cash flow approach
Discount of “Revel” casino recent sale price
Asset liquidation proceeds

II.
TER Liquidation Analysis
Trump Entertainment Resort’s Liquidation Analysis showed that the holders of claims in
Class 3 would receive less value in a Chapter 7 liquidation than they would under the Plan. 472 In
fact, TER’s analysis showed its hypothetical liquidation value estimates at a low of $105.2 million

466

Second Statement, supra note 461, at 111.

467

Value determined after incorporating the $100 million New Term Loan.
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Second Statement, supra note 461, at 111.

469

Id.

470

Id. at 116.

471

Assumes Taj Mahal remains open and TER obtains requested government relief.

472

Second Statement, supra note 461, at 118.
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and a high of $143.4 million.473 The final proceeds for distribution, excluding TER’s property
assets, would ultimately be between $78 million and $102 million after wind-down costs,
professional and trustee fees, disputed claims, and the Cash Collateral Administrative Fee Carveout.474 TER claimed the Taj Mahal and Plaza would be sold on a “fire sale” basis, at a 20%
discount, which would result in liquidation value ranges of $64-80 million and $16-24 million,
respectively. According to TER, general unsecured claims would receive zero recovery under a
Chapter 7 liquidation given the insufficient value to satisfy the secured portion of the First Lien
Credit Agreement Claims in full.
III.
Reorganized Debtors’ Financial Projections
The Reorganized Debtors’ financial forecast was prepared by TER management with
assistance from various professionals and reflected the Debtors’ estimation of the expected
results of operations and cash flow for fiscal years 2015-2019.475 TER warned that although the
assumptions were reasonable, it operated in an extremely competitive environment and faced
many uncertainties.476 Among the challenges facing the organization was the potential for
gaming expansion in nearby communities, regulatory developments, competitor actions, and
adverse effects of changes to the Debtors’ customary practices.477
Gaming revenue estimates were based on several factors including presumptions
regarding the growth of the Atlantic City gaming market and the effect of competitor closures. 478
TER stated 50% of the market attributed to recently closed casinos would remain in Atlantic
City, but the overall market was expected to decline approximately 5% in 2015-2017.479 Nongaming revenues were based on assumed percentages of revenue based on 2014 expected
results.480
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Financial Projections

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

REVENUES
Gaming
Rooms
Food and Beverage
Other
Gross Revenues
Less Promotional Allowances
Net Revenues

206.5
46.9
26.4
11.3
$291.1
(78.4)
$212.7

235.4
53.4
30
12.9
$331.7
(89.3)
$242.4

223.6
50.7
28.5
12.3
$315.1
(84.9)
$230.3

223.6
50.7
28.5
12.3
$315.1
(84.9)
$230.3

223.6
50.7
28.5
12.3
$315.1
(84.9)
$230.3

COSTS AND EXPENSES
Gaming (ex-gaming taxes)
Gaming Taxes
Rooms Food and Beverage
Property Taxes
General and Administrative
Corporate Allocation
Plaza Carrying Costs
Unadjusted EBITDA

(76.8)
(19.1)
(27.2)
(9.8)
(71.7)
(4.1)
(9.2)
($5.3)

(82.1)
(21.8)
(29)
(9.8)
(71.7)
(4.1)
(9.2)
$14.6

(80)
(20.7)
(28.3)
(9.8)
(71.7)
(4.1)
(9.2)
$6.5

(80)
(20.7)
(28.3)
(9.8)
(71.7)
(4.1)
(9.2)
$6.5

(80)
(20.7)
(28.3)
(9.8)
(71.7)
(4.1)
(9.2)
$6.5

SECTION 1113 SAVINGS
Health and Welfare
Pension Savings
Work Rule Changes
Pro Forma EBITDA

8.5
3.7
5.8
$12.7

8.5
3.7
5.8
$32.6

8.5
3.7
5.8
$24.5

8.5
3.7
5.8
$24.5

8.5
3.7
5.8
$24.5

OTHER CASH FLOW
Maintenance Capex
Required CRDA Investments
Free Cash Flow

(15)
(3)
($5.3)

(15)
(3)
$14.6

(15)
(3)
$6.5

(15)
(3)
$6.5

(15)
(3)
$6.5

Unsecured Creditors’ Objection to the Second Proposal
The frustrated Committee filed a Supplementary Objection to the Second Proposal on
November 14, 2014.481 The OCC stated its dissatisfaction with the nominal proposed allocation to
the Unsecured Creditors and argued that TER, with $30 million of cash on hand, had sufficient
liquidity even without additional financing to avoid a liquidation; thus, the “Debtors [could not]
afford to embark on a doomed chapter 11 plan confirmation process and then push the ‘reset’
button when confirmation of the Debtors/Icahn Plan is denied.”482 The Committee requested the
Court’s denial of the Second Disclosure Statement and, if the Court was not inclined to do so,
asked that the Court modify the proposed Statement so that (1) an allowance of Class 3 First Lien
481

OCC Motion to Terminate and Second Objection, supra note 459.

482

Id. at 2-3.
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Credit Agreement Claims for voting purposes would not impair the rights of any party in interest
to seek to have such vote designated pursuant to § 1126(e),483 and (2) ordinary course trade
creditors should be excluded from the Administrative Claims Bar Date for goods or services
provided within 30 days of the Bar Date.484
The Committee questioned the Second Proposal’s inclusion of unspecified terms and
amounts of debtor-in-possession financing, the Debtors’ cash position, and the Icahn Parties’
refusal of transparency, stating: “The Debtors and the Icahn Parties have sought to steamroll the
Committee with conclusory allegations about the extent of their liens and claims. When the
Committee attempted to test [those] allegations in discovery, the Icahn Parties hid behind a
specious assertion of common interest privilege485 with the Debtors.”486
The OCC compared the TER Valuation and Liquidation Analyses, which were
effectively the same if the Taj Mahal were to close487 and analyzed TER’s cash position.488 The
Committee’s analysis showed that the Debtors’ overall cash balance had increased since the
Petition Date which was contrary to TER’s position that, absent debtor-in-possession financing,
the Debtors would run out of cash near the end of 2014.489

Cash Balances
Floor Cash
Working Capital
Internet Gaming
Total Cash

Creditors’ Committee Financial Analysis
Original Budget
Variance Report
(Petition Date)
(November 7, 2014)
$17,550,000
$10,522,000
$7,954,000
$17,164,000
($1,300,000)
($1,700,000)
$26,804,000
$29,386,000

Closure Budget
(November 14, 2014)
$10,600,000
$14,947,000
($1,000,000)
$26,547,000

See U.S.C. § 1126(e) (“On request of a party in interest, and after notice and a hearing, the court may designate
any entity whose acceptance or rejection of such plan was not in good faith, or was not solicited or procured in good
faith or in accordance with the provisions of this title”).
483

484

OCC Motion to Terminate and Second Objection, supra note 459, at 16.

485

See United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2nd Cir. 1989) (The common interest privilege serves to
protect the confidentiality of communications passing from one party to the attorney for another party where a joint
defense effort or strategy has been decided upon and undertaken by the parties and their respective counsel).
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Id. at 2.

Debtors’ reorganization value of $100 million to $155 million if the Taj Mahal closed and $105 million to $143
million upon liquidation before wind-down costs.
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In addition to the Supplementary Objection, and based on their theory the Taj Mahal was
primed to cease operations, the OCC’s Motion requested termination of exclusivity to permit the
Committee to file and solicit acceptances of a Chapter 11 liquidating plan, pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 1121(d).490 The Committee then set forth a plan proposal of its own (the “Committee Plan”). The
OCC stated the Committee Plan would provide fair and equitable treatment to all creditors and
satisfy outstanding administrative and priority claims.491 The objectives and key terms of the
Committee Plan were as follows:





The Icahn Parties would receive the Debtors’ casino assets to satisfy their secured claims.
The City of Atlantic City would retain its secured tax claims against the applicable properties.
Administrative expenses and priority claims would be paid from the remaining cash on hand.
The Debtors’ non-casino assets, including additional remaining cash and claims and causes
of action, would be transferred to a liquidating trust for the benefit of holders of allowed
general unsecured claims (including the Icahn Parties’ deficiency claims).
Trump Entertainment’s Motion for Authorization of Post-Petition Financing

On November 26, 2014, the Debtors filed a Motion for authorization to obtain post-petition
financing from the Icahn Parties (the “DIP Motion”).492 TER sought to obtain senior secured
priming and superpriority financing, first in the form of a $5 million loan facility, later readjusted
and approved for the final amount of $26.5 million.493 The Debtors and First Lien Lenders stated
the available Cash Collateral was insufficient to satisfy their ongoing financial requirements
regarding administration of the Chapter 11 cases. DIP financing was necessary, the Debtors
argued, to enable the Taj Mahal’s continued operations through consummation of the Plan.494
I.
Levine Staller Objection
Levine Staller objected to the entry of an order on the DIP Motion that would grant any
relief that may be inconsistent with the Court’s then-pending decision in connection with the

490

Id. at 1.

491

Id. at 3.

Debtors’ Motion for Order Authorizing Debtors to Obtain Postpetition Financing…Granting Adequate Protection
to the Prepetition Secured Parties…Granting Liens and Superpriority Claims, and Modifying the Automatic Stay,
Docket no. 565, Case no. 14-12103, filed November 26, 2014 [hereinafter DIP Motion].
492
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Order Authorizing the Debtors to Amend the DIP Credit Agreement and Amending the Final DIP Order on
Account of Such Amendment at 2, Docket no. 1144, Case no. 14-12103, filed March 19, 2015 [hereinafter DIP
Order].
494

DIP Motion, supra note 492, at 6-7.
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disputed Charging Lien Motion and Levin Staller’s secured claim.495 Levine Staller argued the
DIP financing would impermissibly prime its fully secured claim and perfected Charging Lien
without Levine Staller’s consent in a supplemental objection on January 13, 2015.496 Levine Staller
stated it fully supported DIP financing, provided the firm receive adequate protection.497 The Icahn
Parties filed a reply to the objection and argued the court had only considered the perfection and
priority of Levine Staller’s claim, not the value.498 Further, Levine Staller had yet to meet its
burden of valuing the claim—the evidence proffered by Levin Staller to date had conclusively
established the value of their claim as unsecured.499 Because the lien was subordinate to the First
Lien Parties’ claims, Section 506(a) mandated that Levin Staller’s claim must be treated as
unsecured.500
II.
Trump Marks Objection
Trump AC Casino Marks filed a limited objection and reservation of rights with respect to
the Debtors’ Motion for DIP financing “to the limited extent that it provides for an impermissible
modification of the parties’ rights and obligations under the License Agreement…and
impermissibly includes among the collateral securing the DIP Loan the license agreement and the
Debtors’ rights thereunder.”501 Icahn responded to Trump Marks’ objection by stating that Trump
Marks failed to disclose a provision of the License Agreement that stated Trump Marks in fact
consented to the Debtors’ pledge of their rights under the Agreement to the First Lien Parties—“it
is utter gamesmanship for Trump [Marks] to have consented to the Debtors’ pledge of their rights
to secure hundreds of millions of dollars due under the prepetition facility, but to oppose the grant
to secure the proposed… [DIP Loan].”502
The parties came to an agreement regarding Trump Marks initial objection to the
modification of its license agreement; however, after the Court approved an extension for the
Debtors’ use of DIP Loans as cash collateral, the Debtors notified Trump Marks the Icahn Parties
Objection and Reservation of Rights of Levine Staller…, Docket no. 583, Case no. 14-12103, filed December 3,
2014.
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Supplemental Objection of Levine Staller… at 4, Docket no. 757, Case no. 14-12103, filed January 13, 2015.
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Id.

First Lien Parties’ Reply to Levine Staller… at 3-4, Docket no. 805, Case no. 14-12103, filed January 23, 2015
[hereinafter Icahn Reply to Levine Objections].
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499

Id.

500

Id. at 9.

Limited Objection and Reservation of Rights of Trump AC Casino Marks… at 1-2, Docket no. 589, Case no. 1412103, filed December 3, 2014.
501

Response of First Lien Parties to Trump AC’s Objection to the Debtors’ Debtor in Possession Financing Motion
at 2, Docket no. 646, Case no. 14-12103, filed December 17, 2014.
502
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may have second thoughts with respect to language agreed upon by the parties in the motion to
extend.503 Trump Marks supplemented the initial objection later the same day and therein renewed
the limited objection and cross-moved for entry of an order vacating the Cash Collateral extension
order “to the extent they provide that the license agreement and the Debtors’ rights thereunder
[were] included within the collateral securing the Adequate Protection Liens.”
III.
DIP Agreement and Financing Authorization
After determining the relief requested in the DIP Motion “fair and reasonable and in the
best interests of the Debtors, their creditors, their estates, and all parties in interest,”504 Judge Gross
authorized the Debtors to obtain senior secured priming and superpriority post-petition financing,
in an aggregate principal amount not to exceed $26.5 million, pursuant to the terms of the Court
Order and Credit Agreement between the Icahn Parties and TER.505 The Court found TER’s
position in need of post-petition financing persuasive and held the Debtors “need[ed]” to obtain
financing in order to permit the orderly continuation of the operation of their business, to maintain
relationships, to make capital expenditures, and to satisfy other working capital and operational
needs.506 Judge Gross permitted liens placed on TER’s assets to the assurance and benefit of the
Icahn Parties (the “DIP Collateral”)507 and prohibited use of the DIP financing to obtain other
security interests equal or senior to the DIP Liens or to take any proactive measures to challenge
the validity of the DIP Agreement or Liens therein.508

503

Supplement to Limited Objection and Reservation of Rights of Trump AC Casino Marks, LLC, with Respect to
the Debtors’ Motion for Order (I) Authorizing Debtors to Obtain Postpetition Financing…, Docket no. 750, Case no.
14-12103, filed January 12, 2015.
Final Order Authorizing Debtors to Obtain Postpetition Financing…Granting Adequate Protection to the
Prepetition Secured Parties…Granting Liens and Superpriority Claims, and Modifying the Automatic Stay at 4,
Docket no. 846, Case no. 14-12103, filed January 30, 2015 [hereinafter DIP Financing Order].
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Id. at 3.
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Id. at 33.
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Trump Entertainment’s Settlement with the Online Gaming Companies
Trump Entertainment Resorts filed Motions to approve settlements between the Debtors,
Betfair Interactive,509 and Ultimate Gaming510 on December 4, 2014 (respectively the “Betfair”
and “Ultimate Gaming” “Settlements”). The Betfair511 and Ultimate Gaming512 Settlements were
approved in full by Judge Gross on December 19, 2014. TER formally denied Betfair’s accusations
but stated the settlement agreement would “preserve estate assets” by avoiding further litigation.513
The Betfair Settlement encompassed all claims and causes of action with respect to the Online
Gaming Agreement, ownership of Betfair Customer Data, and cash deposited in the Online
Gaming and Suspense Accounts.514 The Betfair settlement provided that Betfair owned the
Customer Data, the remaining funds in the Suspense Account belonged and would be remitted to
Betfair, the Online Gaming Agreement would be terminated, and Betfair would pay Plaza
Associates $46,000 in cash.515 Betfair was deemed to hold an Allowed General Unsecured Claim
in the amount of $700,000.516 TER would have access to approximately $400,000 in the Online
Gaming Account for reimbursement of third-party expenses and operational use.517
The Ultimate Gaming Settlement terms generally reflected the Betfair Settlement in respect
to causes of action. However, Ultimate Gaming was to cease operations, as opposed to Betfair,
who would continue operating under an alternate gaming license.518 TER was permitted to use
Gaming Account funds to reimburse itself for expenses associated with the Gaming Agreement,
New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement fees, and Debtor-funded player withdrawals.519 All
Debtors’ Motion for Entry of an Order…Approving Settlement By and Among the Debtors and Betfair
interactive US LLC, Docket no. 591, Case no. 14-12103, filed December 4, 2014.
509

Debtors’ Motion for Entry of an Order…Approving Settlement Agreement by and Among the Debtors and
Fertitta Acquisitions Co LLC, D/B/A Ultimate Gaming, Docket no. 595, Case no. 14-12103, filed December 4,
2014.
510

Order…Approving Settlement By and Among the Debtors and Betfair Interactive US LLC, Docket no. 670, Case
no. 14-12103, filed December 19, 2014 [hereinafter Betfair Settlement].
511

Order…Approving Settlement By and Among the Debtors and Fertitta Acquisitions Co LLC, D/B/A Ultimate
Gaming, Docket no. 669, Case no. 14-12103, filed December 19, 2014 [hereinafter Ultimate Gaming Settlement].
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Betfair Settlement, supra note 511, at 5.
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Id. at 5-6.
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Id. at 7.
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Ultimate Gaming Settlement, supra note 512, at 5.
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Id. at 5-6.
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remaining funds in the Gaming Account would go to TER, less $500,000 payable to Ultimate
Gaming.520 The Ultimate Gaming Online Gaming Agreement was terminated on September 3,
2014.521

4.7 The Final Plan Proposal: Little Hope for the Taj Mahal
The Plan and Disclosure Statement
Trump Entertainment Resorts filed a third amended disclosure statement522 and Plan
Proposal (“Third Proposal” or “Final Plan”)523 on January 1, 2015. The Final Plan conspicuously
changed the language of Debtors’ intention to preserve its business from a “going concern” basis
to a “go-forward” basis,524 perhaps to suggest a change in attitude toward a resolution. TER again
stated the Plan would enable TER to avoid a forced liquidation and continue operations. The Third
Proposal stated the Taj Mahal was to remain open without government assistance and removed the
impractical condition to the Plan’s approval.525 TER proposed to enter into an agreement with the
Icahn Parties526 (then D/B/A IEH Investments I LLC) who would fully equitize their existing
senior secured debt by receiving 100% of new TER shares post-reorganization.527 IEH Investments
would provide $13.5 million in new-money exit financing in the form of a New Term Loan. The
New Term Loan528 would be used to repay the outstanding principal amount of loans under the
DIP Credit Agreement, fees and expenses associated with the First Lien Term Loan Facility,
payment of administrative expenses, priority claims, and to finance TER’s ongoing working
capital.529 To summarize, Mr. Icahn was to purchase Trump Entertainment Resorts for the
520

Id. at 6.

521

Id.

Disclosure Statement for Debtors’ Third Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, Docket no. 713, Case no. 14-12103, filed January 1, 2015 [hereinafter Third Statement].
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Debtors’ Third Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, Docket no.
712, Case no, 14-12103, filed January 1, 2015 [hereinafter Third Plan].
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Third Statement, supra note 522, at 20.
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Id. at 36.
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Id. at 56.
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Id. at 52.

528

Later adjusted to $16 million plus the aggregate outstanding principal amount of loans under the DIP Credit
Agreement.
Notice of Filing of Plan Supplement for Debtors’ Third Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code at 227-28, Docket no. 928, Case no. 14-12103, filed February 15, 2015.
529

80

remaining amount owed under the First Lien Credit Agreement and provide a loan to offset its
relatively superficial debt resolution to the remaining secured and priority interests.
Treatment of Claims under the Final Plan
All allowed DIP Claims were to be paid in full in cash, and all liens and security interests
granted to secure such claims and obligations would be terminated upon full satisfaction thereof.530
Holders of administrative expense and fee claims would be paid in cash in an amount equal to the
claim allowed, provided that allowed administrative expense claims representing liabilities
incurred in the ordinary course of business by the debtors, as debtors in possession, would be paid
from the Debtors’ pockets.531 TER stated it would establish a Professional Fee Account that would
be funded with cash equal to the lesser value of the estimated amount of the collective Fee Claims
or the amount set forth on the Fee Schedule, less any post-petition payments made prior to the
effective date.532 Holders of Priority Tax Claims (Atlantic City) would receive cash in an amount
equal to such claim at the effective date or deferred payments over a period of no less than five
years after the Petition Date.533 TER eventually settled with Atlantic City for $12 million in late
2015.534
Although the Plan’s claimant classifications remained the same, Trump Entertainment
Resorts modified its treatment of General Unsecured Claims.535 Unsecured claimants now had an
option under the Plan. If a claimant opted to release the Debtors from all claims existing on the
Plan’s Effective Date based on any transaction that took place prior to the Effective Date, they
would be entitled to a proportional share of Class A Distribution Trust Beneficial Interests. The
releases were valuable—Class A held 75% of the aggregate value of the Distribution Trust assets.
Claimants that opted not to release the Debtors would receive disbursement from the Class B
Distribution Trust.

530

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Under Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy
Rule 3020 Confirming Debtors’ Third Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code as Modified at 24, Docket no. 1123, Case no. 14-12103, filed March 12, 2015 [hereinafter Plan Order].
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Id. at 24-26.
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Third Plan, supra note 523, at 20.

534

Casino Connection AC, Trump Entertainment Pays Atlantic City Property Taxes (Dec. 2015),
http://perma.cc/HB6P-L9EH.
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Plan Order, supra note 530, at 30.
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Objections to the Third Statement and Plan Proposal
I.
Creditors’ Committee Objection to Disclosure Statement Approval
The Committee filed its objection to the Third Disclosure Statement on January 12,
536
2015. The OCC contended the Debtors failure to finalize an agreement with the prepetition
lenders (including the Icahn Parties) to fund the administration of the Debtors’ Chapter 11 cases
rendered consideration of the Statement premature.537 Indeed, the Court determined prior to the
OCC’s objection that postpetition financing was a necessary condition to confirmation of the
Plan.538 The OCC argued that even if TER and the Icahn Parties were to formalize a post-petition
financing agreement before the Confirmation Hearing, the Third Plan remained “too incomplete,
contingent and speculative to warrant approval of the Disclosure Statement.”539 The Committee’s
assertion that the Third Statement and Plan were unconfirmable relied on the arguments that:






The Third Plan provided that the Debtors would be required to repay $20 million in postpetition financing (in addition to “millions of dollars” in other administrative expense and
priority claims) but were to receive only $13.5 million in exit financing to do so,540
The Third Plan removed two key components previously identified as necessary to future
profitability: It no longer included a $100 million New Term Loan from the Icahn Parties to
fund capital improvements to allow TER to remain competitive, nor did it include the formerly
necessary $175 million in government concessions.541
The Disclosure Statement failed to contain critical “adequate information” that would allow
unsecured creditors to make an informed decision to accept or reject the Plan, including (1)
lists of Causes of Action being retained or waived by the Debtors, (2) a discussion of
outstanding intercompany claims, (3) the terms and conditions of the New Term Loan (other
than the $13.5 million principle amount, and (4) a discussion of the Debtors’ viability under
the “dramatically different circumstances” if the Third Plan.542

536

Second Supplemental Objection and Reservation of Rights of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to
Debtors’ Motion for Order (A) Approving the Disclosure Statement…, Docket no. 743, Case no. 14-12103, filed
January 12, 2015 [hereinafter OCC Third Statement Objection].
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OCC Third Statement Objection, supra note 536, at 4.
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The OCC stated that “At its core, the Third Amended Plan [was] nothing more than an
option for the Icahn Parties to exercise, renegotiate, or terminate in [their] sole discretion.” The
Icahn Parties continued to demand broad and impermissible third party releases, yet refused to
offer more than $1 million to unsecured creditors.543 The Committee maintained that moving
forward with Plan confirmation would not serve the interests of the Debtors’ estates or any creditor
other than Mr. Icahn.544
II.
Levine Staller Objection to Disclosure Statement Approval
Levine Staller argued the Debtors continued to defiantly contest the Firm’s status as a fully
secured creditor in its Objection to the Third Statement on January 13, 2015.545 Levine Staller
again based its objection to the Disclosure Statement on the ground that it failed to provide
adequate information pertaining to the “fully secured claim.”546 Despite the Court’s ruling that the
Charging Lien was in fact secured, and junior only to First Lien claims, TER refused to list it as
such in its filings.547 Finally, Levine Staller argued, the Order perfecting the Charging Lien made
no limitation on the value or allowance of Levine Staller’s claim in the case and, if the debt were
in fact secured, it should be a Class 2 “Other Secured” claim under the Plan.548
The Icahn parties addressed Levine Staller’s Objection by arguing that it failed to object to
the valuation set forth in the previous and current Disclosure Statements—the valuation in which
the First Lien Parties were considered under-secured.549 Therefore, Icahn stated, Levine Staller’s
argument that the Court took into account various valuations presented to it and must have meant
to decide there was sufficient collateral to secure its claim was demonstrably false.550 Not valuation
evidence existed in the record of the case except for that in the Disclosure Statement.551
543
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Supplemental Objection of Levine…to the Debtors Motion for Entry of an Order Approving the Proposed
Disclosure Statement for Debtors’ Third Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization, Docket no. 758, Case no. 1412103, filed January 13, 2015 [hereinafter Levine Staller Third Statement Objection].
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The Third Amended Plan provided that “General Unsecured Claim” means any claim (including, for the
avoidance of doubt, the Levine Staller Claims) (emphasis added).
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Levine Staller Third Statement Objection, supra note 545, at 7.

First Lien Parties’ Reply to Levine Staller, Sklar, Chan & Brown, P.A.’S Supplemental Objections to the
Debtors’ Motion for Approval of…Disclosure Statement at 9, Docket no. 805, Case no. 14-12103, filed January 23,
2015.
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III.
National Retirement Fund’s Objection to Plan Confirmation
The Local 54 employees’ pension account, the National Retirement Fund (“NRF”),
objected to the Plan on March 10, 2015552 and requested the Court provide in the Confirmation
Order that if the CBA Order was reversed after the effective date, NRF’s ballot and release would
be deemed void.553 The NRF argued the Plan’s proposed effective date would likely occur before
approval of the OCC’s CBA Order. The NRF claims were premised on withdrawal liability
incurred by the Debtors as a result of the entry of the CBA Order, and if TER did not withdraw, it
would have no claims related to the rejection of the CBA Agreement or distribution entitlements
therein.554 The NRF stated that a reversal or modification of the CBA Order after the effective date
would force the Reorganized Debtors to continue its contributions to the NRF; alternatively, if the
CBA Order were reversed after the effective date, the NRF’s claims related to TER’s obligation
to the fund would be negated by the Plan’s release provisions.555
The critical component of the proposed agreement was the creditor’s decision to release
the Debtors and Reorganized Debtors from any claims existing on the Plan’s effective date556 The
NRF argued that under the Plan it would be required to provide a broad release to the Released
Parties in order to participate in the Class A Distribution Trust (to which 75% of the aggregate
value of the distribution assets would be allocated). The NRF claimed the predicament subjected
it to a potential “unjust and irrational” outcome if an appellate court were to reverse or vacate the
CBA Order after the effective date.557 “Simply put, NRF [was] merely trying to avoid the whipsaw
effect of both (a) its withdrawal liability claims being negated by a subsequent appellate ruling,
and (b) being prohibited from asserting administrative claims against the Released Parties.”558
IV.
U.S. Trustee’s Objection to Plan Confirmation
The U.S. Trustee argued against certain third-party release and exculpation provisions of
the Plan in an Objection filed March 9, 2015.559 The language at issue in the Plan contemplated
Objection to the Debtors’ Third Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code, Docket no. 1084, Case no. 14-12103, filed March 10, 2015 [hereinafter NRF Objection].
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NRF Objection, supra note 552, at 4.

United States Trustee’s Objection to Confirmation of Debtors’ Third Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization
Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, as Modified, Docket no. 1072, Case no. 14-12103, filed March 9, 2015.
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release by holders of allowed general unsecured claims entitled to vote on the Plan (unless parties
were to opt-out of the release).560 The Trustee claimed the release “did not appear to be voluntary,”
stating “to the extent such parties do not return a ballot [to opt-out], they [had] not consented to a
release, and [could not] be compelled to involuntarily grant a release.” The Trustee argued the
non-debtor release provision was overbroad and the majority of parties seeking to be released had
not provided “critical financial contributions” necessary to enable the Plan’s success. 561 The
exculpation provision of the Plan provided exculpation to the Released Parties and thus was
overbroad (and impermissible) according to the Trustee.562 The Trustee stated the list of parties
receiving exculpation should be limited to those who served as estate fiduciaries.563 This argument,
if accordingly ordered, would effectively allow releases to unsecured creditors while barring
releases to the First Lien Lenders.
V.
Icahn’s Reply to the Trustee and the NRF
The Icahn Parties responded to the NRF and U.S. Trustee’s objections on March 11,
564
2015. The response asked the Court to reject the Trustee’s assertion that releases in the Plan
were impermissibly involuntary because the releases were, in fact, consensual. 565 The response
also challenged the Trustee’s suggestion that nonconsensual releases of the First Lien Lenders, as
third parties, were prohibited because they did not make a “critical financial contribution” to the
case.566 The Icahn Parties argued they had contributed significantly to the case, which provided
the basis for granting them release and exculpation.567
The Icahn Parties addressed the NRF Objection based on its “perceived unfairness
allegedly caused by the Solicitation Procedures Order (“SPO”).” 568 The NRF’s failure to timely
oppose the SPO was “fatal” to the Objection before the Court. The Icahn Parties also argued
against the NRF’s Objection pertaining to the Plaza Bargaining Agreement—the NRF, Icahn
560
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Confirmation of Debtors’ Third Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,
as Modified, Docket no. 1095, Case no. 14-12103, filed March 11, 2015.
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claimed, was not a party to the Plaza CBA Agreement as a result of its admission of “complete
withdrawal with respect of the Plaza.”569
VI.
Trump AC Casino Marks
Trump AC Casino Marks filed a limited objection to the Third Statement on January 12,
570
2015, which, according to Mr. Trump, sought to “impermissibly strip away rights of many
critical parties in favor of one…”571 Trump Marks questioned the extended time-frame during
which the creditors would be “left in limbo” awaiting resolution of the CBA Order 572 and
expressed to the Court several concerns regarding the Disclosure Statement, arguing it:






Wrongly stated that the First Lien Lenders could unilaterally transfer the rights and obligations
under the license agreement.
Failed to address the nature of all administrative and priority claims and whether the debtors
could and would satisfy them.
Failed to identify the Debtors’ significant loss of employees and management personnel and
the impact it will have on operations.
Described a process that ignores the protections of a contract and lease counterparty under
Section 365.573
The Plan sought impermissible third party releases.574
Committee Moves for Standing to Prosecute Claims against Debtors’ Assets

On New Year’s Day, 2015 the Committee took a stab at TER’s cash assets and moved for
an order granting the Committee authority to prosecute claims against the Icahn Parties on behalf
of the Debtors’ estates.575 In order for the Court to grant such standing, the movant must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that: (i) the claims it seeks to bring are colorable, (ii) the benefit
569
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Limited Objection of Trump AC Casino Marks LLC, Donald J. Trump and Ivanka Trump to the Disclosure
Statement for Debtors’ Third Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,
Docket no. 742, Case no. 14-12103, filed January 12, 2015.
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Motion of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for Entry of an Order Granting Leave, Standing, and
Authority to Prosecute Claims on Behalf of the Debtors’ Estates and for Related Relief, Docket no. 826, Case no. 1412103, filed January 1, 2015 [hereinafter OCC Termination Motion].
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of bringing the claim will outweigh the costs, and (iii) the Debtors have unjustifiably refused to
pursue the claims.576
The OCC argued the Debtors’ waiver of claims against the Icahn Parties and their joint
assertion of a “common interest protection”577 entitled the OCC to bring claims against “tens (and
perhaps even hundreds) of millions of dollars that [were] excluded from the First Lien Lenders’
collateral.”578 The Committee further argued certain transactions were preferential or fraudulent
transfers that should have been avoided and recovered for the Committee’s benefit. The Committee
asked the Court to consider the high likelihood of a substantial recovery if allowed to assert the
claims balanced against the possibility of “almost no recovery” if denied.579 The Committee
requested relief under attached Complaint:









A judgment declaring that the Icahn Parties do not have a lien on Cage Cash.580
A judgment avoiding the Icahn Parties’ alleged lien on Cage Cash and preserving such lien for
the benefit of the estate
A judgment declaring net operating losses attributable to any year prior to 2015 and any
increase in the Debtors’ post-petition going concern value excluded from the Icahn Parties’
collateral.581
A judgment declaring the value of the Icahn Parties’ secured claim did not exceed the
liquidation value of the collateral and that any claims exceeding the liquidation value be
reclassified as general unsecured.
A judgment avoiding an amendment to the First Lien Credit Agreement as a preference and/or
as a constructively fraudulent transfer and recovery thereof.
An award of pre- and post-judgment interest, costs and fees, and other relief.

576

Memorandum Order Re Motion of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for Entry of an Order Granting
Leave, Standing, and Authority to Prosecute Claims on Behalf of the Debtors’ Estates and for Related Relief, Docket
no. 943, Case no. 14-12103, filed February 18, 2015 [hereinafter Termination Order].
See OCC Termination Motion, supra note 575, at 2 (“[The Debtors’] common interest protection with the First
Lien Lenders with respect to ‘the Debtors’ strategy and efforts to prosecute and ultimately confirm the plan of
reorganization.”).
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Unknown amount of cash on hand used for gambling operations and payouts.
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Including the rejection of the Local 54 CBA or the termination of the pension fund with NRF.
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Trump Entertainment Resorts582 and the Icahn Parties583 each filed objections to the
Committee’s Motion five weeks later on February 6, 2015. The First Lien Lenders stated the OCC
had not met its burden of showing that the claims it proposed to seek were colorable or that pursuit
of those claims would benefit the estate.584 The Icahn Parties challenged the Committee’s
claims:585









The Secured Parties’ liens on all assets, explicitly including the cage cash, were granted
pursuant to a final non-appealable 2010 Confirmation Order of the prior Bankruptcy Plan.
The 2010 Confirmation Order grant of liens was an in rem order of the Bankruptcy Court and
“binding on the world.”586
The Complaint alleging that the secured parties’ lien on cage cash was voidable as a preference
failed because the Committee did not allege the minimal facts necessary to assert that the
Secured Parties’ position in cage cash improved in the ninety days before the filing. “In fact,
it did not. It actually diminished.”587
The Committee’s theory that the Secured Parties’ collateral should be valued at a liquidation
value as of the petition date was contrary to controlling Third Circuit precedent.
The Committee’s Section 552(b) argument must be rejected because the Secured Parties had
liens on all of the Debtors’ assets including proceeds therefrom. Further, the equities of the
case exception applied to carve our value for unsecured creditors only to the extent that
unencumbered assets are used to enhance the estate’s value.
TER was a general partner of TER Holdings, the obligor under the First Lien Credit
Agreement, and was liable for all of TER Holdings’ unpaid obligations. Since TER was liable
on the debt prior to the amendment of the First Lien Credit Agreement, its change of status
from a guarantor to a co-obligor did not diminish its estate or trigger an avoidable transfer.

Trump Entertainment Resorts argued there were insufficient funds to pay its First Lien
Debt in full,588 and “unfortunately, general unsecured creditors are ‘out-of-the-money’ and not
Debtors’ Objection to Motion of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for Entry of and Order Granting
Leave, Standing, and Authority to Prosecute Claims on Behalf of the Debtors’ Estates and for Related Relief, Docket
no. 874, Case no. 14-12103, filed February 6, 2105 [TER Objection to OCC Claims Motion].
582
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Objection of the Secured Parties to the Motion of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for Entry of and
Order Granting Leave, Standing, and Authority to Commence, Prosecute, and Settle Certain Causes of Action on
Behalf of the Debtors’ Estates, Docket no. 873, Case no. 14-12103, filed February 6, 2105.
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TER Objection to OCC Claims Motion, supra note 582, at 1.
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otherwise entitled to receive a distribution.”589 TER attacked the fact that the Committee’s
Complaint proffered zero quantitative analysis or evidence otherwise demonstrating the impact of
its proposed lien avoidance actions.590 The Company stated the allegations in the OCC Complaint
should be properly addressed at the Confirmation Hearing.591
The Court addressed the Committee’s claims in an Order on February 18, 2015.592 Judge
Gross stated the Termination Motion revealed the complexity of the Committee’s claims and held
the claims were in fact colorable, although the Icahn Parties and TER had raised “weighty defenses
to [them].”593 However, the Court held that the Committee failed to provide evidence as to the
cost-benefit of prosecuting the proposed claims, and, therefore, any finding on the issue would
amount to speculation.594 The Icahn Parties had provided $20 million in DIP financing, $13.5
million in exit financing, permitted their collateral to be used for administrative expenses and cure
claims, were making funds available for the $1 million distribution to the unsecured creditors, and
waived their $100 million deficiency claim. Judge Gross balanced the Icahn Parties’ expenditures,
the interest in preserving three thousand jobs, and the fact that unsecured creditors would receive
a nominal portion of their claims under the Plan—approximately $0.005/$1.00—but deferred the
Motion.595 Judge Gross stated the Court would be in a far better position to evaluate the Motion
when considering whether to confirm the Plan.596
OCC Member Thermal Energy’s Settlement Compromise
On February 20, 2015, Trump Entertainment Resorts filed a motion to reject its service
agreement with Thermal Energy.597 TER entered into agreements with Thermal Energy to service
the Trump Plaza and Taj Mahal in 1996 (the “Thermal Service Agreements”) 598 which were
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Debtors’ Motion for Entry of an Order…Authorizing the Debtors to Reject Certain Energy Service Agreements
with Thermal Energy…, Docket no. 954, Case no. 14-12103, filed February 20, 2015 [hereinafter Thermal Motion].
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extended to 2027 and 2036, respectively.599 The Taj Mahal and Trump Plaza Service Agreements
provided that “title to Thermal Energy’s production facilities600 shall remain with the Debtors,”
and Thermal Energy “shall not remove, alter, or permit any lien to exist” on the production
facilities.601 The parties stipulated proper adequate assurance protections after the Petition Date
that entailed the continued performance of both parties under the Service Agreements. 602 Despite
its post-petition agreement to continue service, TER stated it could adequately supply its own
energy needs through the on-site facilities without the need for Thermal Energy’s service.603 TER
claimed Thermal Energy’s 2014 invoices totaled approximately $16.5 million.604
Without the additional third-party cost TER would save approximately $9 million annually
in energy expenditures.605 TER relied on Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which states that
a debtor-in-possession “subject to the court’s approval, may assume or reject any executory
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor”606 in order to “permit the trustee or debtor-in-possession
to use valuable property of the estate and to ‘renounce title to and abandon burdensome
property.”607 The standard applied to determine whether the rejection of a contract should be
authorized is the “business judgment” standard.608 Under the business judgment standard, once a
debtor states a valid business justification, “the business judgment rule is a presumption that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith
and in the honest belief that the action was in the best interest of the company.” 609 TER argued
under applicable precedent610 that if a debtor’s business judgment has been reasonably exercised,
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Id. at 5-6 (The production facilities provided chilled water and steam necessary for cooling and heating the casinos
and were located on site at the respective casinos. Thermal Energy opted to bypass the Plaza facility and supplied
resources via its “Midtown Thermal Control Center.”).
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Orion Pictures Corp. v. Showtime Networks, Inc., 4 F.3d 1095, 1098 (2d Cir. 1993).
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Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
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the court should approve the rejection of the contract.611 Judge Gross granted the Motion on March
12, 2015, terminating the Thermal Energy Service Agreements and Adequate Assurance
Stipulations.612
On March 31, 2015, the Debtors filed a Motion for approval of a settlement agreement with
Thermal Energy.613 Trump Plaza’s annual capacity costs were reduced by $3 million and rate
escalation rates were capped under the settlement.614 TER proposed to make an immediate
payment of $81,000 to Thermal Energy in satisfaction of claims against title and ownership of the
on-site production facilities.615 TER agreed to continued performance under the Energy Service
Agreements and Adequate Assurance Stipulation through March 31, 2015.616 Judge Gross granted
the Motion on April 21, 2015.617
Thermal Energy Claims Against Trump Entertainment Resorts
Debtor

Initial Claim618

Settlement Outcome

Taj Mahal General Unsecured

$27,496,374

$32,496,374 General Unsecured

Taj Mahal 503(b)(9)

$476,634

$287,500 Admin. Expense

Plaza Associates General Unsecured $16,673,783

$21,673,783 General Unsecured

Plaza Associates 503(b)(9)

$287,500 Admin. Expense

$339,053

Settlement of Levine Staller and Trump Marks Disputes
The Court determined that Levine Staller’s Charging Lien Claim was junior to the liens of
the First Lien Lenders and subsequently approved a settlement agreement between Levine Staller
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Thermal Motion, supra note 597, at 10.

Order…Authorizing the Debtors to Reject Certain Energy Agreements with Thermal Energy, Effective as of the
Rejection Effective Date, Docket no. 1118, Case no. 14-12103, filed March 12, 2015.
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Debtors’ Motion for Entry of an Order…Approving the Release and Settlement Agreement by and Among the
Debtors and Thermal Energy Limited Partnership I, Docket no. 1192, Case no. 14-12103, filed March 31, 2015.
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Id. at 8.
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Order…Approving the Release and Settlement Agreement by and Among the Debtors and Thermal Energy Limited
Partnership I, Docket no. 1252, Case no. 14-12103, filed April 21, 2015.
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Revised amounts in Final Order.
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and TER on March 12, 2015.619 Judge Gross held Levine Staller’s Proofs of Claim associated with
the Charging Lien were to be reduced and reclassified as a single allowed “Other Secured Claim”
in the aggregate amount of $200,000 and a single allowed General Unsecured Claim in the
aggregate amount of $1,437,551.620
Trump Marks, TER, and the Icahn Parties reached a settlement agreement approved by
Judge Gross on March 12, 2015.621 The settlement addressed Mr. Trump’s motion to modify the
automatic stay to terminate the TER Trademark Licensing Agreement (“TLA”), the parties’
dispute over approximately $147,600 regarding Trump Marks’ Ground Lease Claim, and a new
Administrative Claim by Mr. Trump in the amount of $24,578.25.622 The settlement provided that
the Trump Marina and Trump Plaza would no longer constitute qualifying casino properties as of
the Plan’s Effective Date, and all rights and interest in the License granted to TER for the use of
the “Trump” name would become null and void in respect to those properties. 623 TER was
responsible for the labor and expense of removal of all signage that displayed Mr. Trump’s
name.624 Further, Trump Marks was entitled to terminate the Trademark Licensing Agreement for
signage at the Taj Mahal if it were to close.625
Trump Marks consented to the Reorganized Debtors’ assumption of an amended TLA for
their continued use of the Trump name, but held the right to fully terminate the licensing agreement
if the Plan Effective Date did not to occur on or before March 15, 2017.626 The Reorganized
Debtors agreed to pay Mr. Trump $172,216.65 on the Plan Effective Date to fully satisfy the
Ground Lease Claim.627

619

Order, Pursuant to Section 105(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rule 9019, Approving Settlement by
and Among the Debtors and Levine Staller, Docket no. 1120, Case no. 14-12103, filed March 12, 2015 [hereinafter
Levine Settlement Order].
620

Id. at 2.
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Order, Pursuant to Section 105(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rule 9019, Approving Settlement by
and Among the Debtors, the Trump Parties, and the First Lien Parties, Docket no. 1119, Case no. 14-12103, filed
March 12, 2015 [hereinafter Trump Settlement Order].
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Approval of the Plan and Disclosure Statement
Classes 3 and 4 were the only classes entitled to vote on the Plan. As evidenced in the chart
below, Class 3 and the Accepting Class 4 Creditors voted to accept the Plan, although some of
Class 4 voted to reject. Classes 1 and 2 were unimpaired and deemed to have accepted the Plan.
The Remaining classes would not receive distribution under the Plan and were deemed to have
accepted.
Despite the voting classes’ failure to satisfy section 1129(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code,
which requires the affirmative vote of each class of claims, the Court stated the Plan could
nevertheless be confirmed over the non-acceptance of the Rejecting Class 4 Creditors and the
Deemed Rejecting Classes—that is, those classes could be “crammed down.”628 The Impaired
Class 3 and 4 acceptances were sufficient in number and amount to satisfy the section 1129(a)(10)
requirement that at least one Impaired Class must vote to accept. Further, the Final Proposal
satisfied sections 1129(b)(1) and (b)(2) as there were no holders of any interest of the Debtors
junior to any Rejecting Class that would receive property under the Plan, and holders of Claims
against the Debtors that were senior to the Rejecting Classes were to receive distributions valued
less than 100% of their Allowed Claims.629
Final Plan Voting Results630
Debtor Name

All Debtors
TER
TER Holdings
Trump Plaza
Trump Marina
Taj Mahal
628

Id.

629

Id. at 16-17.

Class
Description
Class 3 – First
Lien Creditors
4A – General
Unsecured
4B – General
Unsecured
4C – General
Unsecured
4D – General
Unsecured

# Accept

# Reject
% Reject

Amount
Accepting
%

Amount
Rejecting
%

% Accept
3
100%
28

0
0%
30

$292,257,374
100%
$203,497,458

$0.00
0%
$32,534,000

48.28%
7
50%
20
43.48%
8
66.67%
25

51.72%
7
50%
26
56.52%
4
33.33%
91

86.22%
$198,626,800
86.63%
$198,679,572
89.44%
$198,627,312
90.11%
$199,157,202

13.78%
$30,647,015
13.37%
$23,449,614
10.56%
$21,792,266
9.89%
$25,575,061

630

Class
Voting
Result
ACCEPT
REJECT
REJECT
REJECT
ACCEPT
REJECT

See Lori Butler & John Weil, A Practitioners Guide to Counting Ballots for a Chapter 11 Plan, American
Bankruptcy Institute (Jan. 1997) (stating that unimpaired classes are conclusively presumed to have accepted the
Chapter 11 Plan. If a plan provides that any class will not receive or retain any property under the plan, that class is
deemed to have rejected the plan. In order to accept the plan, the allowed voting classes must vote in one-half in
number and two-thirds in amount), http://perma.cc/38TP-6VCE.
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Trump
Development
TER
Development
TERH LP

4E – General
Unsecured
4F – General
Unsecured
4G – General
Unsecured
4H – General
Unsecured

21.55%

78.45%

88.62%

11.38%

7
77.78%
7
77.78%
6
75%

2
22.22%
2
22.22%
2
25%

$198,626,800
90.08%
$198,626, 800
90.08%
$196,739,532
90%

$21,866,295
9.92%
$21,866,295
9.92%
$21,866,295
10%

ACCEPT
ACCEPT
ACCEPT

4.8 Plan Confirmation Order; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
General Entitlements and Obligations
Judge Gross confirmed the Final Plan on March 12, 2015 after all confirmation objections
were “fully and fairly” litigated in satisfaction of the Bankruptcy Code.631 The Court granted TER
releases from holders of Unsecured Claims that failed to exercise Opt-Out Elections, discharged
all third-party claims and injunctions against TER and its assets, approved satisfaction of all DIP
Claims immediately in cash, and approved the New First Lien.632
Trump Entertainment Resorts convinced Judge Gross it would not be forced to liquidate
post-confirmation,633 and the Court found the Debtors’ current liquidity sufficient to meet its
obligations arising under the Plan based on TER’s Financial Projections—the Court stated TER’s
Financial Projections and evidence in support thereof were “uncontroverted and persuasive,” and
satisfied standard of U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11).634 Interestingly, though, Judge Gross determined the
Debtors’ enterprise value was insufficient to support a distribution to holders of General Unsecured
Claims under absolute priority principles.635 Judge Gross explicitly rejected the OCC’s argument
that the principle purpose of the Plan was avoidance of taxes for the benefit of the Icahn Parties.636
The Plan Order stated the Final Proposal satisfied the Best Interests of Creditors Test under
section 1129(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code.637 According to the court, the Liquidation Analysis
631

Plan Order, supra note 530.

632

Id. at 25-29.

633

Id. at 15.

634

Id. at 15-16.

635

Id. at 19.

636

Id. at 17.

637

Plan Order, supra note 530, at 14.
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and other evidence adduced in connection with the Confirmation Hearing in support of the Final
Plan was “persuasive and credible,” had not been controverted by other evidence, and established
that each claim holder had either accepted the Plan or would receive an amount “not less than the
amount that it would receive if the Debtors were liquidated under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code.638
The Court allowed TER to enter into proposed Severance Benefit Plans for up to nine
executives not to exceed an aggregate amount of $2,634,000.639 Judge Gross stated that any
diminution in a particular executive’s authority or responsibilities directly resulting from the
closure of the Taj Mahal or Plaza did not constitute a “good reason” to reduce severance
compensation under TER’s Executive Severance Plan so long as the reduced authority was
consistent with the executive’s job title.640 In addition to permitting executive severance
disbursements, Judge Gross terminated the Trump Plaza Collective Bargaining and other
Employment Agreements, allowed TER to reject its Compensation and Benefit Programs,641 and
granted TER the right to vacate the Plan Confirmation Order upon any modification or reversal of
the CBA Order,642 stating “Without the CBA Order…the Plan would not be able to be
consummated.”643
The Distribution Trust and Professional Fee Escrow Account
The Distribution Trust Agreement was supplemented to the Plan on March 11, 2015 and
set forth terms for satisfaction of the Unsecured Creditors’ Claims.644 The Distribution Trust was
funded by cash on hand in the amount of $3.5 million in addition to avoidance actions.645
Avoidance actions totaled approximately 23 for those cases with potential transfers greater than

638

Id.

639

Id. at 41.

640

Id.

641

Id. at 41-42.

642

Plan Order, supra note 530, at 52.
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Id. at 60.

Notice of Filing of Modified Exhibits 6 and 8 to Plan Supplement for Debtors’ Third Chapter 11 Joint Plan of
Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, Docket no. 1097, Case no. 14-12103, filed March 11,
2015 [hereinafter Plan Supplement].
644

645

Plan Order, supra note 530, at 76.
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$75,000646 and approximately 53 for cases less than $75,000 in November of 2016.647 The Plan’s
Distribution Trust Provisions were approved in the Plan Order and attorney Nathan Schultz was
appointed as the Distribution Trustee.648 A Distribution Trust Advisory Board was established with
the National Retirement Fund and UNITE HERE Local 54 as its sole members.649 TER and the
holders of General Unsecured Claims were to establish and execute the Distribution Trust
Agreement, and all costs and expenses of the Distribution Trust were paid from the Trust itself.650
Judge Gross ordered the Debtors to fund a Professional Fee Escrow Account with cash
equal to the lesser of the estimated professional fees and the amounts noted on the Fee Schedule.651
The Fee Account was maintained by TER’s counsel, Young, Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP.652
Any cash remaining in the Fee Account after all Professional Fee Claims were satisfied would
revert to the Reorganized Debtors.653 The Court ordered any unpaid Fee Claims due to insufficient
Fee Account funds to be held in reserve and satisfied in cash by the Reorganized Debtors
immediately upon entry of the Court’s Order of Approval of such Allowed Fee Claims.654 Judge
Gross approved Trump Entertainment Resorts’ submission of its final application for Professional
Fee and Expenses on April 28, 2016 in the approximate amount of $14,264,653.655 The Court
ordered TER to pay all reasonable pre and post-petition expenses and fees of the First Lien Lenders
in connection with the Chapter 11 proceedings in addition to its own Allowed Professional Fees.656

Order Establishing Streamlined Procedures Governing Adversary Proceedings…, Docket no. 2187, Case no. 1412103, filed November 18, 2016.
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Order Establishing Streamlined Procedures Governing Adversary Proceedings…, Docket no. 2186, Case no. 1412103, filed November 18, 2016.
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Id. at 35.
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Plan Order, supra note 530, at 35.
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Order Approving Final Fee Applications of the Debtors’ Professionals, Docket no. 2003, Case no. 14-12103,
filed May 28, 2016.
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656

Plan Order, supra note 530, at 49.
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TER Final Professional Fees Application
Professional
Fees
Expenses
Ernst & Young LLP
$1,094,580.95
$14,023.55
Auditors and Tax Advisors
Houlihan Lokey Capital, Inc.
$1,200,000.00
$19,357.25
Financial Advisor and Investment Banker
Merlin Law Group, P.A.
$0.00
$1,836.81
Insurance Litigation Counsel
Levine, Staller, Sklar, Chan & Brown, P.A.
$7,335.00
$0.00
Real Estate Tax Appellate Counsel
Prime Clerk LLC
$57,397.38
$71.28
Administrative Advisor
Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP
$202,865.00
$2,739.33
Appellate Counsel
Sills Cummis & Gross P.C.
$344,237.00657
$225.26
Counsel and Government Regulatory Services Provider
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP
$9,199,571.50658 $136,817.82
Debtor Co-Counsel
Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP
$1,904,238.50
$79,362.55
Debtor Co-Counsel
Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases
The Court deemed all executory contracts and unexpired leases rejected as of the Effective
Date. Although, each assumed contract or lease vested in the appropriate Subsidiary Debtor and
was recognized as fully enforceable after the Effective Date. Judge Gross ordered all Claims
arising from the rejection of executory contracts and unexpired leases to be treated as General
Unsecured Claims, and “all such Claims [were] discharged and unenforceable against the
Debtors.”660 All monetary defaults arising under assumed contracts and leases were ordered to be
satisfied by payment of the appropriate cure amounts documented on the “Cure Schedule,”661 and
659

657

Amount reflects a voluntary reduction of $40,000.00 pursuant to discussions with the First Lien Parties.

658

Amount reflects a voluntary reduction of $100,000.00 pursuant to discussions with the First Lien Parties.
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all non-debtor counterparties to the assumed contracts and leases were barred from disputing the
Cure Amounts.662

Debtor
TER Holdings
TER Holdings
TER Holdings
TER Holdings
Taj Mahal
Taj Mahal
Taj Mahal
Taj Mahal
Taj Mahal
TER, Inc.
Total

5

Cure Schedule and Amounts Summary
Counterparty663
Cure Amount
Philadelphia Coca Cola
$65,358
Ecolab Inc.
$14,137
Waste Management of NJ
$108,534
Low-value Miscellaneous
$25,562
AC Linen Supply
$316,228
Bally Gaming
$252,023
Otis Elevator Co.
$215,332
WMS Gaming Corp.
$184,361
Low-value Miscellaneous
$223,673
Low-value Miscellaneous
$51,273
$1,456,481

The Aftermath: Casino Employees Lose, Industry Moves Forward

Judge Gross stated the Plan represented a “Global Settlement” between Trump
Entertainment Resorts, the Icahn Parties, and the Creditors’ Committee.664 The Chapter 11
settlement left Mr. Icahn with the skeleton of a once-thriving casino group and prepetition
executives with relatively modest severance packages. Tropicana Entertainment Inc., a subsidiary
of Icahn Enterprises LP, managed the Taj Mahal following the reorganization.665 The Unsecured
Class was granted $3.5 million666 to be divided amongst the unsecured parties’ $230 million claims
in addition to money from preference suits overseen by Distribution Trustee Mr. Shultz. The
lawsuits filed by Mr. Shultz ranged from $7,000 to over $2 million—Aetna Life Insurance, Marsh
USA Inc., Sysco Philadelphia LLC, and South New Jersey Federal Credit Union, asserted claims
between $1 million and $2 million and were each challenged by the Distribution Trustee.667 TER
662

Id.

663

Multiple contracts condensed.
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Plan Order, supra note 530, at 24.

Bill Wichert, Atlantic City’s Trump Taj Mahal To Close Amid Strike, Law360.com (Aug. 3, 2016),
http://perma.cc/Q5NA-2FPH.
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Matt Chiappardi, Trump Entertainment Launches $14M Clawback Campaign, Law360.com (Sep. 7, 2016),
http://perma.cc/49X3-AJQP.
667

Id.
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documented approximately $4 million in cash balances and $106.8 million in total assets in a final
Post-Confirmation Report for Q4 2016.668
The Local 54 was forced to accept significant changes to its Collective Bargaining
Agreement, and the National Retirement Fund was left completely in the cold as the Reorganized
Debtors shifted millions in retirement funds to private banks. Both parties disputed the new
agreement’s impact on the employees, but the Local 54 and NRF positions would soon be
irrelevant following the Taj Mahal’s closure in 2017.
Taj Mahal management rejected a final effort, post-bankruptcy proposal from the Local 54
to end the dispute with a price tag of approximately $1.3 million above the terms of the Debtors’
reorganization offer.669 In September 2016, the Taj Mahal announced its pending closure following
a strike by the Local 54.670 Tropicana Entertainment released a statement claiming Icahn
Enterprises had “lost almost $100 million671 trying to save the Taj” and “now with [the] strike,
[they saw] no path to profitability.”672 Tropicana’s CEO Tony Rodio noted the company’s
fiduciary duties to its shareholders and stated the Local 54 had “single handedly blocked any path
to profitability,” and “[e]ven if the union accepted what [the Reorganized Debtors] previously
offered… [the company] would still be losing significant amounts each month, but at least there
would be hope.”673 Following the three-month Local 54 strike, Mr. Icahn stated the Taj Mahal
would require a $100 million to $200 million capital investment and decided to “sell the facility
as a loss, if possible.”674 Icahn was presumably (and reasonably) reeling from his exchange of a
$350 million lien for the doomed casino chain.
Local 54 President Bob McDevitt criticized Carl Icahn stating he was “a playground bully,
who picks up his ball and announce[d] he [was] going home because nobody else would do it his
way,” and that “the great deal-maker would rather burn Trump Taj Mahal down just so he [could]

668

Post Confirmation Quarterly Operating Report, Docket no. 2205, Case no. 14-12103, filed January 30, 2017.

Daniel Siegal, Icahn’s Taj Mahal Rebuffs Union’s Last Bid to Save Casino, Law360.com (Aug. 30, 2016),
http://perma.cc/B5UN-B3U5.
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Mr. Icahn later claimed he had lost approximately $300 million on Trump Entertainment Resorts beginning with
the First Lien Agreement. See The Associated Press, Atlantic City mayor urges Icahn to sell Trump Taj Mahal
casino building (Jan. 5, 2017), http://perma.cc/AQZ8-8PE6.
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Jeannie O’Sullivan, Christie Vetoes Bill To Strip Icahn Of Casino License, Law360.com (Feb. 6, 2017),
http://perma.cc/6QS9-ZANW.
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control the ashes.”675 For a few million bucks, Mr. McDevitt said, Mr. Icahn could have had peace
with the Union but, instead, he will “have to live with what he’s done to working people in Atlantic
City.”676 Following the Taj closure announcement, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie vetoed
legislation that would strip Carl Icahn of his license to operate the Trump Taj Mahal—a
government effort to protect union jobs in the City.677 Senate President Steven Sweeney called the
veto “flat-out wrong” stating it would “allow Icahn to exploit and manipulate bankruptcy laws and
casino licensing regulations in ways that would enrich himself at the expense of regular casino
workers and the families who depend on them.”678 The casino’s closure on October 10, 2016 left
approximately 3,000 unemployed.679
Atlantic City faced its own financial burden following the downturn in gambling revenue
and unsuccessful tax appeals; troubles likely attributed, at least in part, to Trump Entertainment
Resorts. The shutdown of Trump Taj Mahal, the fifth casino closure in two years, reduced the
number of Atlantic City gaming establishments to seven. The State of New Jersey approved a
bailout package for the City in May 2016,680 which resulted in reduction of the municipality’s bond
rating.681 The Mayor of Atlantic City, Don Guardian, vowed the City would continue to move
forward during such challenging times. “Atlantic City has been resilient for over 160 years and we
will continue to do so, as we rise to meet any challenge ahead of us.”682
Today all that remains of Trump Entertainment Resorts is the former Trump Marina, now
a Golden Nugget casino owned by Landry’s Inc. The Trump Taj Mahal and Trump Plaza are empty
and abandoned, although a group of investors led by Hard Rock International Inc. purchased the
Trump Taj Mahal in February 2017683 with plans to reopen the casino under its name in the spring
of 2018.684 A purchase price has yet to be released, but Hard Rock CEO James Allen stated the
675
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purchase and extensive renovations together totaled approximately $300 million.685 As of February
2017, Nathan Shultz has asked the Court for an extension to the claim objection deadline and
additional time to administer the avoidance actions to decide whether objections to remaining
general unsecured claims are appropriate.686 Mr. Shultz claimed to have expunged or resolved $1.7
billion of approximately $1.9 billion in general unsecured claims at that time.687

685
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